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Preface 
On 9 May 1950 the declaration by Robert Schuman began the process of integrating the 
countries of Western Europe into a European Community. 
This work, published under the auspices of the Commission, aims to survey the develop­
ment of the Community legal order during the 30 years from that beginning to 31 Decem­
ber 1980. The principal features of this legal order—the basic structure of the Community 
and the lines along which its activities have developed—are placed in historical perspective 
by examining their origins and gradual implementation through the Treaties, secondary 
legislation and judicial pronouncements. 
A temporal perspective is essential to a full understanding of any phenomenon : this is 
particularly true of European integration, which was conceived from the outset as a process 
of modular construction, concentrating initially on a limited field and intended to expand 
into full political union. Robert Schuman stated: 'Europe will not be made all at once, or 
according to a single, general plan. It will be built through concrete achievements, which 
first create a de facto solidarity. ' He went on to say that pooling the means of production 
of coal and steel as he proposed would constitute the first concrete foundation of the 
European Federation. 
Later on, the EEC Treaty set out a general economic framework for the Community and, 
by vesting broad discretion in the institutions regarding the decisions required for this 
purpose (consider, for example, the Community's power under Articles 43, 113 and 235), 
opened the way for a process of development which was regarded as no more than the 
straightforward implementation of the Treaty, for which the institutions were responsible. 
But, of course, the Member States were no less able to make other agreements going 
beyond the limits of this edifice in order, as the preamble to the EEC Treaty put it, to 
create an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe and to call upon the other peoples 
of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts. 
It is only in retrospect that some Community achievements can be seen as decisive steps 
forward on the road to integration and the inevitable obstacles and set­backs assessed in 
their proper light. 
The historical perspective shows how the main legislative acts and principal judgments of 
the Court of Justice have strengthened Community law. It also shows that progress 
continued even at times when the European idea was not at the forefront of the political 
stage. 
·■ * 
* * 
III 
Thirty years of Community law has been written by a group of academic lawyers from the 
various Member States. They have endeavoured to adopt the simplest and most straight-
forward style so that their work may be accessible to the general public as well as to 
specialists. 
This work is designed to fill the vacuum left by the general surveys of Community law 
written for other purposes. 
— The digests of judgments of the Court which appear from time to time in specialist 
journals and the chapter on Community law in the General Report issued each year by 
the Commission (which also appears separately as an offprint) review the most import-
ant acts of the Community institutions shortly after the event. Their time-scale, how-
ever, is too short for them to consider the general trend of developments in European 
law. 
— A number of authors have produced remarkable studies of the judgments of the Court 
over a number of years. This work, however, also covers acts by other Community 
institutions and some particularly important national legislation and rulings. 
— The great commentaries of the Treaties, whether article by article or systematic, are 
synchronic in character, in the sense that they state the law as at the time of writing as 
if it had always been so and would remain unchanged. As we have seen, however, a 
diachronic view—one which sees developments as a continuum—is essential to a proper 
understanding of European construction as progressive and forward-looking. 
* * * 
Given the number of topics to be considered and the range they cover, each chapter of this 
book was contributed by a specialist, generally in public law or economic law. An Editorial 
Committee was set up to ensure consistency, and its first task was to prepare a structure 
plan to which the contributors—academic lawyers of different nationalities, backgrounds 
and schools of thought—were asked to adhere. The Committee then provided them with 
the information they required and coordinated their work so as to keep contradictions, 
repetitions and gaps to the minimum. It also prepared some additional material itself. 
The contributors willingly accepted the restrictions of subject-matter and presentation 
which were imposed upon them. No restrictions, on the other hand, were imposed on their 
freedom of thought. Their views are not necessarily those of the Commission—unorthodox 
views are advanced and the Community institutions are criticized. 
I believe that an editor should refrain from any form of censorship and that the reader 
gains from being offered a variety of opinions. The honest presentation of a debate ranging 
over a number of questions is preferable to enforced unanimity. Taken as a whole, then, 
this book reflects the complexity of the European edifice as seen by legal experts in the 
Community. 
IV 
However, the conclusion which may be drawn is encouraging. There have been more steps 
forwards than backwards; the contributors to this book do not shrink from drawing atten-
tion to the difficulties encountered on the road towards integration and the mistakes made, 
but they nevertheless recognize that there were good grounds for most of the solutions 
adopted and that the European enterprise is in good heart. 
Gaston Thorn 
President of the Commission 
of the European Communities 
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Introduction 
bv Giancarlo Olmi 
I - The ECSC, the first 
European federal structure 
/. On 9 May 1950 in the Salon de l'Horloge at the Quai d'Orsay, Robert Schuman, the 
French Foreign Minister, made a declaration to which Jean Monnet had contributed in a 
decisive fashion. The importance of this declaration lay not only in the fact that it pro-
posed pooling the coal and steel resources of France and Germany in an organization 
open to all European countries, but also in the declaration of aims and methods which 
have remained the basis for the construction of a united Europe. ' The aim was to create 
a stable basis for peace in Europe and prepare for a European federation. The strategy 
was to create real solidarity among Europeans through practical achievements, beginning 
with economic unification and the establishment of common institutions and rules. 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands accepted these prin-
ciples, but the United Kingdom felt unable to undertake to submit to a supranational 
authority. Hence Europe began as a Community of Six. 
On 18 April 1951 the Six signed the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), whose task was to create in this sector a common market without 
barriers to trade and without distortion of competition so that economic activity would 
develop in a healthy environment. 
The Treaty was inspired by a free-market philosophy but the Community authorities 
were given the power to intervene in times of crisis. 
The ECSC Treaty gave the Community a real executive, the supranational High Author-
ity, which had wide regulatory and administrative powers not just over the Member 
States but also over individual firms. 
This High Authority consisted of nine independent personalities appointed by the gov-
ernments of the six Member States. It was answerable to an Assembly which alone had 
the right to dismiss it by motion of censure, but which had no powers other than political 
control. 
The High Authority was expected to work independently, but for its most important acts 
it had to consult a Council of Ministers composed of representatives of the governments 
E. Noël. The European Community : How it works. European Perspectives 1979. p. 75. 
of the Member States, whose assent was required for some acts. Judicial control over the 
High Authority was exercised by a Court of Justice, modelied on the French Conseil 
d'État, in its judicial function, which could hear cases brought by a Member State or. 
more often, a firm which considered that its rights had been infringed. The Court could 
declare the acts of the High Authority void if the Authority exceeded or abused its 
powers or violated a rule of law. The Community was provided with an own resource—a 
'levy' payable by coal and steel firms in proportion to their turnover. 
This, then, was the launching pad from which governments hoped to bring Europe to a 
form of political unification. In 1953 a Treaty establishing a European Defence Commu-
nity (EDC) was signed: this was a European solution to the problem of German rearma-
ment. After it had been ratified in the other five countries, it was rejected by the French 
National Assembly on 31 August 1954. A planned Political Community proposed by the 
European Assembly also had to be dropped. 
II — The EEC, an economic community 
with an all-encompassing role 
2. The internal logic of what had begun in 1950 inevitably meant that economic inte-
gration should go beyond the ECSC to embrace the whole economy. 
On 25 March 1957, ministers of the Six met in Rome to sign two Treaties: 
(i) the first established a European Economic Community (EEC), the aim of which was 
that common economic policies would be applied over a large area, thus permitting 
continued expansion, greater stability and faster growth in living standards: 
(ii) the second brought into being the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), 
whose task was to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Europe, 
From the beginning, the first of these Treaties was the more successful and became the 
driving force behind European integration. 
It has been said that this Treaty is less 'supranational' than the ECSC Treaty. The term 
'High Authority' for its executive was replaced by 'Commission' and the independent 
decision-making powers enjoyed by this body were far narrower than those enjoyed by 
the 'intergovernmental' body, the Council. There is. however, a good reason for all this. 
The ECSC Treaty is a treaty-law (traité-règles) laying down detailed rules for all situ-
ations—hence its implementation could be entrusted to an executive composed of inde-
pendent people of standing, with an intergovernmental institution exercising control only 
over its most important acts. For the same reason, the Assembly needed to act only in a 
supervisory capacity. The EEC Treaty, on the other hand, is an outline treaty (traité-
cadre) covering a very wide area and laying down little more than a set of broad prin-
ciples, on the basis of which the institutions have to enact from time to time the legis-
lation which proves necessary. 
At the stage which European integration had then reached, the legislative function clearly 
had to be performed by the Council, since this body represented the Member States (and. 
contrary to the opinion of some, it possesses undoubted legitimacy in that it reflects 
majorities in national parliaments). But three factors helped to redress the balance in 
favour of supranationality: 
(a) the rule of qualified majority voting (requiring about two-thirds of the votes, weighted 
in accordance with Article 148); 
(b) the role of the Assembly, which is not merely supervisory, since it is required to give 
its opinion on all important legislation; it very quickly decided to call itself the 
'European Parliament'; 
(c) the Commission's power to prepare, draft and defend legislative proposals of its own 
choice for consideration by the Council (at all of whose meetings it is represented). 
Besides its power to propose legislation, the Commission also has certain decision-
making powers concerning the implementation of the Treaty, which confers on it some 
powers of independent action, notably as regards applying the competition rules, moni-
toring the activities of the Member States, administering safeguard clauses and imple-
menting the budget. In addition, Article 155 gives it the right to implement rules laid 
down by the Council. These responsibilities and its subjection to political review by the 
Assembly give the Commission the characteristics of an executive. 
The Court of Justice retains its role as a 'Conseil d'État' as regards the Commission's 
administrative acts, which may be challenged by those to whom they are addressed (in-
cluding individuals) on the grounds of lack of competence, misuse of powers or infringe-
ment of any rule of law. Since the Community now has legislative jurisdiction in relation 
to matters which are still also the responsibility of the Member States, the Court has also 
acquired the features of a constitutional court. The Member States can challenge Com-
munity legislation before the Court and, conversely, the Commission can ask the Court 
to find that the legislation of a Member State infringes the Treaty. Individuals have no 
right of direct access to the Court in respect of Community or national legislation but 
national courts hearing a case brought by an individual can (and, in some cases, must) 
refer the matter to the Court of Justice so that it can either declare a Community act 
invalid or interpret Community law (usually so that the national court can find that an 
act of a Member State infringes the Treaty). 
The jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to give preliminary rulings in this way is similar 
to that of the constitutional courts in Germany and Italy. 
Ill — The merger of the executives and 
the search for unity 
3. By the Merger Treaty of 1965 the three Communities, which already consisted of the 
same Member States and had two institutions (Parliament and the Court) in common, 
were given a single Council and Commission and a unified budget (with the exception of 
the operating revenue and expenditure of the ECSC). 
Since then the division into three Communities has been something of a legal fiction. The 
legal personality of each has, of course, remained distinct (with little effect in practice), 
but the Community has a single legal order. For the man in the street, there is now just 
one body, the European Community, on behalf of which our statesmen deliver their 
speeches in New York, Helsinki or Tokyo. The European Parliament and the Council 
decided that the designation 'European Community' would be used in official documents 
(but not in legislation) wherever this was both possible and appropriate.2 
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IV — The momentum of the EEC and 
the obstacles which it has encountered 
4. During the transitional period, which had originally been set at 12 years, the EEC 
successfully carried out the following priority tasks: 
(a) creation of a common market in all sectors of the economy, which meant establishing 
the four freedoms (free movement of goods, persons, services and capital) within the 
Community, imposition of the competition rules on the Member States (supervision 
of aid from public funds) and in particular on firms (fight against restrictive practices 
and the abuse of dominant positions) and the establishment of a common external 
customs tariff; 
(b) implementation of a number of common policies, in particular as part of a common 
agricultural policy aimed at protecting producers from the unstable markets and 
prices that typify this sector of the economy, and a common commercial policy in 
relation to non-member countries. 
The Community has never considered its role to be purely economic, and the spirit 
underlying its actions has not been a mercantilist one. Of the four freedoms, the free 
movement of workers has been treated as a priority; indeed it has been interpreted in a 
broad sense, for example, by prohibiting arbitrary measures of expulsion without appeal 
or on the basis of considerations other than the worker's own conduct. In developing the 
common agricultural policy, the Community has paid particular attention to the less 
prosperous regions and types of farming. It has had regard to environmental require-
ments and the quality of life, for example by assisting mountain regions threatened with 
depopulation. Its trading policy has never neglected the interests of exporters in non-
member countries. Furthermore, this has been accompanied by a development policy 
designed to assist many of the emergent non-member countries and those less prosperous 
than the European nations (for example the African. Caribbean and Pacific States and the 
countries of the Maghreb and Mashreq). 
The rapid advances of the European economy in the early 1960s led the Six to establish 
the common market at a faster rate than the rather cautious one laid down by the authors 
of the Treaty. There was a particularly strong feeling of triumph in the case of agriculture 
which, at the beginning of 1962 and following some historic 'marathon' Council meet-
ings, succeeded in overcoming enormous technical and political difficulties, especially 
those arising from the gap between the relatively low prices of Dutch and French produce 
and the relatively high prices in Germany and Italy. Then, in December 1964. the Coun-
cil decided to adopt a plan for the rapid establishment of a single market, without inter-
nal barriers, for cereals and other agricultural products. 
In view of this success, which paved the way for the early introduction of a common 
market for all agricultural and industrial products, the Commission concluded that time 
had come to propose: 
(a) that the Community should finance all expenditure under the common agricultural 
policy, since the Community now fixed prices and other support mechanisms and the 
Community was responsible for surpluses and for the expenditure incurred in elim-
inating them either internally (through market intervention) or externally (by the 
payment of export refunds): 
(b) a reform of the Community's financial arrangements which would replace contribu-
tions from the Member States by 'own resources' in the form of customs duties and 
agricultural import levies. These were regarded as constituting Community revenue in 
the same way that customs duties had constituted the first financial resources of the 
fledgling federal nations of the United States and Germany; 
(c) a strengthening of the powers of the European Parliament: now that own resources 
were replacing the national contributions formerly entered annually in the national 
budgets of each Member State, this body had to be associated with the Council in 
adopting the budget so as to maintain democratic control over revenue and expendi-
ture, which, henceforward, escaped scrutiny by the national parliaments. 
5. The Community fell a victim to its own success. These proposals were totally logical 
and appeared to be the natural consequence of the establishment of a single market for 
agricultural and industrial products. The strengthening of Community institutions in-
volved was not, however, acceptable to all the Member States. On 30 June 1965 France, 
invoking the reluctance of some of its partners to transfer full responsibility for financing 
the common agricultural policy to the Community, noted that discussions were dead-
locked and for seven months refused to take its seat in the Council, which was thereby 
prevented from taking any decisions other than those concerned purely with day-to-day 
management of current policies. 
This crisis was resolved in January 1966 by the 'Luxembourg compromise'. France had 
challenged certain 'supranational' aspects of the Community, especially majority voting 
on matters held to affect the vital national interests of a Member State. The other coun-
tries met France's objections by accepting that every possible effort should be made to 
reach a unanimous decision. The Luxembourg communiqué noted that agreement had 
not been reached on what should happen if these efforts were unsuccessful; in such cases 
France was alone in rejecting majority voting. 
This 'agreement to disagree' was, however, enough to put an end to the dispute. And, in 
practice, unanimity became the rule for all but budgetary decisions and a small number 
of other exceptions. 
But these hurdles did not halt the Community's progress. Gradually, all the Commis-
sion's plans, which had caused so many difficulties, were accepted. 
On 1 July 1968 the customs union for industrial products was completed and free move-
ment of most agricultural products introduced. 
Community financing of the common agricultural policy was largely achieved in 1967 
and completed in 1970. 
In that year too, it was decided that, in addition to customs duties and agricultural levies, 
value-added tax at an as yet unspecified rate should also become a Community own 
resource. 
At the same time the Treaties were amended to strengthen the budgetary powers of the 
European Parliament. The Commission's proposals had been ahead of their time. 
V — Political cooperation 
6. These positive developments culminated in the Summit Conference of Heads of 
State or Government held at The Hague on 1 and 2 December 1969 which, by settling 
these problems and accepting the principle of admitting the United Kingdom to the 
Community, put an end to a war of religion, so to speak, between the Member States. 
One of the key decisions of this meeting was the instruction to Foreign Ministers 'to 
study the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political unification, with a view 
to enlargement'. The result was the first report of the Foreign Ministers, adopted in 
Luxembourg on 27 October 1970. In it, the governments undertook to cooperate in the 
field of foreign policy by consulting regularly, harmonizing views, concerting attitudes 
and, where possible, undertaking joint action. Meetings were to be held for these pur-
poses at three levels—heads of political departments (Political Committee), Foreign 
Ministers (twice a year) and, in exceptional circumstances. Heads of State or Govern-
ment. The Paris Summit in October 1972 decided that the Foreign Ministers should 
henceforth meet four times a year and a second report, adopted in Copenhagen on 21 
October 1973, put the final touches to the system. 
This decision was a turning point in the development of the Community. The initial idea, 
shared by Jean Monnet and the other founding fathers, had been that the Community 
would always develop on the basis of a 'community' institutional structure of which the 
ECSC was the first stage. This was the background to plans for the EDC and later, and 
more successfully, the EEC and Euratom. France was opposed to this plan and proposed 
a political union of an intergovernmental kind. The other Member States could not 
accept the French proposal and feared that a political superstructure of this type would 
eventually overwhelm the original structure of the Community. 
The decision taken was a compromise between the two positions in that cooperation on 
foreign policy matters was to take place outside the Community institutions, albeit with-
out affecting their responsibilities. The immediate result was the total isolation of poli-
tical cooperation from the activities of the Community. Political cooperation meetings 
were prepared by the Foreign Minister of the Member State acting as President of the 
Council and not by the Council Secretariat, and they were held in the capital of that 
Member State, not in Brussels. The Commission was only invited to these meetings 'if 
the activities of the European Communities are affected by the work of the Ministers'. 
Since that time, the rigid distinction has to some extent been broken down. Political 
cooperation meetings are held in Brussels if the Foreign Ministers are there for a Council 
meeting, and the Commission is almost always present. The European Parliament is 
briefed on political cooperation more frequently, and has been given a less passive part to 
play, than originally intended. In particular it can put questions to the Foreign Ministers 
meeting within the framework of political cooperation. 
Political cooperation has grown continuously; it has allowed the Nine to reach a common 
view on important issues (the Middle East, Afghanistan, Iran, etc.) and enabled them to 
speak with one voice, so increasing their authority on the international stage. 
VI — The first enlargement 
7. After France had twice vetoed the accession of the United Kingdom to the Commu-
nity (in 1961 and 1967), it changed its attitude and agreed that the entry of new countries 
was possible provided that the Community first achieved the main objectives which the 
Treaty laid down for the transitional period and felt itself strong enough. This was the 
famous formula of 'completion, reinforcement, enlargement'. Completion was consi-
dered to have been achieved by the establishment of the common market and the com-
mon agricultural policy and reinforcement by the decision of the Heads of State or Gov-
ernment meeting at The Hague on 1 and 2 December 1969 to make progress towards 
economic and monetary union and political unification. 
Thus, at the same Hague Summit the Community agreed to open negotiations in the 
middle of 1970 on the accession of the United Kingdom and the other applicant coun-
tries (Denmark, Ireland and Norway). These began on 30 June and the Treaty of Acces-
sion was signed on 22 January 1972. 
The principles underlying this first enlargement were as follows: 
(a) Acceding to a treaty and entering an existing Community is quite a different thing 
from negotiating a new treaty and founding a new Community. The new member 
must accept the Treaty without amendment and join the Community, which is a 
living entity, at the stage of development which it has reached. The President of the 
Commission, Walter Hallstein, used the following simile to convey this idea: acces-
sion is like the embarkation of new passengers on a liner—the ship has started its 
journey and can neither return to its point of departure nor change its route. Hence 
the Community required applicants to accept the acquis communautaire, that is the 
Treaties and their policy aims, all the decisions taken since the Treaties came into 
force and the options already selected. 
(b) Naturally the Treaties required a degree of'adaptation' to enable the new members to 
take their places in the institutions. The number of seats in Parliament had to be 
determined, votes in the Council had to be weighted afresh and the number of Mem-
bers of the Commission and of the Court of Justice had to be increased. The nego-
tiators kept these changes to what was strictly necessary, although the Accession 
Treaties could have been used to go further to ensure the smooth functioning of the 
institutions. 
(c) Any change requires transitional arrangements. Accession involved changes both for 
the new members, who had to integrate themselves into a new legal order, and for the 
founder members, who had to accept their new partners. The applicant countries 
accepted a short transitional period (five years), which was to be the same for all of 
them and for all sectors of the economy. 
All the Member States ratified the Treaty of Accession during 1972. In May, 83% of Irish 
voters said 'yes', in September, 63.5% of Danish voters did likewise and in October the 
House of Commons passed the European Communities Act by a large majority. But in 
September a bare majority of Norwegians (53%) said 'no', so there were nine Member 
States instead of ten. 
VII — Economic and monetary union 
is launched 
8. Shortly before the Treaty of Accession came into force, the Heads of State or Gov-
ernment of the enlarged Community met in Paris on 19 and 20 October 1972. They 
declared that, at the moment when enlargement was about to become a reality, 'the time 
has come for Europe to recognize clearly the unity of its interests, the extent of its 
capacities and the magnitude of its duties; Europe must be able to make its voice heard 
in world affairs, and to make an original contribution commensurate with its human, 
intellectual and material resources'. 
To this end, the Member States were 'determined to strengthen the Community by estab-
lishing an economic and monetary union, the guarantee of stability and growth, the 
foundation of their solidarity and the indispensable basis for social progress, and by 
ending disparities between the regions'. The implementation of all this, which echoed 
decisions already taken on 22 March 1971 and 21 March 1972, involved not only impor-
tant decisions on economic and monetary policy but also the strengthening of existing 
common policies and the launching of others which were either entirely new or had 
hitherto existed only in embryo. These included regional policy, social policy, industrial 
policy and policies on science and technology, the environment and energy. For this 
purpose they agreed that it was 'desirable to make the widest possible use of all the 
provisions of the Treaties including Article 235 of the EEC Treaty'. Article 235 is a key 
provision which permits the Council (acting unanimously) to take measures to attain one 
of the objectives of the Community even if the Treaty has not provided the necessary 
powers. 
As we have already seen, the Heads of State or Government also agreed to intensify 
political cooperation between the Member States in the area of foreign policy. 
The Summit communiqué ended by stating that the Heads of State or Government had 
'set themselves the major objective of transforming, before the end of the present decade 
and with the fullest respect for the Treaties already signed, the whole complex of the 
relations of Member States into a European Union'. 
What sort of European Union was promised for 1980? Was it to be a federation, a 
confederation or something different? The Heads of State or Government did not say but 
asked the Community institutions to prepare a report by the end of 1975. 
VIII — The economic difficulties 
of the 1970s 
9. The Community had hoped to make great progress in economic and monetary union. 
The Commission memorandum of 12 February 1969, named the 'Barre Plan' after the 
Vice-President of the Commission who was its main architect, proposed a short-term 
harmonization of economic policies, and solidarity on the monetary front. The Council 
accepted these proposals on 17 July 1969 and in February 1970 an automatic support 
fund of USD 2 000 million was set up. The Werner Report, drawn up under the direction 
of the Luxembourg Prime Minister, set out the ways and means of attaining the objec-
tives of economic and monetary union by 1980. The Council accepted the main outlines 
of this plan on 22 March 1971, when the margins of fluctuation of Community currencies 
were reduced from 0.75% to 0.6%. The time was not right, however. The crisis of con-
fidence in the US dollar caused a massive shift to the German mark, and Germany and 
the Netherlands decided to let their currencies float upwards. On 21 March 1972 the 
Community tried to redeem the situation by setting up the 'snake', which ousted the 
dollar from its central role in the Community currency system and allowed a 2.25% 
margin of fluctuation between any two Community currencies. Central banks were to 
intervene in Community currencies. However, first Ireland and the United Kingdom, 
and then Italy, left the 'snake'. 
After the dollar crisis came the oil crisis. The production cuts imposed by the Arab 
countries in October 1973 and the total embargo on deliveries to the Netherlands raised 
the spectre of recession and put Community solidarity in jeopardy. This was the first of a 
scries of adverse developments which was to culminate in a severe economic crisis. 
10. The Labour Party came to power in the United Kingdom and threatened with-
drawal from the Community if the terms of accession were not 'renegotiated'. The Com-
munity remained intact, however, and the Heads of Government looked at European 
affairs with renewed interest. In March 1975 the British renegotiations were declared 
completed at Dublin and a referendum in June produced a 67.2% vote in favour of 
continued membership. 
IX — The European Council 
/ / . Europe received a new political impetus in May 1974 when Valéry Giscard 
d'Estaing became President of France and Helmut Schmidt became Federal Chancellor in 
Germany, for both men were convinced that it was impossible to solve the serious econ-
omic problems of the day by purely national measures. 
At the Paris Summit on 9 and 10 December 1974, France announced that it no longer 
opposed direct elections to the European Parliament but, on the contrary, hoped that 
they could be arranged quickly. The Belgian Prime Minister, Leo Tindemans, was given 
the task of preparing a general report on what was involved in European Union as agreed 
by the 1972 Summit and how it was to be achieved. This report was to be submitted by 
the end of 1975. 
The nine Heads of Government also decided that in future they would meet regularly, 
three times a year, as the 'European Council'. 
This was a significant change. Previously summits had been solemn occasions held at 
turning points in European affairs to resolve a number of important issues. By institu-
tionalizing these meetings, the Heads of State or Government were taking into their own 
hands the management of policy issues which had hitherto been the responsibility of the 
Council composed of Foreign Ministers. 
12. The European Council deals with both Community matters and those aspects of 
foreign policy which form part of'political cooperation'—this constitutes another link 
between the two spheres of action. 
As far as Community affairs are concerned, the European Council is, strictly speaking, 
none other than the Council of the European Communities meeting at a higher level : 
'The Council shall consist of representatives of the Member States. Each government 
shall delegate to it one of its members' (Article 2 of the Merger Treaty). Yet in practice, it 
has all the appearances of a new institution. It is attended only by the Heads of Gov-
ernment, usually but not always accompanied by their Foreign Ministers, together with 
the President of the Commission and another Member of the Commission directly con-
cerned with the matters under consideration. None of the other people normally present 
at Council meetings, including the Permanent Representatives, attend. One practical 
result is that the European Council is unable to enact legislation in due and proper form. 
It is a political body which discusses problems and finds solutions which it then leaves to 
the Council (either of Foreign Ministers or of Finance Ministers) to implement. 
The Commission still has a vital role to play in this mechanism but it operates in a lower 
key than at ordinary Council meetings—it is there to provide assistance rather than to 
take initiatives. Normally the European Council decides to consider a question of impor-
tance (which then becomes its exclusive concern) at the request of a member government. 
Naturally, the Commission adopts a position on every question. The agenda for the 
European Council is generally agreed in advance and the Commission can help with 
preparations by providing the European Council with a brief policy document on each 
point analysing the problems and suggesting solutions. 
There is no provision for dialogue between Parliament and the European Council, and 
Parliament is rarely in a position to give its opinion before matters have been finally 
settled. Legally, of course, this does not violate the Treaties because either there is only a 
policy debate which is not intended to produce legislation or matters remain at a stage 
prior to the legislative process, which will happen later in the normal way. Nevertheless, 
there is undoubtedly a danger of prejudging the final decision. 
X — The discussions on European Union — 
Direct elections to the European Parliament 
13. In June 1975 the Commission presented its report on European Union—a union 
which the Paris Summit in 1972 had hoped to see attained by the end of the decade. In 
the Commission's view, this union would require considerable institutional and opera-
tional changes. It was to be based on a collegiate European Government of members, 
independent of the national governments but supervised by a Chamber of States 
appointed by the national governments and a Chamber of Peoples elected by direct uni-
versal suffrage. The main function of European Union was to be the achievement of total 
social and economic integration and of a common foreign policy; responsibility for 
defence was also to be gradually assumed. 
The European Parliament adopted a report along the same lines and the Court of Justice 
prepared a report on the legal aspects; the Council, however, never succeeded in produc-
ing any response. 
At the end of 1975 Mr Tindemans submitted to the European Council the report which 
had been requested of him at the 1974 Summit. This report did not propose a new treaty 
between the Member States, as proposed by the Commission and Parliament, but a series 
of pragmatic measures to strengthen the Community's internal and external cohesion. 
Leo Tindemans commented on them as follows: 
'For me, European Union is a new phase in the history of the unification of Europe 
which can only be achieved by a continuous process. Consequently, it is difficult to lay 
down, at this stage, the date of completion of the European Union. It will only achieve its 
objectives by means of institutions which have been adapted to its new requirements. It 
is in fact by means of institutions which have been strengthened and improved that the 
Union will be able to give increasing expression to its own dynamism. In this respect, the 
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role of a directly-elected European Parliament will be decisive in the development of the 
Union.' 
Mr Tindemans insisted that priority should be given to the rapid implementation of 
those policies which dealt most directly with matters of public concern such as economic, 
social, regional, environment and research policies. Responsibilities would be transferred 
to common institutions and resources would be transferred from more prosperous to less 
prosperous countries. 
Despite their pragmatism, Mr Tindemans's proposals met with no more success than the 
more 'utopian' ideas of Parliament and the Commission. But, after difficult negotiations 
in the European Council, mainly concerned with the number and allocation of seats in 
the new Parliament, the legislation providing for direct elections to the European Parlia-
ment was approved on 20 September 1976 and subsequently ratified by the Member 
States in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures (Article 138 of the 
EEC Treaty). The first election was to be held at the same time (10 June 1979) through-
out the Community in order to bring Europe into the public eye in all the Member States. 
Direct elections were intended to strengthen Parliament's legitimacy. 
XI — The Community on the eve 
of further enlargement 
14. The institutional structure of the Community is basically the same as that estab-
lished by the Treaties of Rome in 1957 and confirmed by the 1965 Merger Treaty. But its 
features have changed somewhat under the pressure of circumstances and as a result of a 
number of'constitutional conventions'. 
Legislative power and all the important policy decisions remain in the hands of the 
Council, a body which speaks for the governments of the Member States, which are 
themselves the source of power and are reluctant to transfer any of it to supranational 
institutions. Since 1975 the European Council, within which the Heads of State or Gov-
ernment meet three times a year to consider what it regards as the most important 
matters and to lay down guidelines, has provided an additional layer in the structure of 
the Council as normally constituted (by Foreign Ministers or specialist ministers). 
The European Council has not been entirely successful. Some matters, such as the Euro-
pean passport, dragged on for years without being settled and negotiations on the reduc-
tion of the United Kingdom's financial contribution in respect of 1980 and 1981 broke 
down in the European Council only to be brought to a successful conclusion, with the 
Commission's assistance, by the Council of Foreign Ministers. On the other hand, the 
European Council has scored a number of successes, including British 'renegotiation' in 
1975, direct elections to the European Parliament and, on 12 March 1979, the replace-
ment of the 'snake' by the European Monetary System (EMS). The EMS should ensure 
greater exchange rate stability within the Community and include those currencies which 
could not accept the discipline of the snake because of their less prosperous economies. 
(However, the United Kingdom is outside the system for the moment.) Each national 
currency is allowed to fluctuate to a limited extent around a central rate expressed in 
ECU, the forerunner of a European currency. 
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The Council takes a large number of decisions but its mechanisms are overloaded by its 
routine insistence on taking unanimous decisions even where the Treaties provide for 
majority voting. This problem was aggravated by the enlargement of the Community 
from six to nine members. 
At the Paris Summit in December 1974, the Heads of Government stated that, in order 
to improve the functioning of the Council, they considered it necessary to renounce the 
practice which consists of making agreement on all questions conditional on the unan-
imous consent of the Member States. Since then, there have been encouraging develop-
ments and some decisions have been taken by a majority vote, but there is still a long 
way to go before the spirit of the Treaties is fully observed once again. 
Even so, when faced with urgent deadlines or serious problems demanding a solution, the 
Council has managed to take the most difficult of decisions. On 30 May 1980, three 
apparently insoluble matters were settled simultaneously, the financial measures in 
favour of the United Kingdom in respect of 1980 and 1981. agricultural prices for the 
new farm year and the common organization of the market in sheepmeat. demonstrating, 
incidentally, that the 'package deal' technique was an indispensable tool for achieving 
consensus. 
75. The European Parliament has gradually acquired considerable authority. Through 
the full use it has made of its budgetary powers (not without provoking conflict) it is now 
a force to be reckoned with by the other institutions. Parliament has also succeeded in 
ensuring that, in connection with important decisions with financial implications (which 
will therefore affect future budgets), the Council does not merely consult it but engages in 
a 'conciliation procedure' aimed at seeing agreement between the two institutions. The 
Commission, too, is involved in this procedure. 
The impact of direct elections was widespread. They took place simultaneously in all the 
Member States from 7 to 10 June 1979 and filled three-quarters of Parliament's seats 
with new faces, younger and more motivated people. After the elected Parliament's first 
year it is still too early to attempt a final conclusion; as an institution it is still evolving. 
It has continued its struggle to consolidate its hold over the establishment of the budget 
to the point of rejecting outright the 1980 draft budget established by the Council —its 
first use of this power. By doing so, Parliament placed on the agenda a burning question 
which was in urgent need of resolution—how to balance the items of expenditure necess-
ary for the improvement of economic structures taken as a whole within a budget whose 
resources are at present confined within the 1 % VAT rate fixed by the 1970 own 
resources decision, when that rate has almost been reached. 
On the other hand, the impact of the elected Parliament on the Community legislative 
process seems no greater than that which its predecessor had succeeded in acquiring over 
the years. Most of its attention has been focused on the great problems of the day. and 
especially on foreign policy. It is a dynamic, aggressive and attractive assembly to which 
the media, finding there an authentically European voice, pay a great deal of atten-
tion. 
16. The Commission is often criticized for failing to display the leadership and flair of 
its early days, for having become staid, and for exercising its right of initiative with 
excessive caution. It is true that it acts with circumspection and also that, before launch-
ing an important initiative, it takes care to ensure that it has a chance of success, whether 
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through prior consultations with governments and Parliament or by publishing a discus­
sion paper in advance of its formal proposals. But the pioneering days, when what was 
required was a bold advance to occupy the land set aside for the Community by the 
Treaties, are now behind us. What is involved today is the management of a whole series 
of highly complex activities for which the Community has assumed responsibility. New 
ground need only be occupied when this is both possible and necessary. Moreover, the 
Commission's realism has not prevented it from making imaginative proposals (the latest 
Convention with the African, Caribbean and Pacific States, for example, and those con­
cerning the Tokyo Round) and bold proposals (such as those for dealing with milk 
surpluses) which, even if they meet with opposition, at least succeed in focusing the 
attention of those responsible on the matters at issue. 
The Commission also shows its vitality by using its own powers vigorously, for instance 
in solving the many problems of the agricultural markets or in implementing the steel 
industry crisis plan. 
17. The Court of Justice, finally, has bolstered the fabric of the Community by its teleo­
logicai interpretation of the Treaty—an interpretation which has enabled it to fill in the 
gaps left by the Community legislature. 
The van G end en Loos judgment in 1963 was the first in a series which declared a large 
part of the Treaty rules to be 'directly applicable', so that individuals could secure their 
application by the national courts despite opposition from national administrations: see 
the judgments in the Reyners, Van Binsbergen, Defrenne, Dona and other cases. 
In 1964 the judgment in Costa ν ENEL asserted the primacy of Community law and the 
principle that it could not be affected by opposing national provisions. 
The AETR judgment in 1971 and the Kramer judgment in 1975 followed by Opinion No 
1/76 found that the Community's external competence included not only what was laid 
down in the EEC Treaty (Article 113 on commercial policy and Article 238 on associa­
tion) but also whatever naturally followed under the Treaty from an extension of internal 
competence. 
Finally, a series of decisions, starting with the Stauder judgment in 1969, found that 
fundamental human rights, even if not expressly enshrined in the Treaties, must be 
regarded as part of Community law since they were part of the shared legal traditions of 
the Member States and may be invoked in the courts if violated by an act of the insti­
tutions. 
18. To sum up, although the attainment of certain objectives has met with delays and 
obstacles, the Community has fully lived up to the wishes expressed by its founders when 
they declared that they were 'resolved ... to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty, and 
calling upon the other people of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts'. 
The desire to join the Community expressed first by Greece, then by Portugal and finally 
by Spain constitutes 'an act of faith in a united Europe, which demonstrates that the 
ideas inspiring the creation of the Community have lost none of their vigour or rel­
evance'. 3 
Enlargement of the Community—General considerations. Communication sent by the Commission to the Coun­
cil on 20 April 1978. Supplement 1/78 - Bull. EC, p. 6. 
The instruments of the accession of Greece to the Community were signed in Athens on 
28 May 1979 and ratified by the Greek Parliament on 28 June by a majority of more than 
the 60 % of votes required to authorize the transfer of powers to an international organ-
ization. 
The process of further enlargement has begun. ' The challenge of enlargement can and 
must be the start of a new Community thrust towards the objectives set by the authors of 
the Treaties. ' 4 
4 In op. cit. at footnote 3, p. 17. 
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PART ONE 
The structure 
of the Community 

Chapter I — The Community and 
its institutions 
by Guy Schrans 
Section I — General considerations 
/. A number of institutions and organs were set up by or under the Treaty of 18 April 
1951 establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the Treaties of 25 
March 1957 establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European 
Atomic Energy Community (EAEC). It is generally acknowledged that only the institu-
tions so named in these Treaties can be considered as Community institutions. The 
ECSC Treaty (Article 7) provided for the High Authority, the Common Assembly, the 
Special Council of Ministers and the Court of Justice, and each of the other two Treaties 
(Article 4 EEC and Article 3 EAEC) provided for the Assembly, the Council, the Com-
mission and the Court of Justice. 
The EEC and EAEC Treaties clearly provide that each institution is to exercise the 
powers that arc specifically assigned to it ('Each institution shall act within the limits of 
the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty'). The ECSC Treaty makes no such pro-
vision, but the ECSC institutions are likewise generally recognized as enjoying the spe-
cific powers assigned to them. ' 
Since the entry into force of the Treaty of 8 April 1965 establishing a Single Council and 
a Single Commission of the European Communities (the Merger Treaty), the Council acts 
in place of the Special Council of Ministers of the ECSC and the Councils of the EEC and 
EAEC; it exercises the powers conferred on those institutions in accordance with the 
provisions of the different Treaties. A similar arrangement applies to the Commission of 
the European Communities, which acts in place of the High Authority of the ECSC and 
of the Commissions of the EEC and EAEC. The institutions of the Community are 
thus: 
(i) the Council of the European Communities; 
(ii) the Commission of the European Communities; 
(iii) the Assembly (or 'European Parliament'); 
(iv) the Court of Justice of the European Communities.2 
1 In certain circumstances the institutions' powers of action may be extended: see Articles 95 ECSC, 235 EEC and 
203 ECSC. 
; The Court of Justice is considered in Chapter VII and will therefore be left out of this chapter. 
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Lastly, in a separate category, is the European Council, consisting of the Heads of State or 
Government of the Member States, supported by their Foreign Ministers. 
2. In 1951 the Community's institutional structure was already marked by this quadri-
partite pattern. Since the days of Montesquieu, governments have been analysed in terms 
of the legislative power, the executive power and the judicial power, which are wielded by 
constitutionally separate bodies. In practice, this tripartite institutional structure can take 
several forms: between the extreme parliamentary system and the extreme presidential 
system there are other institutional relationships. The tripartite system also applies in 
federal States, although in such States the legislative body is often split into a 'Chamber 
of States' (e.g. the Senate in the United States, the Bundesrat in the Federal Republic of 
Germany) and a 'Chamber of Peoples' (e.g. the US House of Representatives, the Bun-
destag in Germany). 
The authors of the ECSC Treaty discarded this traditional model with the aim of creating 
an institutional structure which would meet the special requirements of a Community 
hallmarked by the partial and gradual transfer of powers.3 The quadripartite structure of 
the Community takes three of its institutions from the tripartite system : the Assembly or 
Parliament, the Council and the Court of Justice. The fourth institution is the Commis-
sion (earlier the ECSC High Authority), whose basic role is to defend the Community 
interest, whereas the Council, though also a Community institution, constitutes the 
forum where national interests tend to prevail. 
3. The development of the Community's quadripartite structure shows an idiosyncratic 
pattern, for this structure is no merely formal innovation. Since 1951 the Community has 
also seen sweeping internal changes. 
First and foremost we have the pattern of relations between the Council and the High 
Authority or Commission. Whereas, in the ECSC, the High Authority (the Community 
institution) had the edge in powers of decision, the system set up by the EEC and EAEC 
Treaties rests on constant cooperation between the Council and the Commission. The 
cooperation (see point 13 below) is established by those Treaties and was confirmed by 
the Merger Treaty of 1965, Article 15 of which states that 'the Council and the Com-
mission shall consult each other and shall settle by common accord their methods of 
cooperation'. This development in the allocation of powers reflects fundamental value-
judgment. The authors of the EEC and EAEC Treaties sought to establish a balance 
between the powers of the national governments and those of the most truly Community 
institution.4 
Secondly, the Parliament has steadily grown in importance. The Treaties give the Assem-
bly of the ECSC, the EEC and the EAEC both supervisory and consultative powers. It has 
neither 'government-making power' (though it can compel the Members of the Commis-
sion to resign as a body—Article 144 EEC), nor legislative power. Two factors have done 
much to enhance the political importance of the Assembly (which renamed itself the 
'Parliamentary Assembly' in 1958 and the 'European Parliament' in 1962). The Treaties 
3 J. Megret, M. Waelbroeck et al., Le droit de la Communauté économique européenne. Vol. 9, Brussels. 1979. 
p. 2. 
4 E. Noël, Les rouages de l'Europe, second edition, Paris-Brussels, 1979. p. 35. 
of 22 April 1970 and 10 July 1975 enormously strengthened Parliament's budgetary 
powers: the draft budget of the Communities established by the Council can now, in 
certain circumstances, be amended or even rejected outright by Parliament. There have 
already been clashes with the Council, particularly over the 1979, 1980 and 1981 budgets. 
Parliament's political weight was also substantially increased by the election of its mem-
bers by direct universal suffrage, pursuant to the Act of 20 September 1976. 
Whereas the Parliament had formerly been composed of delegates designated by the 
national parliaments (Articles 21 ECSC, 138 EEC and 108 EAEC), so that there was no 
direct link between its members and the peoples of the countries forming the Commun-
ity, this direct link has now been forged (and it is synonymous with political answerabil-
ity to the electorate) since the election by direct universal suffrage in June 1979. 
4. The substance of the powers of the institutions is determined by the legal nature of 
the Treaty conferring those powers. Thus the ECSC Treaty is what is called a 'treaty-law' 
laying down detailed rules to govern the Community coal and steel market and entrusts 
implementation of those rules to a Community institution, the High Authority.5 In that 
structure, the main role of the Council is to harmonize the action of the High Authority 
with those of the national governments (Article 26 ECSC). 
In contrast, the EEC and EAEC Treaties tend more to take the form of what are called 
'framework treaties', which lay the keel to an institutional structure in which the insti-
tutions are responsible not only for implementing the Treaties but also for legislation. In 
a structure ofthat type it is only to be expected that the Member States will wish to retain 
their key function in the legislative process, and this is why the allocation of powers and 
cooperation between the Council and the Commission are not regulated in the same way 
as they are under the ECSC Treaty. 
The difference is less sharp as regards the establishment and functioning of the common 
market, the chief means of integration mentioned in Article 2 of the EEC Treaty. Here, 
the basic political option is already contained in the Treaty itself. It is therefore for the 
institutions, and especially the Commission, to act on the logical inferences. 
Conversely, when 'progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States' 
(the second means of integration mentioned in Article 2 of the EEC Treaty) and all the 
more so when working towards economic and monetary union, the authorities must act 
consciously and effectively, which means that they must constantly make a choice from 
among a number of political alternatives.6 The Member States themselves clearly want 
to determine much of the action taken on this second means of integration, and to be 
directly involved in it. 
Article 8 ECSC: 'It shall be the duty of the High Authority to ensure that the objectives set out in this Treaty are 
attained in accordance with the provisions thereof.' 
P.J.G. Kapteyn, 'De implicaties van de economische en monetaire unie voor het Gemeenschapsrecht en voor 
het nationale recht', SEW, 1973, p. 614 et seq., particularly pp. 624-626; G. Schrans, Rechtsbescherming in het 
economisch recht. Leyde-ZwoIIe, 1979, pp. 10-11. 
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Section II — The Council 
of the European Communities 
11 1. The Council's role in the ECSC 
5. The ECSC Treaty states that the Special Council of Ministers (the Council of the 
European Communities since the Merger Treaty of 8 April 1965) shall consist of Member 
States' representatives, each government delegating to it one of its members. Article 26 of 
the Treaty sets its task as follows: 'The Council shall exercise its powers in the cases 
provided for and in the manner set out in this Treaty, in particular in order to harmonize 
the action of the High Authority and that of the governments, which are responsible for 
the general economic policies of their countries. To this end, the Council and the High 
Authority shall exchange information and consult each other. The Council may request 
the High Authority to examine any proposals or measures which the Council may con-
sider appropriate or necessary for the attainment of the common objectives.' Although it 
is already clear from this article that the Council is not to perform a central function in 
implementing the ECSC Treaty, the Treaty nevertheless contains rules enabling the 
Council to wield a decisive influence on the action of the High Authority. 
This is especially true when the ECSC is in a 'period of manifest crisis' or confronted 
with 'a serious shortage' (Articles 58 and 59). In the first instance the High Authority-
must, with the assent of the Council, introduce a system of production quotas: if the 
High Authority does not take the initiative the Council, acting unanimously, may require 
the High Authority to establish a system of quotas (Article 58(1)). In certain circum-
stances (Article 58(3)) the Council may prevent the quota system from being terminated. 
In the second instance (serious shortage) the High Authority must apprise the Council of 
the situation and, unless the Council unanimously decides otherwise, propose the necess-
ary measure. If the High Authority fails to act the Council may take a unanimous deci-
sion declaring that the situation exists. It is again the Council which, acting unanimously 
on a proposal from and in consultation with the High Authority, establishes consumption 
priorities and determines the allocation of coal and steel resources between the ECSC 
industries, export and other sectors of consumption. 
These provisions, which established the principle of cooperation between the Council and 
the High Authority, were a source of serious conflicts of opinion between the two during 
the coal crisis of the 1950s.7 They did, however, manage to act together in 1980 to 
counter the steel crisis. 
As a general proposition, the ECSC Treaty system places the decision-making power in 
the hands of the High Authority, though major decisions need the Council's assent.s 
H 2. The Council's role under the EEC and EAEC Treaties 
6. The situation under the EEC and EAEC Treaties is altogether different. The key 
decisions are taken by the Council, which can act (except in special cases) only on a 
7 J. Mertens de Wilmars in Droit des Communautés européennes, ed. W.J. Ganshof van der Meersch. Les 
Novelles, Brussels, 1969, No 1379. 
8 For majorities required within the Council, see Article 28 ECSC. 
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proposal from the Commission. If it wishes to take a decision which diverges from the 
Commission's proposal, the Council must act unanimously. 
7. Since the Merger Treaty of 8 April 1965 the Council of the European Communities 
has replaced the Councils of the three Communities and exercises their powers in accord-
ance with the three original Treaties. 
As under the ECSC Treaty, the Council consists of Member States' representatives, each 
government delegating one of its members to it. 
The governments may choose their own delegates; designation always depends upon the 
subject on the agenda, e.g. the Minister for Finance, Agriculture or Economic Affairs.9 
Council proceedings are prepared by the Permanent Representatives Committee (com-
monly referred to by the French abbreviation 'Coreper'). This Committee, which had 
already existed in practice on the basis of Articles 151 EEC and 121 EAEC, was given 
formal status by Article 4 of the Merger Treaty of 8 April 1965: 'A committee consisting 
of the Permanent Representatives of the Member States shall be responsible for preparing 
the work of the Council and for carrying out the tasks assigned to it by the Council'. 10 In 
preparing the ground for Council meetings the Committee must find solutions and, if 
possible, reach agreement on the texts. " 
Whenever 'Coreper' reaches agreement on a solution and/or a text, these must always be 
formally confirmed by the Council, which might not even follow the solution reached in 
committee. 
The general tendency, at any rate, is to settle more and more matters at 'Coreper' 
level. 
Depending upon the Treaty or article to be applied, the Council acts by simple majority 
(the general rule save as otherwise provided by the Treaties), by qualified majority, or 
unanimously. Where the Council is required to act by a qualified majority (e.g. under 
Article 43(2) and (3) EEC in respect of common organizations of agricultural markets), 
the votes of its members are weighted as follows: 12 
Belgium 5 Ireland 3 
Denmark 3 Italy 10 
Germany 10 Luxembourg 2 
Greece 5 The Netherlands 5 
France 10 United Kingdom 10 
When the European Council (see Section VI) sits as the Council of the European Communities, it consists of the 
Heads of State or Government and their Foreign Ministers. This Council has recently appeared as a pendant to 
the Treaties. 
This does not mean that the Council can formally delegate powers to 'Coreper'. 
Final communiqué of the Conference of Heads of State or Government, 9 and 10 December 1974. Bull. EC 
12-1974. point 1104; European Union Report by Leo Tindemans to the European Council, Supplement 1/76 — 
Bull. EC, pp. 35-36. 
For the sake of simplicity this chapter gives the present figures resulting from the Act of Accession of Greece, 
which was signed on 31 May 1980 and came into force on 1 January 1981. In the Community of Six the 
weighting was as follows: Germany, France and Italy : 4, Belgium and the Netherlands : 2, Luxembourg : 1 ; the 
qualified majority was 12 votes. The weighting shown in the text refers to the first enlargement, Greece not yet 
being a member (the majority required was therefore 41). 
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A qualified majority is 45 votes in favour for decisions to be taken on a proposal from 
the Commission; in other instances (Article 114 EEC) 45 votes are still required, but they 
must be cast by at least six members (Articles 148 EEC and 118 EAEC). " 
The rule of the simple or qualified majority is a hallmark of Community (some may 
prefer to say supranational) organization and emphasizes the basic difference between the 
Council of the European Communities and a conventional diplomatic conference, where 
in practice each country has a right of veto. Under the majority system no one Member 
State ever has a right of veto (even where a qualified majority is required). 
In what was already a climate of underlying unease, it was over the majority voting 
system that in 1965 and 1966 the Community suffered a severe crisis when one of the 
Member States refused to accept being outvoted if its vital interest were prejudiced by the 
decision in question. By the 'Luxembourg compromise' of January 1966 the Member 
States agreed to endeavour within the Council to find a solution acceptable to all when-
ever a decision threatened the vital interests of one or more Member States (they failed to 
agree on what should be done if no agreement was reached in that way). 
The Luxembourg compromise does not alter the provisions of the Treaty and cannot be 
regarded as more than a 'gentlemen's agreement', and yet its political significance has 
been quite considerable, for ever since then a consensus has systematically been sought 
by means of reciprocal concessions on the part of the Member States in respect of the 
various decisions which have to be taken at Council meetings (the 'package deal'). 
The compromise is, however, clearly not only contrary to the spirit of the Treaty; it also 
negates the very concept of a Community (or supranational) institution. The final com-
muniqué of the December 1974 Conference of Heads of State or Government cautiously 
skated round it. In practice, the majority vote has come back in certain cases where the 
Treaty provided for it (but never on politically sensitive issues). u 
Unanimity is naturally still required wherever the Treaty so prescribes. Since the end of 
the transitional period (31 December 1969) 27 articles of the EEC Treaty have still 
required unanimity, l5 notably on the approximation of laws (Article 100) and on meas-
ures to attain a Community objective where the Treaty has not provided the necessary 
specific powers (Article 235). 
8. The EEC and EAEC Treaties confer extensive powers on the Council. Article 145 
EEC, for instance, provides that the Council shall : 
(i) ensure coordination of the general economic policies of the Member States; 
(ii) have power to take decisions. lf' 
The first limb (coordination of the Member States' general economic policies) admittedly 
has somewhat limited substance: it means in effect that the Council commands a residual 
power of coordination whenever an explicit provision of the Treaty does not give it 
13 The qualified majority defined in Article 28 ECSC, however, is the absolute majority of the Member States' 
representatives, including the votes of two Member States which each provide at least one-eighth of the total 
value of Community coal and steel production; only budgetary decisions are governed by the EEC and EAEC 
rules. 
14 E. Noël, op. cit. at footnote 4 above, p. 43; E. Cerexhe, Le droit européen. 
15 J. Megret, M. Waelbroek et al., op. cit. at footnote 3 above, p. 124. 
16 Compare with Article 115 EAEC. 
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legislative power. " The Council does have limited legislative powers in the field of 
economic policy (notably as regards 'conjunctural policy' under Article 103 EEC). The 
'power to take decisions' conferred by the second limb of Article 145 implicitly refers to 
the many provisions of the Treaty which empower the Council, generally on a proposal 
from the Commission, to enact legislation in the form of regulations, directives or deci-
sions (Article 189 EEC) of a sui generis act, involving, for example, the conclusion of an 
international agreement. 
In actual fact it is the Council that has the legislative power in the implementation of the 
EEC and EAEC Treaties, but this power is exercised in close cooperation with the Com-
mission (sec point 13 below) and in most instances after consulting the European Parlia-
ment. 
Whereas cooperation between Council and Commission regarding legislation is governed 
by formal rules, no such rules exist for consulting Parliament. Legally, the Council is not 
compelled to take account of Parliament's opinions. 18 
Section III — The Commission 
of the European Communities 
H 1. The Commission under the ECSC Treaty 
9. The ECSC Treaty confers on the High Authority (the Commission of the European 
Communities since the Merger Treaty of 8 April 1965) major powers to implement the 
Treaty, which being a 'treaty-law' (see point 4 above) governs policy on the common 
market for coal and steel in some detail. The major role conferred on the High Authority 
is clear enough from the Robert Schuman declaration of 9 May 1950: '...The French 
Government proposes to place Franco-German production of coal and steel under a 
common higher authority within the framework of an organization open to participation 
by the other countries of Europe. ' The High Authority is in fact the executive arm of the 
ECSC, even though on vital issues it must first consult the Council and on occasion seek 
the Council's assent before acting (see point 5 above). 
Under Article 8 of the ECSC Treaty it is 'the duty of the High Authority to ensure that 
the objectives set out in this Treaty are attained in accordance with the provisions there-
of'. 
The powers so conferred are to be interpreted broadly and could include certain powers 
in the field of ECSC external relations. 19 
These powers, nevertheless, have their limits: the High Authority may act only in 
accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.20 Another crucial provision is to be found 
17 J. Megret, M. Waelbroek et al., op. cit. at footnote 3 above, p. 100. 
18 For Parliament's budgetary powers, see point 16. 
" G. Olivier, in op. cit. at footnote 7 above, No 496. 
2(1 M. Lagrange, 'Les pouvoirs de la Haute Autorité et l'application du Traité de Paris', RDP, 1961, p. 41 et seq. 
See also Article 95 ECSC, whereby the High Authority can, in certain circumstances, take a decision or make a 
binding recommendation in all cases not provided for in the Treaty where a decision is necessary to attain one 
of the ECSC's objectives; this action also requires the unanimous assent of the Council. In the corresponding 
provision of the EEC Treaty (Article 235) it is the Council which, acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission, takes the 'appropriate measures'. 
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in Article 5, which lays down that the Community shall carry out its task in accordance 
with the Treaty, 'with a limited measure of intervention'. It has never been established 
how far this rule, which has no counterpart in the EEC and EAEC Treaties, is binding in 
law, except in so far as it may be regarded as a token of the principles of proportion-
ality. 21 
11 2. The Commission under the EEC and EAEC Treaties 
10. Under these Treaties the Commission of the European Communities exercises dif-
ferent powers, less extensive than those conferred by the ECSC Treaty. Its status and 
functions are nevertheless the same under the three Treaties. The Commission currently 
consists of 14 Members chosen on the grounds of their general competence and whose 
independence is beyond doubt. The Commission must include at least one national of 
each of the Member States, but may not include more than two Members having the 
nationality of the same State. : : The Members of the Commission must, in the general 
interest of the Communities, be completely independent in the performance of their 
duties. In performing these duties they may neither seek nor take instructions from any 
government or from any other body.23 They are appointed by common accord of the 
governments of the Member States for a term of office of four years.24 
The Council and the Commission consult each other and settle by common accord their 
methods of cooperation.25 
The Commission publishes annually a general report on the activities of the Communi-
ties. 26 
The Commission constitutes a collective body: its powers are vested equally in each 
Member, and each Member is jointly responsible for all measures taken by the Commis-
sion. As the Commission is a collective body, its decisions are valid only if the number of 
Members laid down in its Rules of Procedure is present27 and if its decisions are taken 
by a majority of its 14 Members.28 
The Commission may be compelled to resign as a body if a motion of censure is carried 
in the European Parliament (Article 144 EEC). 
¡1. The Commission's powers are defined in Article 155 of the EEC Treaty and Article 
124 of the ECSC Treaty. They amount to the obligation to 'ensure the proper functioning 
and development of the common market' (Article 155 EEC) and to 'ensure the develop-
ment of nuclear energy within the Community' (Article 12 EAEC). This means that of all 
21 CM. Schmitthoff, 'The doctrines of proportionality and non-discrimination', Eur. LR, 1977. p. 329 et seq.; F. 
Delperee, Le principe de la proportionalité en droit public. Belgian reports to the Tenth International Congress 
on Comparative Law, Brussels, 1978, p. 503 et seq. 
22 Article 10(1) of the Merger Treaty, as amended by the Council Decision of 1 January 1973, upon the accession 
of the three new Member States. 
23 Article 10(2). 
24 Article 11. 
25 Article 15. 
26 Article 18. 
27 The quorum is currently eight members. 
28 Article 17 of the Merger Treaty. 
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the institutions it is above all the Commission which must look to the Community 
interest. It is in that capacity that it is involved in the Council's legislative activity, since 
the Council, barring very few exceptions, cannot deliberate until a formal dialogue has 
been initiated with the Commission.2y The Commission's chief powers are set out in 
Article 155 of the EEC Treaty (Article 124 EAEC): 
(i) It must ensure that the provisions of the Treaties and the measures taken by the 
institutions pursuant thereto are applied. In that capacity it is the custodian of the 
Treaties30 and, more especially, of Community legality. It steps in whenever a 
Member State fails to honour one of its obligations under the Treaty (Articles 169 
and 170 EEC); it checks for infringements of the Treaties by addressing comments or 
recommendations to the Member States (Articles 93(3) and 102(1) EEC). As regards 
private individuals it may—particularly in the fields of competition (Regulation No 
17) or transport (Regulation No 11)—impose bans, fines and periodic penalty pay-
ments. 
(ii) It makes recommendations or issues opinions on matters relevant to the Treaties, 
wherever the Treaties expressly require it to do so or as it sees fit. Recommendations 
and opinions are not binding (Article 189 EEC, Article 161 EAEC), but they offer the 
Commission a flexible, persuasive means of trying to ensure that the Community 
interest prevails with the Member States, with their nationals and with other Com-
munity institutions.3I 
(iii) The Commission has its own power of decision and is involved in shaping measures 
taken by the Council and Parliament in accordance with the Treaty (Chapter V). 
This rule explicitly refers to specific provisions conferring power on the Commis-
sion. The Commission's 'own power of decision' extends to the elaboration of legis-
lative measures provided for by Article 189 (or Article 161 EAEC) when the Treaty 
confers this power on it. This collaboration in the shaping of Council measures is 
probably the Commission's chief task; we shall return to it.32 
(iv) Lastly, the Commission exercises the powers delegated to it by the Council for the 
implementation of the rules the Council lays down. In practice, the Commission has 
very broad implementing powers, since in most of its legislative measures the Coun-
cil has to delegate these powers to the Commission. At the Conference of Heads of 
State or Government in December 1974 it was agreed that more use should be made 
of the provisions of the Treaty which allow the Commission 'powers of implemen-
tation and management'. 
12. In connection with specific tasks the Commission is assisted in its implementation 
and management powers by management committees and committees on rules (Part I, 
Chapter V, and Part II, Chapter VIII). Management committees have been set up by 
many regulations establishing common organizations of agricultural markets. In manag-
ing these market organizations the Commission consults the appropriate management 
committee (which is made up of Member States' representatives) and takes the necessary 
2'' Sec point 13. 
30 W. Much, 'La Commission, gardienne des Traités', in La Commission des Communautés européennes et l'élar-
gissement de l'Europe. Brussels, 1974, p. 86. 
31 For Commission recommendations to the Council, see, for example, Articles 105(1), 108(1), 109(2) and 113(3) 
EEC. 
32 See point 13. 
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decision. It is only when the management committee opposes the decision that the matter 
is referred to the Council, which may take a different decision: if no Council decision is 
forthcoming within a specified time, the Commission takes the final decision. 
Since these committees have no powers of decision but are simply advisory bodies, they 
are considered to be acceptable by the Court of Justice.33 In practice, the management 
committee system works well and the Council rarely has to step in. 
The committees on rules, the first of which was set up in 1968, assist the Commission in 
preparing certain regulations (e.g. as regards the origin of goods, management of quotas, 
etc.). In contrast to the management committee procedure, the Commission here takes 
the decision itself only if it has the favourable opinion of the responsible committee. 
Should the committee issue an unfavourable opinion (or none at all), the Commission 
must make a proposal to the Council. But most of the regulations concerned provide a 
'safety net' allowing the Commission the power to adopt its draft, if the Council fails to 
take a decision after a specified period. 
Acting under the EEC' and EAEC Treaties the Commission may thus have more limited 
formal powers than when acting under the ECSC Treaty; but it none the less performs a 
leading and essential role in the institutional structure and in the Community's decision-
making process. 
It represents the Community element in that process, though since the Treaties came into 
force, many institutional measures (and here the management and rules committees 
come to mind) have helped to facilitate cooperation between the Commission and the 
Member States. 
Section IV — Cooperation between 
the Council and the Commission 
in the preparation of Council legislation 
13. Article 149 EEC (Article 119 EAEC) epitomizes cooperation between the Council 
and Commission: 'Where, in pursuance of this Treaty, the Council acts on a proposal 
from the Commission, unanimity shall be required for an act constituting an amendment 
to that proposal. As long as the Council has not acted, the Commission may alter its 
original proposal, in particular where the Assembly has been consulted on that proposal.' 
This article governs cooperation between the Council and the Commission at two critical 
levels. 
(i) Barring a few exceptions (e.g. Articles 84(2) and 126 EEC) the Commission has the 
right of legislative initiative : the Council cannot draw up legislative measures with-
out a proposal from the Commission. The Council may indeed 'request the Com-
mission to undertake any studies which the Council considers desirable for the 
attainment of the common objectives, and to submit to it any appropriate proposals' 
(Articles 152 EEC and 122 EAEC), but this in no way diminishes the crucial and 
dynamic role of the Commission in the decision-making process. As long as the 
Council has taken no decision the Commission may amend its proposal, either on its 
33 Judgment of 17 December 1970, Case 25/70 Köster [ 1970] ECR 1161, and judgment of 17 December 1970, Case 
30/70 Scheer [1970] ECR 1197. 
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own initiative, or at the request of the Council, Parliament or the Economic and 
Social Committee. 
(ii) Unanimity is required if the Council is to amend a Commission proposal in those 
cases where it cannot act without such a proposal. This rule should have had the 
effect of affording the Commission a very strong position in the decision-making 
process, as the Council is virtually obliged to maintain a dialogue with it. The first 
paragraph of Article 149 could 'deadlock' the institutional relationship if the Council 
did not agree unanimously to depart from the Commission proposal. But the second 
paragraph of Article 149 leaves the Commission enough scope to adapt to the situ-
ation which has arisen in the Council. It may thus, by judicious amendment of its 
original proposal, be instrumental in achieving the majority required by the Treaty, 
when it seems unlikely that there will be a majority of its original proposal. In point 
of fact, the regular quest for unanimity within the Council following the Luxembourg 
compromise (see point 7 above), even if a majority of the Member States are pre-
pared to accept the Commission's proposal, has prevented the Commission from 
performing such a key role. But the fact remains that the Commission does much to 
inspire the Council's resolve by means of the constant dialogue between them, in the 
course of which the Council frequently has to change its original position. 
This institutional cooperation between the Council and the Commission does not match 
the standard model of the decision-making process in democratic States and that is per-
haps why it has sometimes caused confusion.34 According to some people the Council 
and the Commission together constitute the 'twin-headed' executive of the Communi-
ties; this interpretation is quite wrong for two reasons. First, we are dealing here with far 
more than a purely executive body since the Council and the Commission together per-
form a legislative function. Second, that explanation fails to recognize that each of the 
two institutions, which represent different principles in the construction of the Commu-
nities, is of a specific kind and independent of the other; it particularly fails to recognize 
that the Council is an intergovernmental body and that the Commission is the Commu-
nity institution par excellence. 
Others think that the Council can be compared to a 'Chamber of States', a Senate in a 
federalist structure (like the United States Senate and the Bundesrat of the Federal 
Republic of Germany) and that the European Parliament can be compared to a 'Peoples' 
Chamber'. 
This view is based on the long-standing tripartite State structure, but again it fails to 
recognize the institutional reality of the Communities, which confers a much bigger role 
on the Council than on Parliament. 
We must emphasize the originality of this quadripartite structure underlined by Pierre 
Pescatore.35 The Commission may be regarded mainly as the executive, which plays a 
leading role in the decision-making process, whilst the Council not only represents the 
Member States but is also the Community legislator. This institutional structure corres-
ponds to the political reality within the Communities, for they have yet to become a 
political federation or confederation. The institutional cooperation between the Council 
P. Pescatore, 'L'exécutif communautaire: justification du quadripartisme institué par les Traités de Paris et de 
Rome', CDE, 1978, p. 387. 
In op. cit. at footnote 34 above. 
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and the Commission also distinguishes the Community from traditional intergovern-
mental organizations. 
Section V — The European Parliament 
H 1. Composition and election by direct universal suffrage 
14. Already in Article 20 of the ECSC Treaty we find the principle that the Assembly 
'shall consist of representatives of the peoples of the States brought together in the 
Community', while Article 21 ofthat Treaty states that the Assembly 'shall draw up 
proposals for elections by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform proce-
dure in all Member States'; these provisions are to be laid down by the Council, acting 
unanimously.36 This principle is also laid down by Articles 137 and 138(3) EEC and by 
Articles 107 and 108(3) EAEC. This demonstrates that from the birth of the Community-
it was assumed that eventually the Assembly would be elected by direct universal suf-
frage. But Parliament had to wait until June 1979 before the intention became a real-
ity. 
Until then the European Parliament consisted of delegates whom the national parlia-
ments had to designate from among their members in accordance with the procedure 
established by each Member State. After the Community's first enlargement the number 
of delegates was as follows : 
Belgium 14 Italy 36 
Denmark 10 Luxembourg 6 
Germany 36 The Netherlands 14 
France 36 United Kingdom 36 
Ireland 10 
The Act of 20 September 1976 concerning the election of representatives to the European 
Parliament by direct universal suffrage determined the number of members elected for 
the first time in June 1979: 
Belgium 24 Italy 81 
Denmark 16 Luxembourg 6 
Germany 81 The Netherlands 25 
France 81 United Kingdom 81 
Ireland 15 
The Act of Accession of Greece added 24 Greek members. 
Members are elected for a term of five years. They may accept neither instructions nor 
any binding mandate : they vote on an individual and personal basis. They may concur-
rently be members of a national parliament but any national provision which would 
require only members of national parliaments to be eligible for a seat in the European 
Parliament would be illegal. The office of representative in the European Parliament is 
also incompatible with certain functions, such as membership of the government of a 
36 Here, the Council recommends the Member States to adopt these provisions in accordance with their respective 
constitutional requirements. 
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Member State, of the European Commission, or of another institution or organ of the 
Communities (Article 6 of the Act of 1976). 
In June 1979 the members of the European Parliament were elected according to differ-
ent national electoral procedures. But Article 7 of the Act of 1976 requires Parliament to 
draw up a proposal for a uniform electoral system.37 
The Act of 1976 is the result of numerous proposals from both Parliament and the 
Member States. Election by direct universal suffrage obviously confers upon members a 
democratic legitimacy which makes them genuine 'representatives of the peoples of the 
States brought together in the Community'. 
11 2. Parliament's powers 
15. On 20 March 1958 the Assembly decided to take the name of'European Parlia-
mentary Assembly' and on 30 March 1962 rechristened itself'European Parliament'. 
Ever since then the 'European Parliament' has called itself just that in all its working 
documents. The same practice is followed in Council documents, except that French 
language versions follow the letter of the Treaties and use the word Assemblée. The 
European Parliament does not, however, enjoy all the powers vested in a parliament 
within a parliamentary democracy. It does not, for instance, take any effective part in the 
exercise of legislative power. The powers conferred upon the European Parliament under 
the ECSC Treaty are not quite the same as under the two later Treaties. The 'Assembly' 
has the right under the ECSC Treaty to review a posteriori the acts of the High Authority 
(or the Commission). 
Under the EEC and EAEC Treaties these powers are broader. Article 137 EEC and 
Article 107 EAEC state that the European Parliament shall exercise the advisory and 
supervisory powers which are conferred upon it by this Treaty, while Article 20 ECSC 
allowed it only supervisory, and thus not advisory, powers. 
16. There are three main areas in which Parliament can act. 
(i) As regards the exercise of legislative power (Chapter V), Parliament has only con-
sultative powers.38 Parliament is generally consulted by the Council on proposals 
laid before it by the Commission even in instances where the Treaties do not 
demand such consultation. Although Parliament acts here only in a consultative 
capacity (and there is no obligation on the Council to take account of Parliament's 
opinion), Article 149(2) EEC (Article 119(2) EAEC) nevertheless gives Parliament's 
opinion some potential weight. It states that when it has submitted a proposal to the 
Council and that body has not acted, the Commission may alter it, 'in particular 
where the Assembly has been consulted on that proposal'. This means that the 
Commission can amend its proposal to accommodate Parliament's opinion. 
(ii) With regard to supervision of the Commission in its administrative function, Article 
144 EEC (like Article 24 ECSC and Article 114 EAEC) makes provision for com-
pelling the Commission to resign as a body after a motion of censure has been tabled 
and carried in an open vote by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, representing a 
37 This is based on Article 3 ECSC, Article 138(3) EEC and Article 108(3) EAEC. 
38 The fourth paragraph of Article 95 ECSC provides for an exception (of limited practical scope). 
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majority of the members of Parliament. A number of supervisory techniques, less 
drastic and perhaps therefore more effective, have been developed. These include 
oral or written questions put to the Commission (third paragraph of Article 23 
ECSC; third paragraph of Article 140 EEC: third paragraph of Article 110 EAEC) 
and to the Council,39 opinions on matters referred to it pursuant to the Treaties40 
and the Question Time introduced after the accession of the United Kingdom, when 
members can put precisely worded questions to the Commission, the Council or 
even the Conference of Foreign Ministers. Moreover, Article 140 EEC (Articles 23 
ECSC and 110 EAEC) stipulates that 'the Council shall be heard by the Assembly in 
accordance with the conditions laid down by the Council in its rules of procedure'. 
Since 1954, members of the Council have been appearing in Parliament to speak in 
debates and explain the Council's viewpoints. But Parliament cannot be said to 
exercise any real political supervision over the Council because it cannot censure the 
Council. A trend is nevertheless emerging towards more consultation and concili-
ation between the Council, Parliament and the Commission. The greater political 
weight of a Parliament elected by direct universal suffrage will certainly promote this 
trend. 
(iii) On the budgetary side (Chapter VIII) the original Treaties gave Parliament only very 
limited powers. Article 203 EEC (Article 177 EAEC) requires Parliament (like the 
other institutions) to draw up estimates of its own expenditure and makes provision 
for proposing amendments to the Council's draft budget. This system, however, gave 
the final say to the Council. 
Now that the Communities command substantial own resources (see Council Decision of 
21 April 1970 on the replacement of Member States' financial contributions by the 
Communities' own resources), the Member States have agreed that Parliament can play a 
bigger part in the budgetary procedure. The expansion of Parliament's budgetary powers 
was achieved in two stages: by the first Treaty of 22 April 1970 amending certain bud-
getary provisions in the Treaties and then by the Treaty of 10 July 1975. Under these 
Treaties Parliament has the right to amend non-compulsory expenditure: the Council 
may accept or reject these amendments, but Parliament has the last word within certain 
limits. For compulsory expenditure under the Treaties a distinction should be made: if it 
does not result in an increase in total expenditure, it is considered to be tacitly accepted 
unless the Council expressly rejects it; when it does result in an increase in total expen-
diture, it must have the express approval of the Council. 
It is nevertheless Parliament which adopts the budget. It is also entitled to reject it. for 
valid reasons, by a majority of the House and by two-thirds of the votes cast. 
In the light of these greater budgetary powers. Parliament, the Council and the Commis-
sion adopted on 4 March 1975 a joint declaration laying down a conciliation procedure 
between Parliament and the Council, in which the Commission must cooperate actively. 
This procedure (on the initiative of any of the three institutions) may be applied for 
Community acts of general effect which have major financial repercussions and whose 
adoption does not necessarily result from already existing acts. The procedure begins 
when the Council announces its intention of amending an opinion adopted by Parlia-
39 The Council's and Parliament's Rules of Procedure make provision for putting these questions to the Coun-
cil. 
40 This power also derives from Parliament's Rules of Procedure. 
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ment. The aim of conciliation is to secure agreement between the Council and Parlia-
ment. When the viewpoints of the two are sufficiently close, Parliament may issue an-
other opinion, following which the Council adopts a final decision. 
Expansion of Parliament's budgetary powers and its participation in the conciliation 
procedure (especially if it is properly applied) can both in their way enhance Parliament's 
stature in the quadripartite institutional structure of the Communities. 
When in 1979 the Parliament elected by direct universal suffrage rejected the draft budget 
by 288 votes to 64, it was not only a declaration of its new political identity but also an 
unmistakable warning that, in budgetary terms at least, it was going to raise itself to the 
rank of an institution on a par with the Council. The conditions under which the 1980 
budget was finally established demonstrate that there must henceforth be an institutional 
dialogue on the budget between the Council and Parliament. 
Section VI — The European Council 
17. The European Council, consisting of the Heads of State or Government assisted by 
their Foreign Ministers, was born at the Summit Conference of December 1974 (see 
'Introduction', points 11 and 12). The European Council meets at least three times a year 
to deal both with political cooperation between the Member States and with internal 
Community affairs. It is not a new institution; the European Council acts as the Council 
of the European Communities, but with a specific membership as allowed by Article 2 of 
the Merger Treaty.-41 
In this capacity the European Council can enact legislation (in the form of regulations, 
directives or decisions) provided the procedures laid down by the Treaties (notably with 
regard to the Commission's right of initiative) are complied with. This may well be the 
case when it has to settle matters which cannot be settled at a lower level. It remains to 
be seen whether the European Council will confine itself to taking political decisions of 
principle which then have to be implemented by the ordinary Council. At any rate it has 
already succeeded in solving certain thorny problems, such as the 1975 dispute over the 
United Kingdom's financial contribution to the Community, and in averting, at least 
temporarily, some serious crises. 
Conclusions 
18. It must be remembered that in law there are still three Communities, the ECSC, the 
EEC and the EAEC, although the institutions are common to all three. But it is generally 
agreed that the three Treaties should in practice be regarded as a whole and should be 
interpreted and applied in such a way as to avoid contradictions between them. On 16 
February 1978 Parliament proposed that a single name be used for the Communities— 
the 'European Community'. Though the three separate Treaties have yet to be merged 
41 'The Council shall consist of representatives of the Member States. Each government shall delegate to it one of 
its members.' These, of course, may be the Heads of Government or, in the case of France and under the 
French Constitution, the Head of State. 
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and no single European Community exists, a single name would certainly generate less 
confusion in the public mind. 
The endeavours to achieve a 'European Union' (see 'Introduction', point 13) involve 
more than a question of name, and here the stances vary. In its report on European 
Union42 the Commission proposed three possible new institutional models, which differ 
from the present institutional structure of the Communities. The Commission clearly 
preferred the model consisting of a collegiate government body whose men thus would be 
independent of the national governments, together with a bicameral parliament compris-
ing a 'Chamber of Peoples', whose members would be elected by direct universal suf-
frage, and a 'Chamber of States' which would be an offshoot of national governments. 
The Commission did not rule out possible intermediate solutions. 
The Tindemans Report takes a more pragmatic line.43 It contends that European Union 
can and must be built on the institutional foundations which the Member States have 
already accepted under the existing Treaties. The report nevertheless makes a number of 
suggestions for improving institutional performance and strengthening institutional ma-
chinery, all based on four criteria: the necessary authority to determine policies, the 
effectiveness essential to Community action, the legitimacy also essential to democratic 
stewardship and cohesion in institutional vision and policy. 
It would be unrealistic to erect a new institutional structure in which the Member States 
as such had no major function to perform. From that angle, the Tindemans objective 
would appear more easily attainable, provided the necessary steps are taken to ensure 
that the decision-making process can move more effectively. The first steps along that 
road must consist of reinforcing the powers of the Commission and applying the simple 
or qualified majority voting rule within the Council. 44 
42 Supplement 5/75 - Bull. EC. 
43 'Report on European Union' by Leo Tindemans. Belgian Prime Minister, to the European Council. Supplement 
1/76 - Bull. EC. 
44 P. Pescatore, op. cit. at footnote 34 above, pp. 405-406. 
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Chapter II — The legal nature 
of the European Community 
by Pródromos D. Dagtoglou 
Preliminary observations 
/. The legal nature and, in general, the character and identity of the European Commu-
nity ' have formed the basic problem ever since the ECSC, the first in date of the Euro-
pean Communities, was established 30 years ago. Attempts to provide an answer to this 
question have given rise to a copious bibliography in many languages, extending beyond 
the Community's frontiers. No complete and final answer has yet been given and prob-
ably no such answer can be given because the Community is in a permanent state of 
evolution. 
2. To determine the nature of the Community is a matter which concerns not only law, 
but above all politics, even in the relatively frequent cases where this is done without 
direct political involvement. Moreover, while such a definition is only possible in terms 
related to the Community's existing situation, structure and orientation, it influences the 
mode and rhythm of Community evolution and must inevitably combine diagnosis and 
prognosis. This is the reason why the various theories regarding the nature of the Com-
munity, at the same time, both reflect and determine the political climate and the poli-
tical perspectives of the period during which they were formulated. 
Political understanding and legal understanding of the Community necessarily go hand in 
hand. 
H 1. Federalist and internationalist theories 
3. There can be no doubt that the political figures who conceived, founded and 
fashioned the Communities (Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Paul-Henri Spaak, Konrad 
Adenauer, Alcide De Gasperi, Walter Hallstein) had the federal State in mind as a model. 
Legal writers too (especially German legal writers) attributed to the Community a federal 
nature, or, at all events, federal elements (federalist theory) during the early years which 
The use of the term 'European Community' in place of'European Communities' corresponds to the resolution 
passed by the European Parliament (OJ C 63, 13.3.1978, p. 36) and the letter dated 26 July 1978 sent by the 
President of the Council to the President of the European Parliament. 
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followed the conclusion of the Treaties establishing the Communities (CF. Ophiils. E.J. 
Wohlfarth, G. Jaenicke, H.J. Schlochauer, G. Schwarzenberger. G. Heraud. L. Cartou). 
The federal concept was not, however, the only theory to be advanced in the Commun­
ity's early years. The totally different internationalist theory also found advocates among 
writers and practitioners of international law (E. Vitta. P. de Visscher. R.L. Bindschedler. 
A. Verdross, F. Berber, L. Delbez, I. Seidl­Hovenveldern and. recently. A. Bleckmann). 
According to this theory, the Community, as it is at present, has been established by­
international treaties and falls totally within the realm of international law since it is an 
international organization, although with some peculiarities which are not new, but arc to 
be found (though not all together) in existing international organizations. 
Even the European Court of Justice, in its important decisions in van G end en Loos2 and 
Costa ν ENEL,3 delivered in the early years following the conclusion of the Treaties of 
Rome, defined the Community (EEC) as 'a new order of international law'. The Court, 
however, in its later cases gave up this reference to international law. 
4. This internationalist theory is unable to explain the Community's fundamental char­
acteristics and the Community legal order; for example, the autonomous procedure for 
partial amendment of the Treaties, the autonomous creation of rules of law, especially the 
primacy over national laws and the direct effect of these rules, the binding force and 
directly enforceable effect of the decisions of the Court of Justice, the development of 
Community powers (beyond the express provisions of the Treaties) to the exclusion of 
national powers which can no longer be exercised even concurrently.4 
However, it cannot be disputed that the Member States of the Community not only were 
entirely separate 'States' at the time of their creation but have continued to be so up to 
the present day. 
This is the reason why it continues to be more difficult to establish the Community's 
independence under international law than to do so under domestic (national) law.5 
The weakness of the internationalist case as a whole was, however, fairly quickly and 
very widely recognized. Meanwhile it gradually became apparent that the federalist view, 
owing to its failure to reflect either political or legal reality, was too ideological in content 
to be accepted as a scientific theory. This latter finding dates back to the 1960s when after 
the 1965/66 crisis the agreement known as the Luxembourg compromise came into 
being. 
112. The development of the Community 
5. In reality, the way in which the Community is developing has robbed the federalist 
theory not only of such of its foundations as refer to the current period but also of the 
legal objective directed towards the future. During the course of the 1950s and 1960s 
Judgment of 5 February 1963. Case 26/62 van G end en Loos [1963] ECR 1. 
Judgment of 15 July 1964, Case 6/64 Costa ν ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
Judgment of 31 March 1971, Case 22/70 Commission ν Council (AETR) [1971] ECR 263: Joined Cases 3, 4. 
6/76 Kramer [1976] ECR 1279; Opinion 1/75 [1975] ECR 1355: Opinion 1/76 [1977] ECR 741. 
F. Rigaux. 'Nature juridique des Communautés' in Droit des communautés européennes, published under the 
direction of W. Ganshof van der Meersch. Les Novelles, Brussels. 1969. 
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there was a widespread conviction that the Treaties contained a mechanism which would 
automatically transform the Economic Community into a political confederation or a 
federal State. 
Experienced political figures shared this conviction. Admittedly, after the ECSC had been 
set up, the failure of the European Defence Community (and with it the abandonment of 
all projects for creating a European political community) made it abundantly clear that 
the political will to create a federal Europe did not yet exist. The establishment of the 
EEC and the EAEC, however, served to put new life into the federalist theory. 
Learned men with great reputations championed the idea that the modern way of unifi-
cation is not, as in the 19th century, the creation of a common constitution, but the 
formation of a common administration.6 In other words they believed that European 
unification was going to occur gradually and ineluctably by the way of a common admin-
istration. 
This development, however, has not taken place. It has, on the contrary, become appar-
ent that there is no automatic process for bringing about European unification and that 
nothing can take the place of political will. This will had been limited from the start. The 
Treaties did not give the Community a system of instruments that would, if not auto-
matically, at any rate by providing a preconceived and clearly-delineated model, lead to 
the Community becoming a federation. The Treaties make the European Parliament an 
institution devoid of important powers of decision and equipped with powers of control 
which are not exercisable over the most powerful Community organ (the Council) but 
over the Commission. 
There is an idea, which is certainly widespread and supported by some eminent writers, 
that the Treaties provide for a system of balanced relations between the Council and the 
Commission, instead of which 'the Council has made itself the centre of gravity and has 
relegated the Commission... to the role of a satellite'.7 
The central position of the Council was in reality provided for in the Treaties themselves 
(except in the ECSC Treaty where, however, the power of the High Authority, now taken 
over by the Commission, is restricted by the detailed wording and the administrative 
character of the Treaty's provisions). 
6. The expectations of the early years that its technocratic superiority would eventually 
shift the centre of power in the Commission's favour have not been realized, still less the 
hope of seeing the latter evolve in the direction of becoming a 'European government' 
even in embryo. Indeed the opposite has occurred: on many points the Commission has 
been confirmed in the role of an organ for preparatory work on Council decisions, work 
which often goes unheeded. 
The declarations of the summit conferences at The Hague and in Paris, in 1969 and 1972, 
were unable to set their seal on the nature of the Community. Although, after the Dav-
ignon Report in 1970, European political cooperation was instituted and the regular ses-
sions of the 'European Council', provided for every four months, were begun from 1974, 
no action has been taken either on the Commission's far-reaching projects—the Werner 
Plan on economic and monetary union (1970) and the ambitious recommendations 
6 E. Fortshoff, Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer, Vol. 18, Berlin, 1960, 
p. 177. 
7 cf. Sasse in Die Zeit of 14 January 1972, p. 38. 
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of the Vedel group on enlarging the powers of the European Parliament (1972)—or on the 
prudent and modest Tindemans proposals on European Union, on the proposals of the 
Spierenburg working party regarding the reform of the Commission (1979) and those of 
the 'Three Wise Men' concerning the operation of the Community institutions (1979). 
After the international oil crisis in 1973, the Community programme for social action 
published that year came to nothing whereas it could have constituted the Community's 
contribution to the solution of one of the most vital problems of our time and have 
helped in the construction of European Union. However, though ambitious schemes 
usually do not come to fruition, more specific and restricted projects have a greater 
chance of success. Thus in 1979, for example, the European Monetary System came into 
operation. 
7. Two important steps were taken in the direction of European Union when the Euro-
pean Parliament began to participate, though to a limited extent, in the adoption of the 
Community budget (1975) and when direct elections based on universal suffrage were 
held in 1979. The European Parliament's newly acquired democratic legitimacy, conse-
quent upon its direct election, has, however, not been accompanied so far by any exten-
sion of its powers or by any noticeable reinforcement of its position in the Community's 
institutional system; it has therefore so far had no effect on the nature of the Community. 
This is, however, being progressively affected by the continual enlargement (even if this 
does not always occur in depth) of the Community's field of activity into almost every 
sphere of internal and external policy, by means of legislation in an ever-increasing field, 
as well as through regular or institutionalized consultation and collaboration. Often, 
however, the question is not European unification but rather forms of close intergovern-
mental cooperation. It is not in any case disputed that the Community was not originally, 
has not subsequently become and will not become, either through legal necessity or pol-
itical automatism, a federal State—although such a possibility of course remains open. 
This very fact (that there is an open possibility of a 'federalist' solution or a European 
Union) is an essential component of the Community which, viewed qualitatively, distin-
guishes the latter from traditional international organizations. 
113. The nature of the present-day Community (supranational and 
functional theories) 
8. This conclusion plainly leaves unanswered the question of what the Community's 
nature is today (and not yesterday or tomorrow) since there is no answer to be found in 
the traditional models of international law, any more than in those of domestic (national) 
law. 
If we leave aside the description of the Community as an international organization sui 
generis (a term denoting perplexity which in practice does little to solve the problem but 
merely evades it), there are essentially two answers, not incompatible with each other, 
that seek to explain the Community phenomenon, one derived from its international 
aspect and the other from its federal (nation State) aspect, in this connection emphasizing 
respectively the inter-State element or the administrative element of the Community. 
9. The first answer, the older of the two, is that the Community is an organization 
which is neither international nor national according to traditional concepts, but a 
'supranational' organization, the distinctive marks of which are possession of its own 
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sovereign rights (Hoheitsrechte), the independence of its institutions vis-à-vis the national 
governments and the power to make decisions not necessarily requiring unanimity but 
directly applicable both in the case of all the Member States and of the individuals living 
within its territory. These conceptual elements are not. however, sufficient to constitute a 
new independent concept and their use in the ECSC Treaty (Article 9(5) and (6), before 
its repeal by Article 19 of the Merger Treaty) and their omission in the Rome Treaties is 
of no special importance. The term 'supranational' is not in fact much used now-
adays. 
10. The other answer to the question regarding the present nature of the Community 
emphasizes its differences by comparison with the State and stresses its 'administration' 
aspect. Starting from the American theory of supranational functionalism as formulated 
by Mitrany and developed by Haas and Lindberg in particular, the German theory of the 
Community considered as an organization for special ends (Zweckverband according to 
the conceptual model of German administrative law) has been developed especially by 
Hans Peter Ipsen (Zweckverband funktionaler Integration).8 According to this theory, the 
Community is not a State because it does not possess the Kompetenz-Kompetenz, that is 
to say because it does not have universal competence in all spheres; on the contrary, 
since it only possesses specific powers which (just like the Community's objectives) are 
defined in the Treaties, it is an organization for special ends (particularly economic ends) 
and with limited powers. Understood in this way the nature of the Community presup-
poses, and accordingly is marked by, the absence of Community institutions with general 
normative (law-making) power, or, to use positive terminology, it exemplifies the general 
rule of specific delegation of powers (Prinzip der begrenzten Ermächtigungen, second 
subparagraph of Article 4(1) EEC). 
This description of the Community does not in any way prejudge its future orientation in 
the direction of the nation-State form or the rejection of such a form. However, it avoids 
too marked ideological involvement, such as has always been and still is devoid of pol-
itical foundation and motivation force, and consciously confines itself to the administra-
tive sphere for the attainment of specific objectives which can (it is presumed) be 
achieved within the framework and with the facilities at the Community's disposal. 
This theory, by minimizing the political element and stressing the technocratic, offered 
the Community the prospect, during the Gaullist era and in the period immediately 
following, of a safe voyage on the troubled waters which separated those who dreamed of 
a federal Europe on the one hand from the champions of a 'Europe of nation States' on 
the other. 
11 4. Assessment of the functional theory 
11. In reality this was clearly an attempt to remove the Community from the political 
arena. During the Gaullist era, even non-functionalists9 sought to bring about a divorce 
between the Community and politics, but the functionalist theory maintained that the 
Community could and should shun politics and political power with all its conflicts, by 
8 H.P. Ipsen, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, Tübingen, 1972, p. 197. 
9 D. Sidjanski. 'L'originalité des Communautés européennes et la répartition de leurs pouvoirs', RGDI, 1961, p. 
40 et seq., especially 1142. F. Rigaux, op. cit. at footnote 5 above, p. 36, No 101. 
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assuming an administrative and technocratic character: it was. moreover, from here that 
it drew some of the arguments opposing the alleged need for the 'democratic legit­
imation' and a democratic control of the Community (cf. W.N. Hogan: Power which 
does not exist does not need an external control in order to be consistent with 'democ­
racy'), ι» 
But it is clearly impossible to avoid politics. (Community activity is par excellence pol­
itical activity.) The Community, moreover, possesses strong and continually increasing 
political force not only in its own domain but also in the international field. Its political 
influence is not restricted solely to cases where it is operating, but extends also to fields 
which, for want of will or want of ability, it is not tackling at the right time or with the 
right degree of intensity. Talleyrand's definition of non­intervention (namely that it 
means almost the same thing as intervention) is already valid for the Community at the 
present day, and very likely will continue to be even more so in the future. At the same 
time, however, the Community's unifying force has been weakened by continual claims 
in support of national interests. Functionalism, which was to have turned the Commu­
nity away from its dangerous course of wandering in an impractical dream world, is 
incapable either of comprehending and appreciating the political dimension or of check­
ing the decline in European unification. 
12. On the other hand, functionalism is so safely and surely 'grounded' that it is not at 
all disposed to attempt a 'take off' and accordingly cannot offer a body of theory capable 
of evaluating Community activity which has been constantly expanding over the past 10 
years or so, even into realms not expressly provided for or barely mentioned in the 
Treaties (though admittedly other realms expressly provided for remain untouched). This 
action was possible from a legal point of view because the so­called principle of specific 
powers does not set narrow limits, but, quite the contrary, as has already been observed, 
a large number of'grants of legislative power' in the Treaties and especially, of course, 
the provision contained in Article 235 EEC, are drafted in wide terms and are, moreover, 
interpreted in a wide sense by the Court of Justice. In this way there is hardly any aspect 
of the Member States' policy which has escaped Community intervention, although, in a 
number of cases, this does not go beyond the limits of intergovernmental cooperation. 
13. Taking as his starting point the phenomenon of the grande illusion of creating a 
'European nation' and also the development of certain analogies with States which has 
occurred inside the European Community after some decades of coexistence, Thomas 
Oppermann " suggests making use of all the opposing theories existing up to the present 
and conceiving the Community as a political umbrella (parastaatliche Superstruktur). It 
would be preferable, however, to avoid the term 'State', which can give rise to false 
interpretations, and to keep to Carl Friedrich Ophül's well­tried and felicitous term 
'Community'; in other words simply to describe the nature of the Community as purely 
'Community' (communautaire) 12 and to concentrate our attention on distinguishing and 
coordinating its principal characteristics. 
10 W.N. Hogan, Representative Government and Integration, Lincoln. Nebraska, 1967, p. 207; sec also by the same 
author Political Representation and European Integration, Integration 1970. p. 294. 
11 T. Oppermann, Die Europäische Gemeinschaft als parastaatliche Superstruktur — Skizze einer Realitätsttm­
schreibung, in Festschrift für H.P. Ipsen, Tübingen, 1977, p. 688. 
12 E. Noël, Les rouages de l'Europe, Brussels, 1976, p. 11. 
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11 5. Centripetal and centrifugal tendencies in the Community 
14. Study of the European Community reveals both centripetal and centrifugal tenden-
cies, some of which are expressly laid down in the Treaties, while others have been 
recognized in case-law or have the support of prevailing legal theory though they have 
not been the specific subject-matter of judicial decisions. 
15. Chief among the centripetal influences in the Community are the following: 
(a) the creation, preservation and operation of a common market and common pol-
icies; 
(b) the amalgamation of the Community and its Member States into a system of com-
mon rights and obligations; 
(c) the elements of Community autonomy to be found in the procedure for revising the 
Treaties establishing the Communities or the Treaties amending these, and in the 
procedure for the accession of new Member States (or for association with third 
countries or international organizations); 
(d) the autonomous production of rules of law, the direct effect of these rules vis-à-vis 
individuals and their primacy over the domestic law of the Member States; 
(e) the Community's power to conclude certain international treaties to the exclusion of 
national competence in this respect; 
(0 elements of autonomy vested in the Community institutions (Council majority deci-
sions, Commission independence, direct election of Parliament by universal suf-
frage); 
(g) the Community's own resources; 
(h) the obligation to accept the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice and the character of its 
decisions, which are binding on the parties concerned and (to some extent) capable of 
enforcement; 
(i) the possession of legal personality by the Community and the Community liability. 
16. The centrifugal influences in the Community are chiefly as follows: 
(a) the large and continuing 'national wedges' driven into the common market, the lim-
ited number of common policies and the failure to develop some of these to the 
full; 
(b) the dominant elements of international law in the procedure for revising the Com-
munity Treaties and the procedure for the accession of new Member States; 
(c) the restriction of the Community to certain, admittedly wide, spheres of action (chief-
ly economic), to the exclusion of defence policy in particular; 
(d) the absence of general legislative power; 
(c) the dominance of the national element in the operation of the Council and the Com-
mittee of Permanent Representatives (which accounts for the use of the Luxembourg 
compromise regarding unanimous decisions by the Council); 
(0 the reservations in favour of national power (for example, safeguard clauses); 
(g) the right of Member States to withdraw which, at the present stage of European 
integration, cannot be legally denied. 
17. The characteristic marks of the Community which we can distinguish on the basis 
of the above and from the decisions of the Court of Justice are unity, a new legal order 
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and a dynamic enlargement of aims and activities entailing increased participation by the 
Community in politics. 
11 6. Community unity 
18. The 'unity' element, which is being emphasized more and more by the Court of 
Justice, is contained not only in the idea of a common market and common policies but 
also in the idea of Community in general. The chief signs of this 'unity' element are the 
following: 
(a) the principle of the equality of Member States with regard to Community law; 
(b) the principle of Community preference; 
(c) the principle of Community loyalty or the duty of solidarity; 
(d) the principle of indivisibility, balancing benefits and burdens; 
(e) the principle of the Community's 'external' power to conclude international agree-
ments, to the exclusion of the Member States' power, being parallel and proportionate 
to its 'internal' normative power; 
(f) the principle of unity or of the uniform application of Community law. which results 
in its primacy over national laws and the direct effect of the rules of Community-
law. 
11 7. The existence of a Community legal order 
19. One characteristic element of the Community is the creation of a new legal order 
resulting from the limitation of their sovereign rights by the Member States. The EEC 
Treaty (as well as the general principles of Community law) is evolving towards a kind of 
'constitution' for the Community which also includes protection for individual rights 
which is gradually taking shape. 
The principal characteristics of this new legal order are : 
(a) the specific, independent Community institutions which, although lacking general 
legislative power, nevertheless have had very wide powers conferred on them by the 
Treaties and are continually increasing the scope of these powers; 
(b) the fact that individuals, alongside the Member States, are entitled to certain 
rights; 
(c) the direct effect of certain rules of Community law; 
(d) the primacy of Community law over national laws, including constitutional law and 
even the constitutional protection of individual rights; 
(e) the creation not only of rights and obligations but also of obligatory procedures for 
enquiring into infringements and applying sanctions, particularly the provision for 
submission to the Court of Justice and the binding character of that Court's deci-
sions; 
(f) Community liability for unlawful conduct of its institutions or servants. 
20. The European Community's new legal order simultaneously presupposes and 
creates unity—and vice versa. The Community is above all a 'Community based on law' 
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in the sense that the relations between the Community's subjects are relations between 
subjects of law and 'legalized' to a high degree under the control of the Court, which 
must 'ensure that... the law is observed' (Article 164 EEC). For this reason Community 
law is important as a unifying factor, especially because not only the Member States, but 
also individuals, have been recognized as directly subject to that law. This explains the 
particular importance of the Court of Justice (S.S. Scheingold, P. Pescatore, A.W. Green, 
O. Mann, etc.). These observations are confirmed by decisions of the national courts 
which, after considerable initial reservations and hesitations, acknowledge the autonomy 
and primacy of Community law. It is however significant that, in the case-law of the four 
'big' Member States, the primacy of Community law still meets with opposition, es-
pecially in France. Nevertheless, we can say that time is on the side of and not against full 
recognition of the autonomy and primacy of the Community legal order and that, in this 
process, the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities plays a crucial 
part. 
H 8. The far-reaching character of the Community's aims and activities 
21. The third element characteristic of the Community is the dynamic extension of its 
aims and activities (despite certain set-backs) and its consequently increased involvement 
in politics. In the present political climate, as regards the near future, the Community has 
neither the intention nor the ability to take over the role of the Member States. More-
over, the Court of Justice itself, as has been properly observed, 13 avoids definitions of 
the Community couched in systematic terms. Meanwhile the Community field of action 
is continually expanding, though with different degrees of intensity. 
Nowadays, there is hardly any State activity which remains totally unaffected by the 
Community activity; certain State powers cannot be effectively exercised without Com-
munity cooperation. The Community may consequently be distinguished from the State 
not so much by the extent but principally by the intensity of its powers. The inevitable 
expansion (as a whole) of the Community's field of action (a tendency far stronger than 
the Community's ability to modify the status quo, even where this is the object of con-
tinual bitter criticism, as in the case, for example, of the Community's common agricul-
tural policy or staff policy) entails increased involvement in politics and raises ever more 
acutely two problems which are often confused: justification and democratic legitimation 
of Community power. Justification for the Community is to be found in the opening of 
new fields of action to safeguard the peace, liberty and well-being of its citizens 14 (for 
this reason imbalance in Community activities, especially in agriculture/industry or 
farmer/consumer relations, has considerable repercussions on the Community's credibil-
ity). This justification does not, however, make democratic legitimation superfluous; the 
direct election of the European Parliament marked an important step forward in this 
connection but it has not yet been brought to a final conclusion. The future development 
of the European Parliament's position and powers will reflect fairly accurately the devel-
opment of the nature of the Community. 
13 cf. J. Boulouis and R.M. Chevallier, Les grands arrêts de la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes, 
Paris, 1977, Vol. 1, pp. 191, 194 et seq. 
14 cf. V. Everling, Vom Zweckverband zur Europäischen Union Überlegungen zur Struktur der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft, in Festschrift für H.P. Ipsen, Tübingen, 1977, p. 595, 11613. 
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Chapter III — The powers 
of the Community 
by Antonio Tizzano 
Section I — The framework of powers 
conferred by the Treaties 
/. Although intended to pursue wide aims and exercise far-reaching powers, the Euro-
pean Communities, as is well known, do not have unlimited jurisdiction. Unlike States, 
but like other international organizations, all they actually possess is merely a derived 
power, compétence d'attribution to use the traditional phrase; in other words, they must 
act within the framework of the provisions laid down in their respective statute. 
Although nowadays this statement does not fully explain the significance of the Commu-
nity experiment and a deeper study of its meaning and scope is therefore needed, it 
remains the indispensable starting point for any enquiry into Community powers. 
To define the framework of these powers, it is therefore necessary to start from the 
original design of the Treaties. But it must also be remembered that these texts do not set 
out a list of the subjects falling within the Communities' jurisdiction, as is usually the 
case—to take a fairly common example—in federal States or States where wide auton-
omous powers are granted to lesser territorial entities. As is true of the majority of 
international organizations, the technique employed in the Treaties is, by contrast, more 
complex because the sphere of Community competence is defined by reference to a 
combination of elements to be assessed; it is based on the subject dealt with as well as on 
the action the Community may undertake and the powers which have been conferred 
upon it for that purpose. 
Thus, to consider the EEC Treaty alone at this stage, it is useful to remember that, apart 
from indications furnished by the preamble and provisions relating to individual sec-
tors, ' the organization's objectives are set out in general terms in Article 2, which states 
that 'the Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and pro-
gressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout 
the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and 
balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of 
living and closer relations between the States belonging to it'. However, having specified 
the ends, the Treaty does not automatically confer on the Community all the powers 
necessary for attaining them. Developing the theme and expanding the meaning of part of 
See, for example, Articles 29, 39, 110, 117, 123. 
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the sentence appearing in Article 2 ('by establishing a common market and progressively 
approximating the economic policies'), Article 3 proceeds to draw up a list of tasks to be 
executed and instruments to be used for the purpose of attaining the Treaty's objectives. 
These tasks and these instruments are not, however, necessarily encompassed by the 
'activities of the Community', or, at least, they are not entrusted solely to the Commu-
nity institutions, since there is also provision for action by the Member States or by 
bodies which in the strict sense are not included in the Community institutional sys-
tem. 2 
In other words, the principle of derived powers also applies with regard to the EEC. This 
principle emerges chiefly from Article 3, which specifies that the activities of the Com-
munity must be exercised 'as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the time-
table set out therein', whereas the second subparagraph of Article 4(1), which is usually 
quoted in this connection, only refers to the principle indirectly. This provision, which 
states that 'each institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by 
this Treaty' is probably only intended to affect interinstitutional relations and to empha-
size the internal spheres of competence inherent in those relations. But as a whole the 
principle is chiefly apparent in the system adopted by the Treaty, which consists in spe-
cifying, in its substantive rules, the scope, conditions and methods for exercising the 
various Community powers, thus ensuring that provisions of a general character cannot 
be interpreted as automatically conferring unlimited powers of action on the Community 
institutions. 
2. It follows that, abiding by the texts, the substantive powers of the EEC have to be 
reconstituted on the basis of each of the Treaty's various rules, by identifying not only the 
matters which are the subject of them, but, necessarily too, the nature and extent of the 
powers in these matters which have, in each case, been conferred on the Community. 
Thus to sum up very briefly the principal powers of the EEC, the first point, following the 
lay-out of the Treaty itself, is the sector on the free movement of goods, persons and 
capital, where the powers conferred on the Community are especially far-reaching. The 
subjects are, however, adequately defined by the Treaty which also lays down the general 
terms of the rules to apply to these subjects and the conditions under which Community 
action is to take place; this action is to consist chiefly in fixing time-limits and arrange-
ments for achieving freedom of movement. This explains the frequent use of the directive 
as an instrument, since Community intervention is chiefly intended to stimulate and 
coordinate action by the Member States whose duty it is to adopt the practical measures 
necessary for achieving free movement.3 Quite often, especially in the movement of 
goods sector, the Treaty imposes specific obligations directly on the Member States to act 
or refrain from acting, so that action by the institutions is limited to supervisory tasks, 
apart from the general power to issue recommendations.4 
In other sectors (agriculture: Articles 38 to 47; transport: Articles 74 to 84; commercial 
policy: Articles 110 to 116) the Community's power is, on the contrary, marked by a 
2 As in the case of the EIB (Articles 129 and 130). As regards action by the Member States see, for example. 
Articles 11, 13, 16, 23, 27, 31 to 34, 37, 50, 53, 62, 95, 102, 221. 
3 See especially Articles 13, 14, 21, 33, 49, 54, 56, 57, 63, 66, 69, 70. 
4 See for example, Articles 11, 13, 16, 23, 27, 31 to 34, 37 for the free movement of goods. For other movements. 
Articles 50, 53, 62, 64, 65, 68, 71. See further the tax provisions directly linked to the free movement of goods 
(Articles 95 and 96). 
44 
wider spread of normative powers; the Treaty confines itself to defining Community 
objectives in general terms, leaving it to the institutions to adopt specific implementing 
provisions. These are, moreover, the sectors where the Community's 'legislative' power 
is most often spoken of, meaning that in these cases the institutions enjoy a wide margin 
of discretion as regards both the choice and the content of normative instruments for 
attaining the specific objectives of the sector. 
Competition policy is defined with precision by the Treaty, so that the institutions' nor-
mative powers are limited to implementing the principles set out in Articles 85 and 86. In 
this domain there are duties involving direct management entrusted to the institutions of 
the EEC, so that it is incumbent on them to ensure observance of Community rules, to 
assess the legality of behaviour in this context and to put an end to any infringements 
that may occur. 
3. In other sectors the texts make Community power less clear, with outlines which are 
less well defined though potentially more flexible. This is particularly true of economic 
and monetary policy which, after an early mention in Article 3(g) and in Article 6, is 
governed by Articles 103 (Conjunctural policy) and 104 to 109 (Balance of payments). 
Given the importance and the nature of this subject, the Treaty relies in essence on action 
by the Member States, although it does not rule out various forms of intervention on the 
part of the Community institutions; control and coordination (Article 105), exercising 
direct powers of decision (e.g. Articles 107 to 109) and even the exercise of'legislative' 
powers.5 
The extent of Community powers is, on the other hand, particularly limited in the social 
policy sector, which is basically entrusted to action and collaboration by the Member 
States (Articles 117 to 122) except in respect of the organization and operation of the 
European Social Fund (Articles 123 to 128). In this sector, as generally in all the sectors 
so far considered, note must be taken of the power, to some extent instrumental, which 
the Treaty confers on the Community for the approximation of such national provisions 
'as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common market' (Article 100 
and, for more specific cases, Articles 54(g), 99 and 101). The question here is one of 
normative power, functionally circumscribed, in that it has no specific subject-matter but 
may exert an influence on rules in numerous sectors in order to attain the stated objec-
tives of Article 100. These objectives are and have in fact been open to the very widest 
interpretation, particularly in order to promote the development of Community power in 
the so-called 'frontier' zones and preventing recourse in these fields to agreements 
between Member States (see point 16 below). 
Finally some mention must be made of the Community's powers in the field of external 
relations where, apart from commercial policy which has already been mentioned, there 
are contemplated agreements with certain international organizations (Articles 229 to 
231) and especially association agreements (Article 238). 
5 This is especially true of Article 103 under which, for example, regulations were issued for conserving and 
managing fish stocks, such as Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 350/77 of 18 February 1977 (OJ L48, 19.2.1977); 
672/77 of 25 July 1977 (OJ L 186, 26.7.1977); or on energy and supply policy, especially control of imports of 
crude oil and/or petroleum products: Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 1893/79 of 28 August 1979 (OJ L220, 
30.8.1979), 2592/79 of 20 November 1979 (OJ L297, 24.11.1979), 649/80 of 17 March 1980 (OJ L 73, 
19.3.1980). 
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Section II — The development of 
Community powers 
4. The Treaties establishing the European Communities outline, in a ven' sketchy and 
limited fashion, the actual extent of Community powers as it has been determined over 
the years by virtue of an extremely dynamic practice, which has progressively led to a 
considerable expansion of these powers, with results often exceeding the most optimistic 
expectations. It is accordingly necessary to look beyond the Treaties in order to discover 
the instruments, tendencies and results of this practice. 
In this connection it must be observed, very briefly, that the advances just mentioned 
have basically been achieved in two ways: on the one hand, developing principles and 
techniques of interpretation, especially judicial, that made clear the full potential of the 
rules known as Community law; on the other hand, by making continually wider and 
more frequent use of the clauses in the Treaties which lay down formal procedures to 
supplement the powers of the Community institutions, especially Articles 95 ECSC. 203 
EAEC and 235 EEC (see point 8). 
It is true that many commentators, who in general emphasize the importance of the route 
which, for convenience, one may call judicial, nevertheless, as regards the extension of 
Community powers, end by diminishing its scope. Such an approach is only partially-
satisfactory, chiefly because it is possible nowadays to take as a standard of reference a 
rich and meaningful practice which makes clearer the system's direction and lines of 
development, and the implications of the process underlying it. It will become apparent 
that, although formally and logically distinct, the two ways described are in reality closely 
connected at a functional level, in the sense that both tend toward the development of 
Community powers; though following different routes, they give expression to needs 
which are basically alike and they reflect in very similar ways the evolutionary tendencies 
in the system as well as the principles of interpretation and the politico-constitutional 
practice developing within the system and finding expression principally in these two 
ways. 
Proof of all this is furnished by a sort of interaction and reciprocity between these two 
methods on account of their common function, and also because for a long time, owing 
to the vicissitudes suffered by the Community enterprise, they had been employed in 
different ways. The judicial method represented at the outset practically the only means 
of strengthening and developing Community powers in view of the reluctance of the 
Member States to make any appreciable use of Article 235. However, from about 1973, 
following certain political developments which will be covered later, a change eventually 
took place. Since that date the two ways have been employed almost on an equal footing, 
because the more frequent use made of Article 235 in no way curbed judicial action and 
the wide influence of the latter did not and does not affect recourse to the other 
method. 
It may broadly be said that the real result of employing Article 235 instead of conferring 
more vigorous powers of action in cases already coming within Community jurisdiction 
was to extend this jurisdiction to cases where such jurisdiction did not exist or was open 
to some doubt. The alternative way, on the contrary, apart from the results which arc 
covered in the next paragraph, brought about an increase in the institutions' powers of 
action in sectors already subject to Community jurisdiction. 
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H 1. The doctrine of implied powers and the role of the Court of Justice 
5. In any rapid analysis of the judicial way, it must be emphasized that the extension of 
Community powers through the practice of the institutions, and of the Court of Justice in 
particular, was underestimated: this attitude is based essentially on the general recogni­
tion of the principle of derived powers in connection with Articles 235 EEC, 95 ECSC 
and 203 EAEC. which lay down a special procedure for supplementing these powers. 
Accordingly it is generally and nowadays almost automatically accepted that extension of 
Community powers beyond the formal provisions should be entirely or very substantially 
ruled out. In particular, application to the European Communities of the doctrine of 
implied powers should be severely restricted. This theory of judicial origin was devel­
oped by the Supreme Court of the United States and gradually spread to important 
international tribunals where it is used both to legitimize and to curtail the common 
tendency of federal States and international organizations to extend in the practice their 
own jurisdiction regardless of the traditional principle that limits to the sovereignty of 
States are not to be presumed. In particular, it is perhaps useful to recall briefly that this 
theory, which at the outset recognized powers not expressly conferred by the texts but 
indispensable for carrying out the institutions' tasks more thoroughly, ultimately accepted 
the grant of new powers and functions in so far as they were necessary to the attainment 
of the ends laid down by the constituent act.6 As mentioned previously, even if its 
application is admissible, it is only in very limited terms that the doctrine has been 
accepted in the context of the European Communities, bearing in mind that the above-
mentioned provisions in the Treaties restrict its implementation. 
One observation can, however, be made : in its pressing anxiety to observe the principle 
of derived powers and, more generally, the principle of legality, the approach just des­
cribed, both in this case and in the case of the problems raised by Article 235 EEC, ends 
by overlooking the possibility that an overall evolution of the system with its conse­
quences might require such broad rules of interpretation and constitutional practices that 
the very principle would be affected. Accordingly, instead of evaluating the validity of the 
principle from this point of view, commentators either criticize the important practical 
developments as excessive and unjustified, or else minimize their significance and 
scope. 
If, however, profitable and realistic instruction is to be sought from the substantial and 
forceful action so far taken by the Court of Justice, with the constant consent, moreover, 
of the Member States, the restrictive conclusions described above may be somewhat 
tempered. 
For the case-law of the Supreme Court of the United States, see especially the celebrated judgment in the case of 
McCulloch ν Maryland ( 1819), in Munro, The Constitution of the United States, 1947, p. 55. For international 
case-law, apart from the consultative opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice on the powers of 
the European Commission of the Danube (PCIJ, Series B, No 14, p. 64), the following are of special interest: 
consultative opinions of the International Court of Justice of 11 April 1948, on compensation for damage 
sustained by individuals in the service of the United Nations (ICJ [1949] 179); of 13 July 1954, on the effect of 
judgments by the Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations awarding damages (ICJ [1954] 57); of 20 July 
1962, concerning certain expenditure by the United Nations (ICJ [1962] 168). In particular, in the first of these 
opinions the Court, referring to the United Nations, stated that the rights and duties of a body such as the 
organization must depend on its aims and functions as set out or implied in its constituent act and developed in 
practice. 
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6. It is true that the more restrictive version of the doctrine of implied powers seemed 
at the outset to have been endorsed by the Court of Justice itself, whose judgments 
appeared openly to conform to it, albeit rather more in practical effect than in statements 
of principle.7 
One element, however, is generally overlooked : in the Court's case­law, as opposed to the 
works of legal writers, this theory is not in any way connected with the existence in the 
Community Treaties of the provisions mentioned above; indeed no reference is ever 
made to them. All things considered, the theory seems the product of initial political 
hesitation on the part of the Court of Justice, especially in ECSC matters, arising from the 
caution which was inevitable in the face of a process which at the time was taking its first 
steps in order to find a definitive asset. Once these hesitations had been surmounted and 
a new case­law had started to emerge, there is no longer any trace to be found in the 
Court's judgments of the theory of implied powers as such. Instead, increasingly wide­
ranging principles of interpretation gradually emerge, and then become definitely esta­
blished; taking, however, the same direction as the theory assimilating it and stripping 
out the restrictive version, they provide greater impulse for construction and definition of 
the Community legal system and especially for extension of the institutions' powers. 
These principles and rules of interpretation are variously designated and classified by 
legal writers, but they all point in the same direction and have the same objective, 
namely the strengthening and development of Community integration. Whether the 
expression used is implied powers, teleological, dynamic and evolutive interpretation, the 
principle of practical effect or, more succinctly, functional interpretation, these principles 
and rules of interpretation are in any case homogeneous and always take that objective as 
a decisive and univocal guidance. 
This position has yielded results of considerable importance going far beyond the matter 
under examination because they influence the reconstitution of the whole system. How­
ever, from this angle too, as regards the operation of Community law, the precise defin­
ition of the Member States' obligations and, as a corollary, the reinforcement of the 
powers conferred on the Community institutions, it is not without importance that case­
law should confirm the immediate effect of numerous rules in the Treaties establishing 
the Communities and in the implementing legislation, the direct effect of these rules 
and their primacy over rules made by the Member States (see Chapter VI). But above 
all, in this field, interpretation by the Court has on every occasion enabled the sphere of 
Community powers to be enlarged, sometimes through strict definition of Member 
States' obligations derived directly from the Treaties, sometimes through broad interpre­
See CJEC Case 8/55 Fédération charbonnière de Belgique ν High Authority [1956] ECR 299: 'without having 
recourse to a wide interpretation, it is possible to apply a rule of interpretation generally accepted in both 
international and national law, according to which the rules laid down by an international treaty or a law 
presuppose the rules without which that treaty or law would have no meaning or could not be reasonably and 
usefully applied'. 
See also CJEC Case 20/59 Government of the Italian Republic ν High Authority [1960] ECR 663: Case 25/59 
Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands ν High Authority [1960] ECR 731. For a restrictive application of 
this case­law see also Case 31/59 Acciaieria e Tubificio di Brescia ν High Authority [1960] ECR 169 et seq.: 
Joined Cases 4 to 13/59 Mannesmann ν High Authority [1960] 271 et seq. 
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tation of the overall effect of the powers conferred or, with the same result, of the con­
cepts taken by the Community rules as their standard of reference.8 
7. However, intervention by the Court of Justice sometimes ends in results so far-
reaching that they tend to blur the boundary between broad interpretation and enlarge­
ment of Community powers and to give rise to the view that even the limits of the 
restricted version of the doctrine of implied powers have been exceeded. This problem 
arises mainly in connection with the EEC's power to conclude agreements; until the 
Court delivered its judgments, even though the doctrine was kept in mind, it was almost 
unanimously considered that the Treaty did not authorize the exercise of such power 
outside the cases expressly provided for. Instead, relying on the principles of interpreta­
tion discussed above, the Court of Justice, subsequently supported by a large section of 
legal opinion, decided upon an entirely opposite view and in gradual stages defined the 
principles of parallelism between the Community's internal and external powers, making 
the extent of the latter proportionate to the increase in the former.9 
It is not possible here to embark upon a more profound analysis of this line of cases (see 
Chapter IX for a closer examination). Nevertheless, it should be noted that in view of the 
interpretations current before this line of decisions was developed, of the terms in which 
it has been expressed and its objective scope, this line of decisions seems to transcend the 
restricted version of the doctrine of implied powers and almost to go so far as to envisage 
a genuine extension of Community powers outside the procedure laid down in Article 
235 EEC, in spite of the fact that this provision is equally applicable in the field of 
external relations. It has been actually suggested that Article 235 has undergone a sort of 
judicial transposition on to this field. 10 The fact that such developments are generally 
justified by invoking the broad principles of interpretation already referred to does not 
affect the root of the problem, when it is results rather than phrases that are under 
consideration. 
The work done by the Court of Justice thus presents a much more pliant and articulate 
surface picture than results from the current rigid concept of the doctrine of implied 
powers and it enables the restrictive conclusions set out above to be relaxed. In particu­
lar, it can be held that use of Article 235 and analogous provisions is rendered necessary 
only when there is absolutely no possibility of granting powers to the Community insti­
tutions either on the basis of express provisions in the Treaties or by application of all the 
principles developed over the years by the Court of Justice for reconstituting and defining 
the system. It is indeed only on these terms that it is possible to reach a conclusion which 
does not formally devalue this action on the part of the Court and, at the same time, 
provides a plausible explanation for the otherwise unjustifiable coexistence of such con­
sistently vigorous action alongside the wide use made of Article 235. 
See, for example, Opinion 1/75 [1975] ECR 1355 et seq. and 1364; Opinion 1/78 [1979] ECR 2871 regarding the 
concept of commercial policy and Community competence in the matter. 
See especially Opinion 1/76 [1977] ECR 755; but also Case 22/70 Commission ν Council (AETR) [1971] 263; 
Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76 Kramer [1976] ECR 1279; Case 61/77 Commission ν Ireland [1978] ECR 417; Case 
88/77 Minister for Fisheries ν Schonenberg [1978] ECR 473; Cases 185 to 204/78 van Dam [1979] ECR 2345; 
Case 141/78 French Republic ν United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [1980] ECR 2923; Case 
32/79 Commission ν United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [1980] ECR 2403. 
See Hardy, 'Opinion 1/76 of the Court of Justice: the Rhine Case and the Treaty-Making Powers of the 
Community', CML. Rev. 1977, p. 561, especially at p. 592. 
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11 2. The provisions in the Treaties for allowing an extension of Commu-
nity powers (especially Article 235 EEC) 
A. Function and scope of Article 235 
8. Independent of the above and separate from the actual procedure for amending the 
texts (Articles 96 ECSC, 236 EEC, 204 EAEC), the Treaties contain a special normative 
instrument for extending Community powers in order to tackle, in due form but with 
more flexible procedures, the gradual adaptations bound to be required in organizations 
as dynamic as the Communities. This instrument is Article 95(1) ECSC. Article 235 EEC 
and Article 203 EAEC. Except for some details, we shall only examine here the article 
which, in practice, is by far the most important, namely Article 235 EEC. " 
9. Nowadays it would probably seem superfluous to emphasize the exceptional import-
ance of this archetypal provision. It must not, however, be forgotten that in the past this 
opinion was less prevalent and that it is only in recent years that the provision has 
received adequate attention, by virtue here too of considerable—and sometimes even 
unforeseeable—developments in practice. The provision came to be vigorously and sys-
tematically applied and more lively and widespread interest in the surrounding theory 
was aroused, since it became possible to find more practical points of reference for an 
argument which had for a long time remained basically theoretical. 12 
" The text of the provision reads as follows: 'If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the 
course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not 
provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and 
after consulting the Assembly, take the appropriate measures. ' Article 203 EAEC is drafted in identical fashion 
but does not contain the phrase 'in the course of the operation of the common market'. 
But the text of the first paragraph of Article 95 ECSC is different: 'In all cases not provided for in this Treaty 
where it becomes apparent that a decision or recommendation of the High Authority is necessary lo attain 
within the common market in coal and steel and in accordance with Article 5, one of the objectives of the 
Community set out in Articles 2, 3 and 4, the decision may be taken or the recommendation made with the 
unanimous assent of the Council and after the Consultative Committee has been consulted.' The second and 
third paragraph of the article contain what is called the small revision clause: in this connection see point 26 
below and Chapter IV. 
12 Apart from general works on the Community, see especially: Wohlfarth, 'Art. 235', in Wohlfarth. Evcrling. 
Glaesner, Sprung: Die EWG, Kommentar zum Vertrag, [I960]; Ferrari-Bravo, Giardina. 'Commento art. 235'. 
in Quadri, Monaco, Trabucchi: Commentario CEE. 1965. Vol. Ill, pp. 1699-1713; von Meibom. Lückenfüllung 
bei den Europäischen Gemeinschaftsverträgen. NJW, 1968. p. 2165 et seq.; Marenco, Les conditions d'applica-
tion de l'art. 235 du traité CEE, RMC, 1970, p. 147; Gericke, Allgemeine Rechtsetzungsbefugnisse nach Art. 235 
EWG-Vertrag. 1970; Schumacher, Die Ausfüllung von Kompetenzlücken im Verfassungsrecht der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaften, AWD des BB, 1970, p. 539; Gori, 'Commento art. 95', in Quadri. Monaco. Trabucchi: Com-
mentario CECA, 1970, Vol. II, p. 1325-1345; Henckel von Donncrsmarck. Planimmanente Krisensteuerung in 
der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft. 1971; Mitzka. Möglichkeiten und Grenzen des Art. 235 EWG-Ver-
trag, ZZVerbr., 1972, p. 357; Peeters, L'art. 235 du traité CEE et les relations extérieures de la CEE. RMC. 
1973, p. 141 ; Lesguillons, L'extension des compétences de la CEE par l'art. 235 du traité de Rome. AFDl. 1974. 
p. 886; Ehring, 'Art. 235', in von der Groeben, von Boeckh. Thiesing: Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag, II, 1974. 
pp. 749-796; Giardina, 'The Rule of Law and Implied Powers in the European Communities', in Italian 
Yearbook of International Law, 1975, p. 99 et seq.; Everling. Die allgemeine Ermächtigung der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft zur Zielverwirklichung nach Art. 235 EWG-Vertrag, EuR, 1976. special issue, p. 2 et seq.; 
Schwartz, EG-Rechtsetzungsbefugnisse, insbesondere nach Art. 235 — ausschließlich oder konkurrierend?, idem, 
p. 27 et seq.; Tomuschat, Die Rechtsetzungsbefugnisse der EWG in Generalermächtigungen, insbesondere in Art. 
235 EWG, idem, p. 45 et seq.; Lauwaars, Art. 235 als Grundlage für die flankierende Politiken im Rahmen der 
Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion, EuR, 1976, p. 100; Kapteyn, 'Art. 235', in Smit en Herzog: The Law of the 
European Economic Community, Vol. V, 1978, p. 288 et seq. ; Olmi. La place de l'art. 235 CEE dans le système 
des attributions de compétence à la Communauté, in Mélanges F. Dehousse, 1979. p. 279-295; Kaiser. Grenzen 
der EG-Zuständigkeit. EuR, 1980, p. 97; Tizzano, Lo sviluppo delle competenze materiali delle Comunità euro-
pee, RD, EuR, 1981, p. 139 et seq. 
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Various factors brought about and maintain these developments; it is therefore necessary 
to give a brief summary of them, though in extremely succinct and schematic terms. 
Emphasis must first be laid on the dynamic nature of the system and on the evolution 
already mentioned in the previous paragraph, both of which are equally relevant to 
Article 235. That article is itself subject to the broad principles of interpretation described 
above and to the tensions which accelerate the progress of the system, the more so 
because it is drafted in sufficiently general terms to allow for considerable extension of its 
scope. 
Furthermore, the constantly changing situations, the dynamics of economic processes, the 
fact that the objectives of the Treaty are gradually fulfilled and the ever increasing areas 
occupied by Community activities inevitably lead to further developments. This is espe-
cially true in the field of general economic policy where, as we have seen, the Treaty 
restricts the Community institutions merely to the task of coordination (see point 3). 
When the transitional period was over and the customs union more or less fully esta-
blished together with some sectoral policies (agriculture, transport, commercial policy), 
the limits of the system became more clearly apparent in face of the further developments 
called for: to allow for closer and broader cooperation and to remedy the social and 
regional imbalances occasioned by the actual introduction of the common market itself 
and, especially, to tackle the consequences of the monetary and energy crisis and then the 
more general crisis in the world economy. The developing integration process has also 
revealed new needs in the sectors of industry, technology, environmental conservation, 
consumer protection, etc., where common action by the institutions finally proved desir-
able or even indispensable (see point 25). 
The most effective instrument for achieving the objectives described could only be the ad 
hoc procedure laid down in Article 235, not only because of the length and complexity of 
the mechanism for a formal revision of the Treaty provided for in Article 236, but owing, 
especially, to the doubts entertained as to its being politically practical and the inherent 
risks of weakening the Treaty's original design. 
10. It is clear, however, that the reasons marshalled above would in practice have 
achieved very little, if the Member States had not been politically in full agreement on 
the advantage of employing Article 235. Whether the reason lies in objective pressures 
resulting from integration, impulsion arising as a result of the new situations described 
above, internal pressures in the system, reluctance to embark on the formal revision 
procedure or perhaps in the conviction that its development can be controlled owing to 
the decision mechanism contained in the provision, it is a fact that the national govern-
ments have at a certain stage abandoned their initial mistrust of Article 235 and agreed 
that this provision should be put into practical effect. The turning point was reached at 
the summit of Heads of State or Government held in Paris from 10 to 21 October 1972. 
On that occasion the political leaders of the Member States, stating their desire to pro-
ceed with strengthening and completing the Community, agreed to the introduction of an 
economic and monetary union and requested that a series of action programmes be 
drawn up in the sectors mentioned above, expressing the opinion that 'it was advisable to 
use as widely as possible all the provisions of the Treaties including Article 235 of the 
EEC Treaty'. From that moment Article 235 came to be in frequent use, especially since 
subsequent summits impliedly renewed the call to that effect whenever the Community 
institutions were asked to produce action programmes in sectors where recourse to that 
provision was unavoidable. 
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The developments just described are quite clearly of fundamental importance. Apart 
from occasional specific reservations, they make plain not only the Member States' 
acquiescence in a practice the legality and expediency of which have previously been 
often in doubt, but also their explicit willingness to exceed the limits usually set for the 
application of Article 235. The fact that these limits have been exceeded in actual fact at 
the instance of the Community's highest policy-making body confirms, on a more general 
level, the close connection between the constitutional development of that organization 
and the definition of limits on the use of Article 235. 
Furthermore, the agreement of the national governments once achieved, there has been 
no insurmountable resistance offered in practice to the extension of Community powers 
already mentioned, apart from that arising out of objective difficulties inherent in indiv-
idual subjects. The other Community institutions could not, of course, raise objections; 
they had always favoured both enlarging the organization's powers and using Community 
procedures for the purpose. But, after full consideration, no fundamental difficulties have 
arisen even at national level. The consolidation of the Community phenomenon, the 
wide consensus of political and social forces towards the progress of European integra-
tion, the gradual adjustment of relations between Community and State legal systems, a 
constitutional practice matured over many years and now definitely orientated in the 
direction of full acceptance of the Community experience, have all contributed to over-
coming initial resistance and actually increasing the readiness of the constitutional bodies 
to cooperate in this matter. 13 
In conclusion, it would not be unduly rash to speak of the formation of a genuine con-
stitutional practice within the Community orientated towards extremely broad applica-
tion of Article 235 and rather flexible delineation ofthat provision's limits, in the sense 
that its frontiers advance from time to time, keeping pace with the overall development 
of the system and the consequences that this entails as regards the definition of the 
Community and the attainment of its objectives. 
B. The conditions for the application of Article 235 of the EEC Treaty 
11. The conclusions just stated can be confirmed and illustrated in more detail by 
examining the many problems of interpretation raised by Article 235 and studying the 
indications furnished by practical experience. Since these are subjects which have already 
been widely discussed by legal writers, we shall be able to limit ourselves to summarizing 
the basic conditions and the principal questions raised. 
I. The attainment of one of the 'objectives' of the Community 
12. First of all it is necessary to examine the meaning and effect of the condition that 
new powers may be conferred on the institutions only if this is necessary 'to attain, in the 
course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Treaty'. 
13 On this subject see point 22 also. Of course the preceding observations, as is clear in the text, concern the 
specific problem discussed here and are not intended to describe as idyllic relations which in many respects are 
peculiarly tormented (see, in this connection, Kaiser, op. cit. at footnote 12 above, p. 100 et seq). 
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Nowadays, it seems self-evident that, when defining these 'objectives', the principal 
point of reference must be Article 2 of the Treaty which lists the tasks of the Community. 
In the great majority of cases, acts based on Article 235 are indeed aimed at the objec-
tives set out in Article 2, sometimes referring explicitly to that provision, but most often 
confining themselves to the use of its terminology. There are, however, some acts where 
the reasoning is expressed in extremely vague terms or which contain no reasoning of this 
kind; similarly there are acts which introduce objectives that are not set out in any 
provision of the Treaty ('the attainment of economic and monetary union') or which 
employ vague phrases ('smooth running', 'harmonious operation' of the Community) or 
which appear to avoid any reference to a specific provision and merely make allusion to 
an overall evaluation of the system. 
However, in this connection it is clearly not the use of ritual phrases that counts, nor the 
description, however full and detailed, of the objectives to be pursued. What is important 
is that the innovation should be actually and indisputably linked to one of the Treaty's 
objectives. Viewed from this standpoint, there is no doubt that practice confirms the 
trend outlined, towards a widening of the Community's powers and even of its objec-
tives. A number of new 'policies' were concerned with activities in 'frontier' areas, and 
for this reason raised doubts and objections from the angle considered here; nevertheless 
these actions had all been initiated and sometimes brought to fruition on the basis of 
Article 235 (see point 25). 
A fact to be noted, especially in the light of the observations made in point 10 above, is 
that recourse to Article 235 is usually accompanied by explicit mention of the conclu-
sions reached by summits or European Councils and the action programmes proposed at 
these meetings and drawn up by the Council and/or the representatives of the Member 
States. In other words, as developments in integration came to require a progressive 
extension of Community activity and as the traditional limits of Article 235 proved to be 
inadequate, so the institutions were able to avoid any hesitation, relying not so much on 
mere instruments of interpretation as directly on explicit requests made by the highest 
political authorities, which were also taken as the formal basis for new developments. 
II. The restriction imposed by 'the operation of the common market' 
13. Furthermore, only by adopting the view just described is it possible to explain the 
broad interpretation of the phrase 'the operation of the common market' nowadays cur-
rent among legal writers and accepted in practice. 14 
In this connection it is generally recognized that the phrase was inserted in order to 
restrict the application of Article 235 to the pursuit of Community objectives bound up 
with the attainment of the 'common market', that is solely to cases where there is a clear 
functional connection between the measures to be introduced and the attainment of the 
actual 'common market'. 
The definition of the expression 'common market', however, remains highly controver-
sial. Initially, it was interpreted broadly but always in conformity with Article 2 of the 
Treaty, accordingly employing the concept of'common market' in the strict sense as 
14 As stated in footnote 11 above, this expression does not appear in Article 203 Euratom, since the more res-
tricted and well-defined objective of that Community rendered any specific limitation superfluous. 
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distinct from and almost opposed to the concept of'progressively approximating the 
economic policies'. Over the years, however, the expression became the subject of much 
wider interpretation which gradually blunted the technical meaning of the concept to the 
extent of assimilating it to the Treaty itself or making it synonymous, as in current 
language, with the concept of Community. 15 With this end in view it has been stressed 
that the concept in question has different meanings in the provisions of the Treaty where 
it is employed, and that Article 235, owing to both its position and its aims, must 
necessarily provide the widest sense as it covers both free movement and the common 
policies intended by the Treaty. Above all it is emphasized that, since this concept affects 
an extremely evolutive element, it should itself be subject to wide evolutive interpret-
ation, in order to enlarge its scope in keeping with the objective developments and 
growing involvements of the common market in the sense mentioned above. 16 
Further, although the objectives of the Treaty are to be identified by reference to the 
creation of a 'common market', the opposite is equally true, namely that the latter con-
cept should, in its turn, be judged in relation to the ends set out in the Treaty; these ends, 
as is shown by various points including the text of Article 2 itself, not only cover the 
whole economic sector which is moreover the direct object of the integration process, but 
need not be limited to a purely commercial perspective, restricted solely to the produc-
tion and trade aspects. These ends are also, to a great extent, involved with the social 
aspects, which cannot in any case be overlooked, and isolated within the attainment of a 
'common market' and the various consequences which this entails. 17 
14. In conclusion, therefore, with support drawn also from the indications found in 
practice, it may nowadays be held that the expression 'in the course of the operation of 
the common market' defines the scope of Article 235 in the sense that it authorizes, for 
the purpose of attaining the Treaty's objectives, any measures which have a direct func-
tional connection with the subjects which initially formed part of the Community's field 
of action or which have gradually been incorporated into it. In view of the above 
remarks, these may comprise any measures falling within the context of economic life 
understood in the widest sense and therefore including also the social aspects directly or 
indirectly connected with it. 
III. The necessity for new powers 
75. Another condition for applying Article 235 is that 'action by the Community should 
prove necessary' to attain the objectives set by the Treaty. It is clear that it is for the 
Council to judge whether action is 'necessary' and that it naturally enjoys a wide margin 
of discretion in this regard. 
15 In the first sense, Olmi, op. cit. at footnote 12 above, p. 289; in the second sense, Louis, The Community legal 
order, 1980, p. 34. 
16 For these observations see especially Close, Harmonization of Laws: Use or abuse of the powers under the EEC 
Treaty?, Eur. LR, 1978, p. 461 et seq.; also useful for the purpose of comparison with Article 100 EEC. How-
ever, the broad interpretation of the concept under consideration is nowadays by far the most widely accepted in 
academic discussion. 
17 One should think of Article 2, which refers to the 'harmonious' development of economic activities, a 'bal-
anced' expansion, a raising of the 'standard of living', 'closer relations' between the Member States. These are 
precisely the expressions which have justified the new common policies intended to protect non-material values 
(Paris Summit, 1972). 
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16. Another more complex and far more controversial question in the context of that 
expression concerns the compatibility of Article 235 with the practice of concluding 
agreements between Member States in the traditional forms or—as is more often the 
case—in the simplified form of decisions by representatives of the Member States meet­
ing within the Council (Chapter IV). In the opinion of some writers, who point to the 
practice of the ECSC as well as to the early experiences of the EEC, new action on the 
basis of such agreements rather than under a measure pursuant to Article 235 should be 
allowed since, until such a measure is taken, the matter does not fall (or does not yet fall) 
under Community jurisdiction, with the result that the Member States would be free to 
regulate it directly, independently of institutional procedures. The so­called 'intergovern­
mental' way and the Community way would therefore both be available as alternatives, 
the only problem being to judge the political expediency of following one or the other. 
In opposition, however, the theory gradually emerged that once the conditions for apply­
ing Article 235 have been satisfied the intergovernmental way should be abandoned, 
except in the cases provided for in the Treaty itself (Articles 20 and 220). In taking this 
view, the authors are relying essentially on the text of Article 235 (the Council 'shall' take 
the appropriate measures), inferring that this provision imposes on the institution a 
positive obligation to act in cases where the requisite conditions have been genuinely 
satisfied. Furthermore, it is pointed out, the meaning and function of Article 235 properly 
consist in giving a wholly 'Community' answer to the problem of integration of the 
organization's powers. To admit the alternative would, it is argued, be to accept proce­
dures foreign to the system, outside the Court's judicial control and unlikely to ensure 
coordination between Community action and the action of the Member States : in a 
word, it would destroy the very foundations for the existence of Article 235. 18 
The case­law of the Court of Justice seems to support this view. Although it is true that in 
the AETR judgment (see footnote 9), the Court seems to reject the argument that the 
Council's decision pursuant to Article 235 is a mandatory act, on other occasions it has 
openly displayed its aversion to intergovernmental agreements and has denied that the 
Treaty can be amended except by the ad hoc mechanisms provided therein. 19 The 
Court's recent decisions regarding external relations are also significant : it is denied that 
the Member States, even when acting collectively, can conclude agreements with third 
countries where the subject­matter of such agreement falls within Community compe­
tence or where 'Community participation in the agreement' is 'necessary to attain ... one 
of the objectives of the Community'.20 
For the first theory see especially Zuleeg, 'Les répartitions de compétences entre la Communauté et ses États 
membres, in La Communauté et ses États membres, proceedings of the Sixth conference of the Institut d'études 
juridiques européennes, 1973, p. 56 et seq., p. 282 et seq. The other theory is fully explained with the aid of 
textual and schematic arguments by Schwartz, op. cit. at footnote 12 above, p. 27 et seq. 
cf. for example Case 7/71 Commission ν France [1971] ECR 1018; Case 185/73 König [1974] ECR 616; Case 
43/75 Defrenne ν Sabena [1976] ECR 497; the Treaty can only be altered—saving specific provisions—by 
revision in accordance with Article 236. 
cf. Opinion 1/76 (footnote 9 above). Of course it is always possible to maintain, though the conclusion appears 
ever less defensible, that the Member States, acting collectively, would be able to alter the Treaty by procedures 
other than those provided therein (see, for example, Zuleeg, op. cit. at footnote 12 above, p. 56 et seq. and p. 282 
et seq.). But this supposes that these States wish to place themselves outside and above the system and, in that 
case, the intergovernmental way should be practicable, even if a decision had already been taken under Article 
235. If, on the other hand, one starts from the premise that it is desired to remain within the system, the choice 
of the intergovernmental agreement would constitute a breach of Article 235. 
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17. The latter theory thus rests on arguments which appear more solid and more logical. 
It has, however, been advanced by legal writers and practitioners only at a relatively 
recent date and accompanied by a considerable amount of uncertainty and contradiction. 
This is understandable, when it is borne in mind that the problem under discussion has 
extremely delicate political and constitutional overtones and reflects, like few others, the 
overall developments of the system. Any consolidation of solutions accordingly necessi-
tated a compromise with the various interests at stake. This is the reason why, despite the 
validity of the arguments and despite the aspirations everywhere apparent, Article 235 
became a practical alternative to intergovernmental agreements only after the political 
and institutional developments which we have described, in other words after the Euro-
pean summits and councils gave the green light for the full use of that provision and 
showed, moreover, that they wanted it to have precedence over the other solution. 
From that time on, 'decisions' by the representatives of the Member States and inter-
governmental agreements in general became considerably less frequent and finally van-
ished almost completely. The institutional way, despite the reservations mentioned (point 
20), is gaining ground; use of Article 235, and of Article 100, has been proposed and often 
put into practice, even in cases where the other procedure had already been embarked 
upon.21 
IV. The absence of provision in the Treaty for the necessary powers 
18. The action necessary to attain one of the objectives of the Treaty is possible only if 
the Treaty 'has not provided the necessary powers'. 
Many writers initially deduced from this expression that Article 235 was applicable solely 
in cases where the Treaty conferred no power at all on the Community institutions, thus 
rejecting its use in the purpose of increasing powers already conferred under other pro-
visions. However, after certain initial hesitation, the Court of Justice took a different 
view. In the Massey-Ferguson judgment22 it recognized the legality of a regulation based 
on Article 235, although powers in the matter, but not fully effective powers, were con-
ferred on the institutions by other provisions in the Treaty. This is not all: the Court 
went even further in that case, since it has held the use of Article 235 to be legitimate 
even in cases where other provisions in the Treaty affect the matter but where it is not 
possible to state with certitude that they are applicable because this would require exten-
sive controversial interpretation of those provisions.23 
V. The 'appropriate measures' which may be taken 
19. Where the conditions for applying Article 235 are satisfied, the Council shall 'take 
the appropriate measures'. It has already been shown that the Council has both a power 
21 For fuller information on this practice see Schwartz, 'Voies d'uniformisation du droit dans la Communauté 
économique européenne: Règlements de la Communauté ou conventions entre les États membres', J. Dr. Int., 
1978, p. 751 et seq., esp. p. 790 et seq. 
22 Case 8/73 [1973] ECR 897. 
23 In that case, observed the Court, 'there is no reason why the Council could not legitimately consider that 
recourse to the procedure of Article 235 was justified in the interest of legal certainty ... since, under the 
circumstances, the rules of the Treaty on the forming of the Council's decisions or on the division of powers 
between the institutions are not to be disregarded'. 
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and a duty to act. The measures which it may take by virtue of the provision in question 
are any of the acts provided for in Article 189 of the Treaty. However, the Court has 
declared that measures taken pursuant to Article 235, although decided by the Council 
acting unanimously, are Community acts and not agreements between Member 
States.24 
The measures taken by the Council must be appropriate, that is to say connected and 
proportionate to the action judged necessary to attain one of the objectives of the Com­
munity. In this context, however, the institution enjoys the very widest freedom and has 
not hesitated to take advantage of it. Suffice it to recall simply that regulations made 
pursuant to Article 235 have actually enabled new organs to be created, endowed with 
legal personality and intended to cooperate in the attainment of the Community's objec­
tives under the control of the EEC institutions.25 This situation has come about despite 
the Court's previous attitude (perhaps less severe nowadays) which made delegation of 
powers to the institutions subject to strict conditions except in cases provided for in the 
Treaty,26 and despite the contrary view widely held by legal writers following this case-
law. 
VI. Limits to the use of Article 235 and its relation to the revision procedure contained 
in Article 236 
20. The final point to be dealt with concerns the limits for applying Article 235 and its 
relation to the revision procedure laid down in Article 236. 
Although it is clear that formal amendments to the text of the Treaty cannot be made by 
means of Article 235 (as can be done under Article 236), it is nevertheless true, that its 
application can bring about substantial alterations in the extent of the Treaty's single 
provisions, quite apart from cases where new Community policies are actually intro­
duced. To trace the limits within which this process can legitimately develop is not a 
particularly easy task since the practice shows, as has been emphasized on several occa­
sions, the provision in question to be extremely flexibly adapted to the overall develop­
ment of the system. It is, however, important to determine the criteria likely to help in 
defining the field within which Article 235 may be applied, both in the abstract, since the 
Community is not a body with unlimited power, and in relation to the procedure laid 
down in Article 236, with which Article 235 is tending more and more to overlap. 
In particular, since every enlargement of Community powers generally entails a corres­
ponding reduction in the powers of the Member States (cf. Section III), it is obviously not 
a matter of indifference whether the process results from one procedure or the other. The 
use of Article 235 in fact presents some considerable practical advantages and certainly 
constitutes progress by comparison with the practice of making agreements in simplified 
form (point 16). It does, however, raise a number of problems regarding democratic 
guarantees and the right formulation for relations between the Community and its 
24 Case 38/69 Commission ν Italian Republic [1970] ECR 57. 
25 One thinks of the European Monetary Cooperation Fund, the European Centre for the Development of Voca­
tional Training and the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions: see 
point 25 and Chapter V generally. 
26 cf. Joined Cases 9 and 10/56 Meroni ν High Authority [1958] ECR 34, especially at p. 73 et seq. The trend 
towards a reversal of this theory appeared recently in Opinion 1/76 (see footnote 9 above). 
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Member States. Reservations and anxiety are especially prevalent because it is a proce-
dure which ultimately amounts to concentrating in the hands of governments the power 
to extend Community jurisdiction, without any control by national parliaments or even 
any immediate likelihood that the latter might be adequately replaced by the European 
Parliament. 
21. This consideration explains the concern, often expressed, that the scope of Article 
236 should be safeguarded since this article, unlike Article 235, takes full account of the 
Member States' constitutional requirements (Chapter IV). However, while almost all 
legal writers, as a consequence of these arguments, declare the need to define limits for 
applying Article 235, such statements are usually no more than declarations of intent, 
limited to very general indications. To summarize the indications so far provided by the 
case-law of the Court of Justice and by legal writers, it might be said that the use of 
Article 235 does not mean going as far as to change the 'Community identity' or to cause 
European integration to take 'qualitative leaps'.27 To be more specific, Article 235 can-
not go beyond the bounds, described below, set by what has become known as the 
Community constitution (in this connection, see Chapter IV), namely: 
(i) observance of the principles essential to the organization's structure, especially those 
concerned with safeguarding interinstitutional balance, allocating powers and laying 
down the methods for exercising them, as is done in Articles 189 to 191;28 
(ii) observance of the substantial principles of the Community constitution, in the con-
text, naturally, of the organization's socio-economic objectives; principles which, 
though open to wide interpretation, do nevertheless set bounds which cannot be 
crossed when applying Article 235 (cf. points 12 and 13). Drawing on the very ade-
quate case-law developed so far by the Court of Justice, it is possible to summarize 
these principles as follows: non-discrimination, freedom, solidarity and unity;29 
(iii) observance of the general principles of law laid down by the Court of Justice, such as 
respect for acquired rights and legitimate expectations, or introduced owing to 
evolving Community experience, as in the case of the protection of fundamental 
rights (Chapter IV). 
The bounds just traced undoubtedly constitute useful points of reference, especially for 
the purposes of judicial control exercised by the Court of Justice over measures taken 
pursuant to Article 235. Nevertheless, they still appear too fluid and too general and 
accordingly incapable of defining clearly and surely the field within which Article 235 
may apply, and particularly unsuited for determining the relations between that article 
and Article 236, especially since the latter is not confined solely to radical transforma-
tions of the Treaty. It is useless to try to banish the problem by denying that Article 235 
itself also constitutes a form of Treaty revision, even if a limited form. Word disputes 
apart, the introduction of new instruments for Community action, the alteration of insti-
tutional mechanisms through the creation of new organs and, more generally, the shift in 
27 cf. respectively Ehring, op. cit. at footnote 12 above, p. 783, and Tomuschat, op. cit. at footnote 12 above, 
p. 66. 
28 Regarding these principtes see the Massey-Ferguson judgment, cited in footnote 22, together with Opinion 1/76, 
cited in footnote 9, which states that any changes made must not affect the relations between the Member States 
which arise from the Community Treaties (ground 10), and that the basic principles concerning the Court's 
jurisdiction must be observed (ground 18 et seq.). 
29 For these principles, see especially Pescatore, Les objectifs de la Communauté économique européenne comme 
principes d'interprétation dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice, in Mélanges Ganshof van der Mcersch, 
1972, p. 325 et seq. 
58 
the distribution of powers between the Community and the Member States, all amount to 
departures from the strict provisions of the Treaty. 
[22. It should also be remembered that some legal writers, German ones in particular, 
insist that it is possible to find, among the constitutional principles common to the 
Member States, limits which can be set to the growth of Community powers and that it is 
accordingly feasible to furnish a new guarantee against possible abuses arising from the 
application of Article 235. Recalling in particular article 24 of the Grundgesetz, they 
stress that the constitutional law of the Member States precludes any idea of those States 
willingly authorizing the creation of organizations endowed with indeterminate and 
unlimited powers (see especially Tomuschat, op. cit. at footnote 12). In this connection it 
is, however, necessary to recall what has already been stated in connection with devel-
opment of internal constitutional practices progressively directed towards full acceptance 
by national systems of the arguments for Community integration and its implications 
(point 10). These developments undoubtedly contribute to promoting and legitimizing, 
on the national plane also, the extension of Community powers, and therefore to justify-
ing the fluidity of their boundaries. But they confirm, in particular, that the problem 
should be considered not so much on the normative plane as from the angle of the 
structural alterations which the development of European integration is likely to bring 
about in the relations between the Community system and the State systems (also affect-
ing the constitutional principles of the latter) and which must be verified and evaluated 
chiefly in the historical and political context. 
As regards possible intervention by national courts, especially constitutional courts where 
these exist, it must be stressed that their supervision of Community measures taken 
pursuant to Article 235 can always cover the last of the limits of the Community con-
stitution described above, particularly from the point of view of observance of the sub-
stantial principles of national constitutions, relating to the fundamental rights and liber-
ties of citizens.30 It must nevertheless be borne in mind that recent decisions of the 
Court of Justice tend, in their turn, to reduce this domain, since, at Community level, the 
Court is gradually taking over the protection of these rights. Furthermore, however, it is 
only within restricted limits, except in extreme cases, that national courts can legitimately 
exercise control, since the Treaties have reserved to the Court of Justice the task of 
ensuring that 'in the interpretation and application' of the Treaties themselves 'the law is 
observed' (Articles 31 ECSC, 164 EEC, 136 EAEC). This duty clearly includes jurisdic-. 
tion over any infringement of the limits of application of Article 235]. 
23. In fact, to make sense of Community practice and of the important developments 
which have been indicated several times, it must be realized that there has come to be a 
large measure of overlap between the spheres where Articles 235 and 236 apply in mat-
ters covered by the Treaty's vast socio-economic objectives. In this context, provided 
there is no question of formal amendments to the Treaty, the choice between the two 
provisions is less concerned with the quality and scope of the innovations than with the 
nature of the procedure to be followed. It is a choice based on assessments of a political 
and constitutional character rather than on considerations of legal form: the stronger the 
In this connection see judgment No 183 of the Italian Constitutional Court delivered on 27 December 1973, 
Frontini, F. It., 1974, p. 314 et seq.; judgment delivered by the German Constitutional Court on 29 May 1974, 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, EuR, 1975, p. 50 et seq. 
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political will of the Member States to extend cooperation by institutional and 'Commu-
nity' means rather than by inter-State means and the greater the encouragement to make 
this choice provided by the objective pressures of the integration process, the greater will 
be the extension of the scope for use of Article 235 (at the expense of the other provision) 
and it will become more and more the key stone of further developments of the Com-
munity. Of course, if this process is to stop providing pretexts for reservations and 
anxieties and is not to be reduced to a matter of concern merely to Community and 
national bureaucracies, a decisive solution must be found to the problems already men-
tioned regarding the democratic character of the system, to avoid the institutional sys-
tem, despite the declarations, becoming a mere façade intended to conceal the national 
governments' almost unlimited freedom of action. 
C. The practical applications of Article 235 EEC and Article 95 ECSC 
24. Rapid consideration must now be given to the practical application of Article 235 
EEC, without however disregarding the first paragraph of Article 95 ECSC. in order to 
provide concrete illustrations in support of the observation made above. 
It must be remembered firstly that until the 1972 Paris Summit Article 235 was 
employed primarily in the sectors of agriculture (where the first measure on that basis 
was taken) and the customs union, with very rare incursions into other fields (social 
policy, acts of the institutions), amounting to a total of about 35 measures up to 31 
December 1972. After the 1972 Summit, the provision was employed in new sectors on 
an increasing scale: between 1 January 1973 and 31 July 1975, 54 Council measures were 
based on Article 235; there were 32 more in the period ending 30 March 1977; now-
adays, it has even become difficult to keep an exact count of them. An exhaustive list of 
these measures, even if limited to measures based solely on Article 235, therefore appears 
impossible. This is the reason why only the most important are mentioned.3I 
Further, as regards what one may call traditional sectors, it is possible to disregard the 
many measures relating to the customs union and the free movement of persons which 
here are of no special interest. The same is true of the agricultural sector where, however, 
it is useful to recall Community action on food aid, usually taken under Article 43 of the 
Treaty, but sometimes, owing to extraneous financial considerations, under Article 235 
also,32 and in the fisheries sector, where special note should be made of Council Regu-
lation (EEC) No 2141/70 of 20 October 1970 laying down a common structural policy for 
the fishing industry, subsequently replaced by Council Regulation (EEC) No 101/76 of 19 
January 1976 where the use of Article 235, though controversial, was justified by the fact 
that the fishermen of each Member State were authorized to fish in the waters subject to 
jurisdiction of the other Member States.33 
See the careful list in Marenco, op. cit. at footnote 12 above, p. 155 et seq., for the period up to 1969; for the 
period up to 1975/76, Lauwaars, op. cit. at footnote 12 above, p. 107 et seq.; Ehring, op. cit. at footnote 12 
above, p. 751 et seq.; Everling, op. cit. at footnote 12 above, p. 22 et seq.; Kapteyn, op. cit. at footnote 12 
above, p. 270 et seq.; Olmi. op. cit. at footnote 12 above, p. 282 et seq. and, more recently. Tizzano. op. cit. at 
footnote 12 above, p. 7. 
See for example Council Regulation (EEC) No 1010/80 of 21 April 1980. regarding the supply of sugar to 
UNRWA (OJ L 101, 26.2.1980, p. 1); Council Decision 80/444/EEC of 21 April 1980 on concluding the agree-
ment with UNRWA for assistance to refugees in the countries of the Near East for 1979 and 1980 (OJ L 101. 
26.2.1980, p. 55). 
OJ L236, 27.10.1970; OJ L20, 28.1.1976. For other measures concerning fisheries, see footnote 5 above. 
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In the sphere of the common commercial policy Council Decision 74/393/EEC of 22 July 
1974 is particularly important. This measure, establishing a consultation procedure for 
Member States' cooperation agreements with third countries, does not state any special 
ground for the recourse made to Article 235.34 The regulations governing the conclusion 
of cooperation agreements between the Community and third countries are also import-
ant: they are made under Article 235 as well since they provide for wide forms of econ-
omic cooperation and therefore initiate action which exceeds the Community's powers in 
the commercial policy sector.3S 
25. But the most noteworthy developments, as has been emphasized several times, are 
to be found in connection with the introduction of new Community initiatives, beginning 
with economic and monetary cooperation. It is Article 235 that was relied upon for 
attaining economic and monetary union by the Paris Summit on 19 and 20 October 
1972, and, previously, by the resolution on the matter adopted by the Council and by the 
representatives of the governments of the Member States on 22 March 1971 and 21 
March 1972. The modest developments which followed have not made it possible to 
solve the highly controversial question of the limits to be set to the use of Article 235 for 
the purpose of attaining economic and monetary union. It is, however, significant that 
the first and most important measure on the subject, Council Regulation (EEC) No 
907/73 of 3 April 1973, setting up a European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF), 
makes express reference to the acts just referred to and that, for the first time, as stated in 
point 12, it includes among the Community's objectives 'the attainment of economic and 
monetary union'. The regulation provides for the creation of a new body, intended to 
form the nucleus of a 'Community organization of central banks', entrusted with import-
ant tasks. These tasks have subsequently been considerably increased since the EMCF 
has been entrusted with the operation of the European Monetary System (EMS) instituted 
by Council Regulation (EEC) No 3181/78 of 18 December 1978 for the purpose of creat-
ing a European Monetary Fund which, however, has still not seen the light of day.36 
In the context of economic and monetary cooperation, Council Regulation (EEC) No 
397/75 of 15 February 1975 must also be noted: this has now been replaced by Regula-
tion (EEC) No 682/81 of 16 March 1981, which permits Community borrowing for the 
purpose of making loans to Member States whose balance of payments has been adverse-
ly affected by the increasing cost of petroleum products. Also worthy of mention is 
Decision 78/870/EEC of 16 October 1978 which similarly empowers the Commission to 
contract loans on the capital market, but for the purpose of promoting investment inside 
the Community ('Ortoli facility' or 'New Community Instrument').37 Finally, Article 
34 OJ L208, 30.7.1974. 
3i See especially Council Regulation (EEC) No 2300/76 of 20 September 1976 regarding the agreement with 
Canada (OJ L 260, 24.9.1976); Council Regulation (EEC) No 2237/78 of 26 September 1978 regarding addi-
tional protocols to the agreement with Portugal (OJ L 274, 29.9.1978); Council Regulation (EEC) No 1440/80 of 
30 May 1980 regarding the agreement with Member States of ASEAN (OJ L 144, 10.6.1980); Council Regula-
tion (EEC) No 3323/80 regarding the agreement for granting aid to Portugal (OJ L 349, 1980, p. 1). 
3" cf. OJ L379, 30.12.1978. 
37 OJ L46, 20.2.1975. The implementing regulation is Regulation (EEC) No 398/75 of the same date (idem). The 
new regulation was published in OJ L 73, 19.3.1981. Under Regulation (EEC) No 397/75 loans were granted to 
Italy and Ireland, see Council Decision 76/322/EEC of 15 March 1976 (OJ L 77, 24.3.1976); for Italy, see also 
Decisions 76/324/EEC of the same date (idem); 77/359/EEC and 77/361/EEC, both of 17 May 1977 (OJ L 132, 
27.5.1977); 78/840/EEC of 10 October 1978 (OJ L291, 17.10.1978); for Ireland, Council Decision 76/323/EEC 
of 15 March 1976 (OJ L 77, 24.3.1976); Decision 78/870/EEC (OJ L 298, 25.10.1978). 
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235 is also the basis used by Council Regulation (EEC) No 1172/76 of 17 May 1976 
'setting up a financial mechanism' consisting essentially in granting subsidies out of the 
Community budget 'to Member States in a special economic situation whose economies 
bear a disproportionate burden in the financing ofthat budget'.38 
Once again it is Article 235 that is employed in the so-called structural and support 
policies for economic and monetary union. Chief among these should be noted : regional 
policy, entirely and exclusively based on this provision, despite countless uncertainties 
and hesitations, and put into operation by Council Regulation (EEC) No 724/75 of 18 
March 1975, setting up a European Regional Development Fund, subsequently amended 
by Regulations (EEC) No 214/79 of 6 February 1979 and No 3325/80 of 16 December 
1980;39 social policy, which admittedly cannot be considered a new venture since it was 
already provided for in the Treaty (see point 3) and since Article 235 had already been 
employed in the matter, but which once again did not come into effective operation until 
the 1972 Paris Summit and the action programme adopted on 21 January 1974 by reso-
lution of the Council. 40 Many other measures followed, among which the following 
should be recalled: Council Regulation (EEC) No 337/75 of 10 February 1975 establish-
ing a European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 1365/75 of 26 May 1975 setting up a European Foundation for the Improve-
ment of Living and Working Conditions; Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 
1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as 
regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working condi-
tions; Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implemen-
tation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social 
security. 41 
The 1972 Paris Summit, finally, required that, under Article 235, action should be 
launched or reinforced in the following sectors: industrial, scientific and technological 
policy, including data processing, environmental protection where it now became poss-
ible to legalize Community participation in important international agreements and 
many measures on the subject, often taken also under Article 100, and energy policy. 
demanded by the Paris Summit in order to guarantee the Community a sure and lasting 
supply on satisfactory terms. Measures regarding the supply of petroleum-based products, 
which is also an objective of the common energy policy, have, however, been based on 
Article 103 (see footnote 5). 
26. In conclusion, some mention should also be made of the use of Article 95(1) ECSC. 
which was intended to fulfil the same function in that Community as Article 235 in the 
EEC Treaty. The two provisions are, however, distinguished by certain significant differ-
ences which reflect the special characteristics of the two Communities and help to explain 
the different developments in practice. In particular, it must be remembered that Article 
95 is far more restricted in its application than Article 235; it can be employed only for 
the purpose, in cases not provided for in the ECSC Treaty, of enabling decisions or 
recommendations of the High Authority (now the Commission) to be made in accor-
dance with Article 5 to attain one of the objectives set out in Articles 2 to 4. 
OJ L 131, 20.5.1976. 
OJ L 73, 21.3.1975; OJ L 35, 9.2.1979; OJ L 349. 1980. 
OJ C 13. 18.1.1977. 
OJ L39, 13.2.1975; OJ L 139, 30.5.1975; OJ L 39, 14.2.1976; OJ L6, 10.1.1979. 
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Moreover, the use of the first paragraph of Article 95 is further limited in principle by 
paragraphs 3 ünd 4, which lay down a special procedure for what is called slight revision 
(petite révision) of the Treaty, meaning adapting the rules for the High Authority's exer-
cise of its powers (Chapter IV). It must, however, be remembered that the Court of 
Justice subjected the latter provision to very stringent conditions, so that use of the first 
paragraph of Article 95 despite the limits indicated, was felt to be a practical way of 
providing an 'institutional' answer for needs arising during the Community's existence. 
In any case, few measures were taken under this provision, even though their importance 
should not be underestimated, as they were almost all adopted to cope with the serious 
crisis which affected first coal and, later, iron and steel: until 1973 there were only 10 or 
so, almost all referring to the coal sector and the number of subsequent measures is 
comparable. 
Section III — The relations between 
Community powers and 
national powers 
27. It has already been observed that an extension of Community powers normally goes 
hand in hand with a decrease in the powers of the Member States. The question now is to 
describe more exactly—and the above analysis puts the problem clearly into relief—the 
relation between the two spheres of competence when Community power becomes exer-
cisable in a given sector. 
It must be made clear at the outset that, in examining this question, no account will be 
taken of the controversy which has arisen in this connection between the writers who, 
generally speaking, take the 'internationalist' and 'federalist' views when defining the 
relations between the Community and the Member States. In face of the specific prob-
lems under consideration, these writers continue to find in favour of opposite solutions : 
some hold that Community powers are revocable and not exclusive; others state that 
once these powers have been drawn into the Community's orbit, they never again come 
under the jurisdiction of the Member States.42 The argument, however, has become a 
matter of dogmas, and is concerned essentially with the theoretical aspects of the prob-
lem. Accordingly, it has not only lost sight of the compromises which were still possible 
and the points of contact between the two theories but has proved of very little use in 
solving the more concrete but no less complex questions on the subject which have arisen 
in the course of practical application over the years regarding the special technique fol-
lowed by the Treaties in defining the powers of the Community. 
28. As was indicated in point 1, the Treaties do not contain a list of these powers and 
do not share them out at all precisely between the Community and the Member States, as 
is the case in federal constitutions. On the contrary, powers are specifically conferred on 
For a full explanation of the first theory, see Zuleeg, op. cit. at footnote 18 above, p. 56, p. 282 et seq. For the 
other theory, see Pescatore, 'Les répartitions de compétences entre la Communauté et les États membres' in La 
Communauté et ses États membres, proceedings of the Sixth Conference of the Institut d'Études juridiques 
européennes, 1973, p. 63 et seq. and p. 79 et seq.; Louis, 'Quelques réflexions sur la répartition des compétences 
entre la Communauté européenne et ses États membres', in Revue d'Intégration européenne, 1979, p. 357 et 
seq. ; idem, op. cit. at footnote 15 above, p. 9 et seq. On the problem in general, see also, quite recently, Tizzano, 
op. cit. at footnote 12 above, p. 8. 
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the Community according to sector, to a degree which varies depending on the case and 
with caution as to their extent and the compass of the matters covered. These uncertain-
ties were further amplified by the developments continually taking place in legislative 
and judicial practice. Moreover, it is quite certain that the obligations of the Member 
States are becoming clearer and more definite by virtue of the acceptance of the primacy 
and direct effect of Community law, which ensure, at national level, that Community 
powers are respected (Chapter VI). However, in a normal situation, these powers come 
into being, and thus limit the freedom of powers of the Member States, only in so far as 
they are actually exercised; as a result new difficulties may arise when, for various rea-
sons, these powers have not been exercised or have been exercised only belatedly and in 
part, as often occurs. 
This situation does not facilitate the drafting of general, unitary criteria and lends itself 
even less to a priori solutions. Furthermore, the Court's decisions in this regard bear 
witness to a high degree of pragmatism, since the Court has been obliged to adapt the 
principles to fit the particular nature of the case in point. A brief survey of the solutions 
proposed in the case of the principal common policies may enable some light to be shed 
on what has just been said. 
29. It must be recollected at the outset that it is in the sector of commercial policy that 
the Court first spoke clearly of the Community's exclusive power (from the end of the 
transitional period) irrespective of whether or not the Community has exercised its pow-
ers in the matter. In the Court's view, such a policy is conceived in Article 113 'in the 
context of the operation of the common market, for the defence of the common interests 
of the Community ... Quite clearly, however, this conception is incompatible with the 
freedom to which the Member States could lay claim by invoking a concurrent power, so 
as to ensure that their own interests were separately satisfied in external relations ... '.43 
This applies both as regards the conclusion of international agreements on the subject 
and for the so-called 'autonomous' commercial policy measures, taken unilaterally by the 
Member States. In the case of the latter the Court also reaffirms the Community's general 
jurisdiction and the prohibition against Member States taking such measures. But the 
prohibition in that case is less stringent, since the consequences of national action arc 
different and easier to remedy. On account of the gaps still existing today in the Com-
munity rules on the matter, the Court admits that Member States may take independent 
action if the Commission so authorizes them in accordance with Article 115.44 
However, the as yet incomplete character of the common commercial policy is not the 
only obstacle to declaring unreservedly the exclusive nature of Community powers: some 
considerations of politics or expediency also have to be taken into account. For example, 
in the opinion regarding Community participation in the international agreement on 
natural rubber, the Court, though considerably enlarging the scope of the commercial 
policy concept, eventually held, contrary to its previous Opinion 1/75, that the organ-
ization did not have exclusive competence in cases where the agreement in question 
would result in burdening the Member States with the financial commitments it con-
tained: in this case, in the Court's view, participation in the agreement by the Member 
States would prove necessary, perhaps jointly with the Community.45 
43 cf. Opinion 1/75, cited in footnote 8. 
44 cf. Case 41/76 Donckerwolcke [1976] ECR 1937. 
45 cf. Opinion 1/78, cited in footnote 8. 
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30. Outside commercial policy, however, the Court of Justice inclines towards stating 
that the Community enjoys wide and exclusive power in the whole field of international 
agreements. Raising some lingering doubts as to interpretation following the well-known 
AETR judgment, the Court not only extended very considerably the field within which 
this jurisdiction is applicable, going so far as to declare absolute parallelism between the 
Community's internal and external powers; it also stated specifically, in successive cases, 
that once both have been exercised, the organization's power to conclude agreements 
thereby becomes exclusive.46 
This solution, however, has to make allowances for the many difficulties encountered 
during the integration process. There are delays, for example, in achieving Community 
policies and this makes it necessary to authorize Member States to conclude agreements 
directly with third countries. The Community is therefore often forced to reinforce the 
instruments for 'endorsing' action by the Member States.47 There are also obstacles to 
the recognition of the Community set up by important groups of States (especially those 
of Comecon) or to allowing its participation as of right in international organizations and 
the conventions concluded in that context (for example, the ILO) and the Member States' 
continuing status as contracting parties within GATT, etc. This explains a certain hesi-
tancy on the part of the Court in some decisions of this sort, the continuing practice of 
'mixed' agreements, adopted jointly by the Community and the Member States, the 
conclusion of many economic and commercial cooperation agreements solely by the 
Member States, etc. 
31. The case-law of the Court of Justice abounds in decisions on the common agricul-
tural policy and the interesting subject of the relations between the Community's powers 
in that sector and those of the Member States. Accordingly, it is not easy to summarize 
the principal guidelines emerging from this line of decisions, especially on account of the 
hesitation and uncertainty resulting from the evident complexity of the subject and the 
difficulties which have arisen as time goes by.48 
Leaving aside some aspects with a narrower compass, it can be said that the problem 
assumed special importance as regards the common organization of the markets; the 
progressive introduction of such organization might, by virtue of its very existence, have 
put an end to national action, apart from any points of incompatibility. This, moreover, 
is the approach adopted by the Court for the first time in a famous judgment where it 
stated that 'the very existence of a common organization of the market has the effect of 
precluding the Member States from adopting in the sector in question unilateral measures 
capable of impeding intra-Community trade'.49 
However, the Court already recognized in this judgment that Member States could adopt 
unilateral measures for fixing prices at retail trade and consumer level, 'on condition they 
4'· cf. judgments cited in footnote 9; also Ruling 1/78 Euratom [1978] 2177. 
47 It is in this context that the explanation is to be found for the consultation procedure on the subject introduced 
by Council Decision 74/393/EEC (OJ L 208, 30.7.1974). 
48 For a profound analysis of the Court's case-law on the subject, see especially Marenco, ' Le limitazioni dei poteri 
degli Stati per effetto delle organizzazioni comuni dei mercati agricoli', Dr. Sc. Int. 1977, p. 13 et seq.; Cappelli, 
De Caterini, 'La Corte di Giustizia e la politica agricola comune', in Politiche comunitarie e giurisprudenza 
della Corte di Giustizia, Sienna, 1977, p. 55 et seq.; finally, with bibliography, Louis, op. cit. at footnote 42 
above, p. 364; Capelli, Controllo dei prezzi e normativa comunitaria, Milan, 1981, p. 409. 
49 See Case 31/74 Galli [1975] ECR 64; see also Case 190/73 Van Haasler [1974] ECR 1123. 
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do not jeopardize the aims and functioning of the common organization of the market in 
question'. Subsequently, the Court not only reaffirmed this position but came to recog­
nize the legality of national action, even in respect of production and wholesale trade. In 
the Court's view, these actions are not indeed illegal in themselves but 'in every case it is 
for the national court to decide whether the maximum prices which it is called upon to 
consider produce such effects as to make them incompatible with the Community pro­
visions in the matter. In this respect it is necessary to take account of the specific nature 
of the organization of the market in question'.5u 
It is from the same standpoint that, outside the question of fixing prices, the various 
aspects of the matter have been approached.51 
It is quite clear that, in this way, the problem propounded above has not been solved in a 
general a priori fashion, but pragmatically, by considering firstly the specific characteris­
tics and practical implications of the common organization of the markets rather than its 
mere existence. As a result the limitations placed on the power of the Member States are 
not absolute in character but are solely a facet of rigorous observance of the objectives 
and operation of the common organizations. 
32. Even in the fisheries sector, delay in exercising Community powers and the need, in 
consequence, to avoid general legislative paralysis forced the Court to relax in practice 
the principle of exclusive powers, although affirming it in general terms. In particular, 
with regard to the policy for conserving the sea's biological resources, the Court, in the 
face of the delay in adopting Community regulations on the subject, had to recognize the 
competence of the Member States to enter into international undertakings on the subject. 
At the same time, however, the Court continued to state that such competence was only 
'transitional', in that the adoption of the common rules provided for must bring it to an 
end and that, moreover, it was limited by observance of the Community obligations 
incumbent on Member States under any heading whatever: the obligations in question 
being basically the general obligation to cooperate described in Article 5 EEC and the 
specific obligation contained in Article 116 of the same Treaty to proceed, within the 
framework of international organizations, only by common action.52 
The Court employed the same criteria with regard to conservation measures taken uni­
laterally by a Member State; it held them provisionally to be possible (although in the 
particular case they were illegal), provided they complied with the obligation to cooperate 
based on Article 5 and with the 'requirements of Community law'.53 
50 cf. Case 223/78 Grosoli [1979] ECR 2362. For previous development of this trend see Case 65/75 Tasca [1976] 
ECR 291; Joined Cases 88 to 90/75 Sadam [1976] ECR 323; Case 154/77 Dechmann [1978] ECR 1573. For 
further developments, not always clear and consistent, see Case 51/74 van der Hulst [1975] ECR 95; Case 60/75 
Russo [1976] ECR 45; Case 50/76 Amsterdam Bulb [1977] ECR 137; Case 52/76 Benedetti ν Munari [1977] 
ECR 163; Case 5/79 Denkavit [1979] ECR 3203; Case 10/79 Toffoli [1979] ECR 3301 ; Joined Cases 16 to 20/79 
Danis [1979] ECR 3327; Joined Cases 95 and 96/79 Kefer and Dehnelle [1980] ECR 103. 
51 See Case 111/76 van den Hazel [1977] ECR 901; Case 83/78 Pigs Marketing Board ν Redmond [1978] ECR 
2347; Case 31/78 Bussone [1978] ECR 2429; Case 151/78 Nykøbing [1979] ECR 1 ; Joined Cases 15 and 16/76 
French Republic ν Commission [1979] ECR 321. 
52 Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76 cited in footnote 9. 
53 See the judgments in Cases 61/77, 88/77, 185 to 204/78 and 141/78 cited in footnote 9. See similarly Case 32/79 
(cited in footnote 9) where these obligations are defined in the sense that the Member States are under a duty 
not only to refrain from actions incompatible with Community rules but also to take positive action in cases 
where inertia on their part might prejudice the pursuit of the common objectives. 
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33. If the Court's decisions so far show evidence of a remarkable degree of pragmatism 
even as regards the most advanced of the common policies, this is all the more reason for 
the definition of the limits of the States' powers in other sectors to be based on the 
specific nature and scope of the Community's powers of intervention which vary consid­
erably from one sector to another, even though they all tend to increase. 
In general terms it can be said that, even in these sectors, it is the exercise of the Com­
munity's legislative powers which precludes any contrary initiative by the Member 
States. The latter, however, have a duty to observe not only the specific requirements of 
the Treaty, but also the general principles, both structural and normative, summarized 
above, and especially Article 5 which in a certain sense sums them all up, since it 
imposes a general obligation to cooperate, 'the actual significance of which depends in 
each particular case on the provisions of the Treaty or on the rules laid down within its 
general framework'.54 
Thus even when the Member States retain autonomous and parallel jurisdiction in a 
given sphere, as in the competition field for example, a national system of rules 'can be 
allowed in so far as it does not prejudice the uniform application throughout the common 
market of the Community rules ... and of the full effect of the measures adopted in 
implementation of those rules'.55 Similarly, in sectors where there is a noticeable 
absence of Community rules, such as certain aspects of tax provisions and movement of 
goods, the Member States' competence will still be limited by the need to observe the 
principles mentioned above. There can therefore be no question of violating the principle 
of non-discrimination or 'the condition that those rules do not present obstacles, directly 
or indirectly, actually or potentially, to intra-Community trade'.56 
cf. Case 2/73 Geddo [1973] ECR 878. 
Case 14/68 Wilhelm [1969] ECR 14 et seq. More recently in the same direction, see Joined Cases 253/78 and 
1 to 3/79 Guerlain and Others [1980] ECR 2327. 
Case 788/79 Gilli [1980] ECR 2017. See also Case 120/78 Rewe [1979] ECR 660. For the fiscal sector see, for 
example, Case 148/77 Hansen [1978] ECR 1787; Case 168/78 Commission ν French Republic, Case 169/78 
Commission ν Italian Republic, Case 170/78 Commission ν United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland. Case 171/78 Commission ν Kingdom of Denmark, all [1980] ECR 345, 385, 417 and 447 respect­
ively. 
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Chapter IV — The sources of 
Community law: 
the ' constitution ' of the Community 
by Rudolf Bernhardt 
Section I — The concept of constitution 
Λ The word 'constitution' is used in various ways. In non-legal terminology, we refer to 
the actual physical or mental constitution of an individual or of a community, and even 
animals or inanimate objects can be said to possess a good or bad 'constitution'. Simi­
larly, in the case of States, international organizations or a country's domestic institu­
tions, such as associations or cooperatives, the concept of constitution can be applied to 
the physical composition of the organization concerned, irrespective of the legal context. 
However, that is not the sense in which, in this paper, we shall use the word 'constitu­
tion' in connection with the European Communities (or Community),1 much as the 
evolving composition of the Community deserves to be studied and appraised. 
2. In legal terminology, 'constitution' means the law on which a community is based. 
Both international and national communities may be endowed with a constitution within 
the legal meaning of the word. However, the word is often employed in a narrower sense 
when it refers exclusively to the constitution of a State. It cannot be given this restricted 
meaning when applied to the European Communities since they are not States or com­
parable entities, even though the final conceivable stage of development may be a federal 
union or confederation of States. By 'constitution of the Community' we mean the law 
on which this community is based and by which it is bound. 
The word 'constitution' appears nowhere in any of the Treaties. Nevertheless, it is used 
1 Wc need waste no time on the question whether we are dealing with one or three Communities as separate legal 
entities whose activities are governed by several basic Treaties. Although, in this paper, we shall refer to the 
Community, the question is left open although, on grounds of institutional unity, we incline to the view that 
there is only one legal entity. 
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to identify and emphasize the special features of the Community legal order.2 It also has 
political undertones in that it suggests the idea of an increasingly closer union which 
could lead to the foundation of a State. In this paper, we shall refer to the constitution in 
the more neutral sense of the basic law of the present Community. 
3. Another distinction which is also drawn from public law and found in the work of 
learned writers is that between a 'formal' and a 'material' constitution. A 'formal con-
stitution' comprehends all the rules embodied in a written constitution, together with any 
unwritten rules which supplement them, provided that they have the same force, that is 
to say, that they are as binding as the provisions of the written constitution and that, in 
particular, all organs of the State, including the legislature, are bound to abide by them. 
On the other hand, 'material constitution' means all the basic provisions of a commu-
nity's legal order, regardless of their relative force. The formal constitution is concerned 
with the comparative ranking and precedence of the norms whereas the material consti-
tution is concerned with their fundamental significance for the community and with their 
content. A formal constitution and a material one may coincide, but this is by no means 
necessary. It is no rarity for a written constitution to contain provisions which have less 
than fundamental importance, leaving the legislature to resolve important 'constitutional 
questions' such as those which relate to the economic order. 
4. The distinction between formal and material constitution will be maintained 
throughout this paper, which will primarily concern itself with the formal constitution 
and only as a subsidiary topic consider the possible existence of'material constitutional 
law' outside the formal constitution. The concept of constitution is, accordingly, treated 
here as broadly corresponding with that of primary Community law, which has largely-
prevailed in practice as well as in theory and serves to distinguish the law of the Treaties 
which binds the Community institutions and the Member States from the secondary 
Community law which is laid down by the institutions and which they have power to 
amend or repeal. 
Consequently, the term constitution, as a source of Community law, will be used in this 
paper to designate those rules which are binding upon all the Community institutions and 
upon the Member States, which are beyond their reach and which, in the main, are 
written into the Community Treaties, and exceptionally, those rules which are reflected 
in certain specified acts of the Community institutions or which may be binding as part 
of unwritten constitutional law. 
In 1967, Walter Hallstein emphasized 'the fact that the Treaty of Rome had proved its efficacy as a constitu-
tional instrument and could be looked on as the first chapter in a constitution for Europe' (see First General 
Report, point 28). Since the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community the word 'constitution' 
has been used by various writers (e.g. Ophiils, ' Die Europäischen Gemeinschaftsverträge als Planungsverfassung-
en' in Kaiser, Planung I, 1965, p. 229 et seq.; more recently, H.J. Hahn, Funktionenteilung im Verfassungsrechl 
Europäischer Organisationen, 1977); during the preliminary discussions on the ECSC Treaty, the use of the word 
'constitution' was contemplated but later abandoned (see Herman Mosler, 'Die Entstehung des Modells supra-
nationaler und gewaltenteilender Staaten Verbindungen in den Verhandlungen über den Schuman-Plan' in 'Pro-
bleme des Europäischen Rechts', Festschrift für Walter Hallstein, 1966, p. 355 et seq., especially at p. 382). 
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Section II — The elements of 
Community constitutional law 
5. Most of the constitutional law of the Community is contained in the Community 
Treaties. The provisions are, in their entirety, equally binding upon the Member States 
and the Community institutions, whether or not, in substance, a basic provision is 
involved. It is only in cases where the Treaties themselves provide for the possibility of a 
derogation (see below) that the Community institutions and Member States possess cer­
tain powers, but this arises from the wording of the constitution and not solely from a 
decision of those institutions or States. 
The constitution of the Community is, in all material respects, set out in Treaties con­
cluded between States. The question is often asked whether the Community Treaties and 
a fortiori the remainder of Community law, especially secondary legislation, form part of 
international law or constitute a separate and independent legal order. The Court of 
Justice of the European Communities has unequivocally pronounced in favour of the 
second alternative;3 however legal opinion is divided.4 This is not the place to continue 
the debate; all that needs to be borne in mind is that the Community Treaties, including 
the Treaties amending them, were concluded between the Member States and, on their 
entry into force, became fully binding upon the institutions and the Member States. 
There is no need here to deal with all the revisions of the Community Treaties or even to 
cite them. The main instruments may be briefly listed as follows: 
(i) Treaty of 18 April 1951 establishing the European Coal and Steel Community; 
(ii) Treaty of 25 March 1957 establishing the European Economic Community; 
(iii) Treaty of 25 March 1957 establishing the European Atomic Energy Community; 
(iv) Convention of 25 March 1957 on certain institutions common to the European 
Communities; 
(v) Treaty of 8 April 1965 establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of 
the European Communities; 
(vi) Decision of the Council and Treaty of 22 January 1972 on the accession to the 
Communities of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom; 
(vii) Decision of the Council of 21 April 1970 and Treaties of 22 April 1970 and 22 July 
1975 on financial and budgetary questions relating to the Community; 
(viii) Decisions and Act of the Council of 20 September 1976 concerning the election of 
the representatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage; 
(ix) Decisions of the Council of 24 May 1979 and Treaty of 28 May 1979 on the ac­
cession of Greece to the Communities. 
All the other acts and treaties constituting Community law as well as the annexes, pro­
tocols, etc. thereto must each be considered in turn with a view to establishing whether 
they are treaties or parts of treaties of equal rank and, in consequence, form part of the 
constitutional law (see below).5 
Case 6/64 Costa ν ENEL [1964] ECR 585; Case 14/68 Wilhelm ν Bundeskartellamt [1969] 1. 
The different viewpoints are set out in Werner Meng, Das Rechi der internationalen Organisationen — eine 
Entwicklungsstufe des Völkerrechts, 1979, p. 162 et seq. 
The decisive factors in each case are the wording of the provisions under consideration and the intentions of the 
contracting parties; in the Acts concerning the Accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, pro­
visions of the Treaties were 'downgraded' to the status of secondary Community law (see Sixth General Report, 
point 371). 
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6. The instruments of primary Community law are so numerous that they sometimes 
contradict or conflict with each other. In each case, their effect must be determined by 
the rules traditionally applied by legal commentators. A later instrument takes preced­
ence over an earlier one and a special instrument prevails over a general instrument 
(primacy of the lex posterior and of the lex specialis). Since the provisions of the Treaties 
are technically of equal rank, it is in principle impossible to attribute to some a wider 
application or significance than to others; on the contrary, interpretation must aim at 
harmonization and endeavour to treat all the rules uniformly. Nor is there any hier­
archical relationship between the ECSC Treaty, the EEC Treaty and the EAEC Treaty: 
they all rank equal. Here, again, interpretation must be used to determine which rule 
applies in a particular case, what the various provisions are to be taken as meaning in 
relation to each other, and so on. 
Article 232 of the EEC Treaty expressly states that the Treaty shall not derogate from 
either the ECSC Treaty or the EAEC Treaty. This means that the provisions of the ECSC 
Treaty and of the EAEC Treaty continue to apply within their respective fields and to 
that extent exclude the application of the EEC Treaty. This does not, however, mean that 
the EEC Treaty has no application whatsoever; on the contrary, it operates to fill the gap 
where there is an absence of provision in the other Treaties.6 
7. Apart from the Community Treaties, the question arises whether other legal acts of 
the Community institutions or of the Member States can, with or without reservations, 
be regarded as also forming part of the constitutional law of the Community. The ques­
tion applies to the decisions of the 'representatives of the Member States meeting in the 
Council', to the Luxembourg Agreement of February 1966, to the treaties concluded 
between the Member States and to those which the Community and/or the Member 
States have entered into with non-member countries and even, in certain cases, to meas­
ures taken in implementation of the Treaties (e.g. under Article 235 EEC). 
At this juncture, a radical dividing-line must be drawn: the only other acts which can be 
regarded as forming part of the constitutional law of the Community are those covered 
by articles of the Treaties providing for acts amending or superseding the existing law of 
the Treaty. In this connection reference should be made to the following provisions, in 
particular: Article 95 ECSC, Articles 138 and 201 EEC and Article 76 EAEC.7 Once the 
substantive conditions set out in those provisions have been satisfied and the specific 
procedures carried out, the new constitutional law can supersede the old. 
Moreover, the Treaties themselves contain rules providing for their own formal amend­
ment (see Section III below). 
To put it negatively, amendments and additions to Community law which are not pro­
vided for or authorized in the Treaties do not form a part of the constitution of the 
Community. That is not to say that such amendments and additions are in general 
unlawful and without legal effect; we will return to this point later. 
8. The case-law of the Court of Justice has done much to shape the present concept of 
the 'constitution'. The Court has usually interpreted and applied previously obscure and 
disputed provisions and principles in favour of the Community. Among the many exam­
ples of this are the precedence of Community law over national law. the direct applica-
6 See Second General Report, point 655. 
7 On Article 76(2), see Fifth General Report, point 619; Case 7/71 Commission ν France [1971] ECR 1003. 
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bility of certain provisions after expiry of the transitional period and of provisions con-
tained in directives, the Community's competence in external matters, etc. 
In this case-law, are the rulings concerning the content and scope of the Treaties to be 
regarded as also forming part of the constitutional law of the Community? The broad 
answer must be in the negative. The Court's primary duty is to 'ensure that in the 
interpretation and application' of Community law 'the law is observed' (Article 164 
EEC); moreover, Community law is binding on all the other Community institutions and 
on the Member States. It follows that, quite apart from the fact that the parties before the 
Court are formally bound by its decision, its case-law must be observed by those insti-
tutions and the States. The fact is, however, that despite the law-creating elements which, 
like any other, its case-law possesses, the Court of Justice does not, strictly speaking, do 
more than apply existing law; it concretizes the constitution of the Community but does 
not make constitutional law in the proper sense of the words. This means that Commu-
nity law is not bound by case-law and that the interpretation of Community law can, like 
the case-law of the Court, evolve in the light of changing circumstances and possibilities 
without the need for formal amendment of the Treaties. 
9. The classification of unwritten law, which supplements written Community law, and, 
in particular, of the general principles of law in the Member States, is of equal complex-
ity. A distinction must be drawn on the basis of whether the legal principle in question is 
or is not of fundamental importance. Some involve quite technical rules or basic legal 
principles of secondary importance. To a large extent, this applies to the rules laid down 
in the second paragraph of Article 215 EEC on the subject of non-contractual liability: 
while they do not form part of the constitutional law, the principle of liability which they 
embody certainly does. 
Except where temporary provisions are involved, the basic rights enshrined in the con-
stitutions of the Member States apply also to the Community. The Court of Justice has 
made it increasingly clear that the Community is under an obligation to respect those 
basic rights; the other Community institutions followed suit in a declaration made on 5 
April 1977. Since the declaration is neither a treaty nor a unilateral legal act having direct 
and binding effect, it cannot rank as formal constitutional law. This does not alter the fact 
that the text of the declaration reflects the legal concept, which all the Community insti-
tutions and the Member States share, of the obligation on the Community to respect the 
major basic rights and human rights. The latter should and may form part of the con-
stitutional law of the Community. 
10. In conclusion, consideration must be given to the rules of international law in gen-
eral and of the main international treaties. Do they, too, form part of the constitutional 
law? Here again, the answer must be only in general terms. The law of international 
treaties and certain rules of customary international law may well be binding in principle 
on the Community, but they hardly belong to its constitutional law. The situation is 
different in the case of the basic rules which, in common with Alfred Verdross, we can 
bring within the expression 'constitution of the international community'. Both the jus 
cogens and other basic rules of international law (in the field of human rights, for exam-
ple) are, in the writer's view, part of the Community's constitutional law in the sense that 
all Community institutions are bound to respect them. 
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11. Much has been written and said on the subject of the rules to be applied in 
interpreting primary Community law.8 It has, for instance, been argued that there should 
be no reference to the rules of interpretation applied to international treaties and that, on 
the contrary, regard must be paid to the independent status of the Community legal order 
in relation to international law. Here again, we must differentiate: while interpretation 
cannot wholly ignore the fact that the Community Treaties have their roots in interna-
tional law, it must be primarily guided by the objectives and principles of Community 
law, which differ from the objectives and principles of almost all other international 
treaties. In Community law, interpretation attaches special importance to the effet utile 
(practical effect). 
12. To sum up, the position is that the constitutional law of the Community consists of 
the Community Treaties (primary Community law), the amendments and additions to 
primary Community law authorized by the Treaties and, in addition, the basic principles 
of the law of the Member States and the basic rules of international law. 
Section III — Amendments and additions 
to the constitution of the Community 
13. The various legal acts which can amend or add to the Community constitution were 
described above. They can be summarily listed as follows: 
(i) formal amendments of the Community Treaties pursuant to the general rules con-
tained in the Treaties; 
(ii) extraordinary amendments under special provisions of the Treaties: 
(iii) formal amendments which ignore the procedure laid down in the Treaties: 
(iv) amendments and additions by other acts and Treaties; 
(v) measures taken under Article 235 EEC. 
These variations will now be examined. The essential task is to determine whether or not 
such amendments and additions are permissible. 
14. The Community Treaties contain provisions relating to their amendment (Articles 
96 ECSC, 236 EEC and 204 EAEC) and to the admission of new Member States (Ar-
ticles 98 ECSC, 237 EEC and 205 EAEC). The admission of a new member usually 
requires a substantial number of amendments and additions to the Treaties. If the details 
and special features of the ECSC Treaty are ignored, the procedure for amendment may 
be summarized as follows: an amendment is proposed by a Member State or by the 
Commission, the Commission and Parliament take part in the procedure which follows 
and, as far as the Community is concerned, the final decision rests with the Council. The 
amendment comes into force only after it has been 'ratified by all the Member Slates in 
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements'. 
If this procedure has been followed and the Treaty formally amended, the new provision 
becomes part of the constitutional law of the Communities; it replaces any existing pro-
vision which conflicts with it and ranks equal with all other provisions of primary Com-
munity law. 
Sec for example 'Judicial and Academic Conference. 27-28 September 1976' (at Court of Justice). Reports. 
Luxembourg, 1976. 
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The Treaties do not impose any express limitation on constitutional amendments; they 
do not, for example, contain anything which could make sacrosanct the basic rules set out 
in Articles 2 and 3 EEC or would prohibit substantial amendments of the institutional 
provisions. An amendment could, conceivably, conflict with the spirit and general prin-
ciples of the Treaties and, in consequence, be open to challenge. However, it is virtually 
impossible to give any convincing examples of a legal restriction on the amendment of 
the Treaties. In any case, any amendment is possible provided that the prescribed pro-
cedures have been followed. 
15. Reference has already been made to Articles 138 and 201 EEC. The amendments of 
the Treaty for which they provide are subject to a special procedure, and once adopted, 
they have the same force as the primary constitutional law of the Community and super-
sede the corresponding previous rules. 
Other provisions which appear throughout the Treaties provide for their amendment at 
the instance of the Community institutions alone.9 Similarly, constitutional amendments 
of a special kind are provided for in Article 95 ECSC. By way of derogation from the 
rules normally applicable to amendments to the Treaties, amendments under Article 95 
are subject to special rules governing both procedure and content. With regard to pro-
cedure, it is necessary and sufficient for a proposal to be made jointly by the Commission 
and by the Council acting by an eight-ninths majority of its members, for the Court of 
Justice to give a favourable opinion and for Parliament to approve the proposal by a 
majority of three-quarters of the votes cast (and two-thirds of its members). Ratification 
by the Member States is not required. With regard to content, amendments under Article 
95 must not 'conflict with the provisions of Articles 2, 3 and 4 or interfere with the 
relationship between the powers of the High Authority and those of the other institutions 
of the Community'. Here, the Treaty differentiates between, on the one hand, its own 
basic provisions and, on the other, the adaptation of the Commission's powers to a 
change of circumstances. The latter is alone authorized under the procedure laid down in 
Article 95. 
On entering into force, amendments effected under Article 95 form part of the constitu-
tional law and rank equal with all other rules of primary Community law. 
16. Under a general principle of international law, the parties to a treaty of any kind are 
'masters of the treaty' in the sense that they can at any time, in principle unanimously, 
amend the treaty as they see fit, formally or informally, or revoke it. 10 Even where a 
treaty specifies a precise procedure for this amendment, or is concluded for a specified 
period or subject to notice of termination, the parties can, by common consent, dispense 
with such requirements. This is because the contracting parties are sovereign. 
Does the same apply to the Community Treaties? Are the Member States free to ignore 
the procedure laid down for amendment of the Treaties and, by means of formal or tacit 
agreements, create a new law in place of the old? Could they go so far as to revoke the 
Articles 14 (7). 33 (8) and 165 (4) EEC; non-standard amendments to the Treaty also proved necessary when the 
Community was first enlarged, the eventual withdrawal of Norway requiring an amendment of the institutional 
provisions of the accession instruments; see Decision of the Council of 1 January 1973 (OJ L 2, 1973); the Acts 
concerning Accession also contain idiosyncracies which need not be noticed here. 
Sec Articles 39, 54 and 57 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. 
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Treaties by unanimous vote? The answer to these questions is neither clear nor free from 
controversy. ' ' The Court of Justice would probably reply in the negative. In fact, when 
account is taken of the underlying purpose of the Treaties and the intentions of the 
contracting parties when they entered into them, the conclusion is inevitable that the 
Treaties can be amended only under the procedure for which they provide and that there 
can be no question of any other amendments or of revocation of the Treaties, even by 
common consent. In the writer's view, this is not so much the consequence of the inde-
pendence claimed for Community law or of its separation from international law as of 
the wording, objects and underlying purpose of the Treaties. The Treaties created a new 
legal entity, having its own institutions and sovereign rights, and to that extent the 
Member States have accepted a limitation of their own sovereignty. They can neither 
renounce nor substantially modify this commitment, even by common consent. 
There is often a delicate balance between precept and practice, between what the law 
permits and what the facts allow. This is especially true of the international community, 
whose members and most prominent representatives are still sovereign States. It is dif-
ficult to deny that some Member States of the Community are quite capable of with-
drawing from their Community obligations and, a fortiori, to deny that decisions taken 
unanimously and by common consent by all the Member States could bring down the 
whole edifice of the European Community and its legal system, or force it to undergo 
radical change. Without doubt, however, this would be a revolutionary act which could 
have no foundation in the law in force. 
It is possible to conceive of derogations from the Community constitution which would 
be less dramatic and less open to challenge. If, bypassing the required procedure, the 
Member States, by formal Treaty, unanimously adopted provisions supplementing the 
Community Treaties in the light of changed circumstances and without infringing the 
objects and basic principles of the constitution, failure to fulfil the procedural require-
ments would provoke fewer objections. In other words, even if a derogation from the 
constitution has been adopted in a manner which is open to challenge, it can have bind-
ing force provided that its substance is not open to criticism and is welcomed and 
approved by the legal community as a whole. n 
It follows from the foregoing that, in contrast to the general position in international law, 
where the rules of interpretation treat the subsequent conduct of the parties as an inde-
pendent consideration, the Member States cannot act in this way and validly amend or 
add to the constitution of the Community as they see fit. This is why the Luxembourg 
agreement of 1966, despite its practical importance and implementation, does not 
involve any legally binding amendment of Community law. '3 The application and inter-
pretation of Community law are the task, essentially, of the Community institutions and 
it is for the Court of Justice to ensure that the Community constitution is observed. This 
1 ' O. Jacot-Guillermod has recently come out against recognition of the Member States as having an independent 
right of revision {Droit communautaire et droit international public. 1979, p. 11 et seq.), running counter to the 
prevailing view (see Meng, op. cit. at footnote 4 above, pp. 120 and 121). 
12 These comments apply to the revision of the ECSC Treaty carried out on the conclusion of the EEC Treaty, 
Article 96 ECSC being ignored; a different view is taken by L. Constantinesco, Das Recht der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaften, I, 1977, p. 544, where he refers to an amendment which takes effect, although invalid in 
law. 
13 J.H. Kaiser refers to a 'constitutional compromise' in Grenzen der EG Zuständigkeit. EuR 1980, pp. 97 and 99. 
see also J.H. Kaiser, Das Europarecht in der Krise der Gemeinschaften. EuR 1966. p. 4 et seq. 
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mandatory division of responsibilities makes it impossible for the Member States to 
amend Community law without restraint or control and so once more regard themselves 
as masters of the Treaties. 14 
17. In all cases where the Community constitution, formally (under Article 220 EEC) or 
tacitly, leaves it to the Member States to conclude additional treaties, the conclusion of 
international treaties is not open to criticism. The contents of such treaties must be 
compatible with the Community constitution. However, treaties which add to Commu-
nity law cannot, strictly speaking, be regarded as forming part of the constitution of the 
Community, even though the institutions of the Community are bound to observe them. 
They cannot form part of the constitution since they remain subject to the general rules 
of international law and, in consequence, under the control of the Member States. The 
question arises as to whether it is possible to amend additional treaties so as to extinguish 
Community obligations and jeopardize the integration which has been achieved. In spite 
of the fundamental objections which such 'anti-Community' measures may provoke, 
there is, in the writer's view, no compelling reason why such amendments should not be 
valid when considered in the light of the general rules of international law. 
18. Nevertheless, the relationship between the constitutional law of the Community and 
other international treaties (whether concluded by the Community or by the Member 
States) raises a number of difficult questions. The treaties concerned fall into four cate-
gories : treaties concluded by the Community with non-member States (or international 
organizations); 'mixed' treaties to which the Community and the Member States on the 
one hand and non-member States (or international organizations) on the other are par-
ties; treaties concluded between the Member States and non-member States (or interna-
tional organizations); and treaties concluded between Member States. 
19. The treaties which the Community concludes with non-member States must not 
derogate from the constitutional law of the Community either in regard to content or to 
the prescribed procedure (Article 228 EEC). In the event of a breach of Community law, 
that law must be regarded as taking precedence within the Community and as far as its 
institutions are concerned. As for the Community's obligations under international law 
and its external liability, the same rules as those binding the States under unconsti-
tutional treaties must apply. 
The same principles govern mixed treaties. However, the latter raise further questions, 
such as the obligation of the Community and the Member States to observe all the 
provisions of the treaties concerned or splitting of commitments, possibility of denuncia-
tion, etc. Without going into these very delicate questions, all that need be stated about 
such treaties here is that they too may not be considered to form part of the Commun-
ity's constitutional law. 
This is not the place to consider the extent to which exceptional circumstances may require or permit extra-
constitutional amendments to the Treaties, especially by virtue of the clausula rebus sic stantibus; see the 
declarations which the Government of the Federal Republic made on the protocol when the EEC Treaty was 
signed to the efTect that 'in the event of the reunification of Germany, the Treaties will be the subject of review' 
(M. Hilf, comments on Article 240 EEC in von der Groeben, von Boeckh, Thiesing, Kommentar zum EWG-
Vertrag, second edition, 1974, p. 828). 
77 
Finally, treaties between the Member States and non-member States can be concluded 
only if they conform to the constitutional law of the Community. The external obligation 
to abide by illegally concluded treaties is, here again, subject to the general rules of 
international law. 
20. Treaties concluded between Member States are lawful in so far as Community law 
does not limit the sovereignty of the States. Treaties which are in breach of Community 
law are not only illegal but, moreover, have no binding force in international law. This 
follows both from the underlying purpose of the constitution and from the fact, men-
tioned above, that the Member States are no longer masters of the Treaties. The same 
would apply to treaties concluded between the Community and some or all of the Mem-
ber States. 
21. Article 234 of the EEC Treaty makes special provision for the treaties concluded 
between the Member States and third countries before the Treaty itself entered into 
force : until such treaties are extinguished or amended under international law. they take 
precedence over Community obligations. Article 234 must, mutatis mutandis, un-
doubtedly apply to the treaties which the Member States still had the right to conclude 
after the entry in force of the Community Treaties; subsequent Community law must 
respect such treaties. 
22. Other questions arise in connection with Article 235 of the EEC Treaty. This article 
enables the Community to take fresh powers by decision of the Council, acting unani-
mously on a proposal from the Commission and after consultation with the Parliament. 
As an exception to a fundamental principle of Community law, namely, the conclusive 
and binding determination of the Community's sovereign rights by the Treaties, fresh 
powers of limited extension can be created and exercised. 
Provisions adopted under Article 235 cannot properly be included as part of the consti-
tutional law of the Community, whether looked at from the standpoint of content or of 
procedure. The substance of the new provisions must conform to primary Community 
law and must not amend the law of the Treaties: as to procedure, the amendment or 
repeal of provisions adopted pursuant to Article 235 must be effected in the manner 
provided for in that article and not according to the rules relating to the amendment of 
the Treaties. Where, and to the extent that, the constitutional law of certain Member 
States forbids the adoption of provisions under Article 235 without the consent of the 
national parliament, the question arises as to whether the Council's decision has to await 
the outcome of consultation with the parliament within each of the States concerned, in 
other words, the outcome of a consultation prior to the consent given in the Council by 
the representatives of the Member States. 15 Community law does not. of course, require 
such a procedure, but nor should it stand in its way. 
15 Kaiser draws attention to the constitutional limitations on an unjustified use of Article 235. EuR 1980. op. cit. 
at footnote 13 above, p. 118. 
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Section IV — The decisions of 
the Member States' representatives 
meeting in the Council 
23. These decisions are the result of practical experience and are not easily classified in 
law. In neither the Community constitution nor in international law in general is there 
anything to prevent the members of a Community institution from performing different 
functions and acting sometimes as members of the institution and sometimes as man-
dated representatives of the governments concerned. 
In the first case, it is the Community institution which acts; in the second, its members 
act as participants in a kind of conference of States. They may be the same people but in 
each case they assume different functions. 
Since the constitution of the Community itself provides for action by the governments 
(and not the Community institution), as in the first paragraph of Article 167 EEC, for the 
appointment of judges, there is nothing to prevent the members of the Council from also 
exercising the relevant powers of their governments. 
In the case of other 'decisions' of the Council, in the wider sense, which have no formal 
basis in the Treaties proper, the governments of the Member States use their authority to 
meet as often as they wish and to take decisions by common accord. 
Those decisions must, however, remain within the bounds of the Community constitu-
tion; they must not be in breach of material constitutional law, nor must the represen-
tatives of the Member States undertake the tasks reserved to the Community institutions. 
The dividing line must be determined in relation to each case. 
Legal classification of the decisions adopted must not be carried out as a theoretical 
exercise but in the light of circumstances in each case. Although only political pronoun-
cements or objectives may be involved, consideration may also have to be given to 
informal agreements the effect and scope of which are governed by general international 
law. 
Section V — The 'constitutional agreements' 
24. The day-to-day work of the Community involves a large number of acts and meas-
ures which have no formal legal basis in the Treaties, yet have greatly influenced the 
evolution and working of the Community. Among numerous examples are the setting-up 
of the European Council, the agreements on the Community institutions and the declar-
ations on human rights and on democracy. To be valid and binding, these acts must not 
conflict with Community law. 
These quasi-constitutional instruments are equally difficult to classify in law. They are 
unlikely to fall into a single legal category. The circumstances of each case form the only 
basis on which to determine whether the States or the institutions really intended to enter 
into a legal commitment or whether they had no objective other than to publish a declar-
ation of political intent and lay down guidelines. The latter case is undoubtedly the most 
common. 
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This is also true of a number of rules developed in practice for concerted action by the 
Community institutions16 or, again, by the institutions and the Member States. In so fai-
as those rules have not been embodied either in the form prescribed for the Community 
or in agreements clearly designated as legally binding, they cannot rank as law. Their 
want of binding force in law does not affect their practical political importance; in fact, it 
enlarges the field for political initiative in the future. 
Decisions and declarations which are, strictly speaking, without binding effect may, never-
theless, disclose legal tenets held in common by the States or institutions participating in 
them. This, in the writer's view, applies to the declarations on democracy 17 and human 
rights. 18 These acts are not in themselves legally binding but they shed light on the legal 
tenets shared by the States which subscribed to them. Although not rules of law. these 
acts provide guidance and information on the legal principles and rules of law in force 
which, as indicated earlier, can be regarded as forming part of the Community's consti-
tution. 
Section VI — The 'material' principles 
of the constitution 
25. The difference between a formal and a material constitution was explained at the 
beginning of this chapter. As an introduction to a brief account of the material principles 
of the constitution, it must be emphasized that they can be set out in the Treaties or, 
equally well, unwritten. Do the unwritten principles rank as part of primary Community 
law? The question must be answered separately in the case of each principle. 
26. The 'Declaration on democracy' of April 1978 contains this passage: 
'The Heads of Government confirm their will ... to ensure that the cherished values of their legal, political and 
moral order are respected and to safeguard the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law. of 
social justice and of respect for human rights. The application of these principles implies a political system of 
pluralist democracy which guarantees both the free expression of opinions within the constitutional organization 
of powers and the procedures necessary for the protection of human rights. 
They solemnly declare that respect for and maintenance of representative democracy and human rights in each 
Member State are essential elements of membership of the European Communities.' 
Attachment to the principles of representative democracy and to the other values men-
tioned in the declaration is not, as such, expressly referred to in the Community Treaties. 
Nevertheless these principles and values form part of the unwritten constitutional law of 
the Community. This implies that the Community takes for granted that the Member 
States have constitutional structures which are democratic. So long as Greece. Spain and 
16 This applies, in particular, to Parliament's involvement when the Community concludes Treaties in accordance 
with the Luns and Westerterp procedures. Where consultation with Parliament is expressly provided for. e.g. 
under Articles 228 (1) and 238 of the EEC Treaty, it is, strictly speaking, consultation, not the actual procedure, 
which is obligatory; where, e.g. in connection with agreements concluded under Article 113 of lhe EEC Treaty, 
the participation of Parliament is enlisted without having been provided for, this usually involves nothing more 
than political arrangements and practices; on the procedure for concerted action between the Community 
institutions, see Seventh General Report, point 455 and the Joint Declaration of 4 March 1975 (OJ C 89, 
23.4.1975). 
17 Declaration of 7 and 8 April 1978, Bull. EC 3-1978. 
18 OJ C 103, 27.4.1977. 
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Portugal had dictatorial and undemocratic forms of government, their entry into the 
Community was out of the question; their accession was given serious consideration only 
after their transition or return to democracy. If in the future one of the Member States 
abandoned democratic consensus and adopted an authoritarian structure, its continued 
presence in the Community would be difficult to reconcile with the principle of consen-
sus and it would be desirable for it to withdraw. How such a withdrawal could be effected 
is beyond legal speculation at the moment. 
27. Similarly, the principle of respect for human rights constitutes an obligation on the 
Community institutions as well as the Member States. This is a further basic principle of 
the Community constitution which, without providing directly and in detail for the pro-
tection of fundamental rights, asserts that respect for those rights is inalienable. 
28. Among the basic principles of the Community constitution are the existence of the 
present main institutions and the broad distribution of responsibility amongst them: the 
Commission, composed of independent persons, as a legislative and executive organ; the 
Council, composed of one representative for each Member State, as a legislative organ 
with overall political responsibility; the Parliament, the elected representatives of the 
peoples, endowed with powers which are still rudimentary but enjoying the authority of 
having been directly elected; and, finally, the Court of Justice, a tribunal whose essential 
task is to interpret and apply Community law. 
It may seem consistent with the process of integration that Parliament's powers and the 
Commission's responsibilities should be strengthened in relation to those of the Council, 
since it is mainly through Parliament and the Commission, together with the Court of 
Justice, that the Community demonstrates its independence, whereas the Council is more 
inclined to reflect the Member States' traditional concepts of sovereignty. However, even 
in cases where integration demands a strengthening of the Community institutions, 
whether they be legitimized by the democratic process or independent, the constitution in 
force is. despite its lacunae, binding and it must be observed. Only by means of inter-
pretation of Community law does it seem possible legally to attribute a more important 
role to Parliament and the Commission. For this reason, the 'quasi-constitutional' par-
ticipation by Parliament in the decision-making process, as it evolves from day to day, is 
compatible with the Community constitution so long as it does not conflict with the right 
to take the final decision as provided for in the Treaties. 
29. The Community is a community based on the rules of law, in that its institutions 
and the Member States are bound by the constitutional law and by all Community 
legislation and its acts can be reviewed by an independent court. These are basic consti-
tutional principles which apply not only to the Community but also to the Member States 
as States founded on the rule of law. 
30. To conclude, there can be little dispute that the Community constitution itself lays 
down the limitations on the changes that can be made in the economic order of the 
Member States and of the Community. At the present day, States no longer rely exclu-
sively on market mechanisms; on the contrary, they influence economic activity in a 
wide variety of ways. The authors of the Community constitution fully realized this and 
allowed for it, at least in part. The Community system itself rests on both the free play of 
economic forces and the constant activity of the institutions in relation to the economy. 
However, we must not lose sight of the fact that an economy completely regulated by the 
States or by the Community institutions would cause the edifice of the Community 
constitution to collapse. To that extent economic freedom is also a fundamental principle 
of the constitution. 
Section VII — Conclusion 
31. A full description of the Community's material constitution would necessitate going 
into much greater detail, a task which is neither possible nor appropriate here. Taken as a 
whole the Community constitution does not depend on details but on future progress 
towards a genuine 'European Union'. 
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Chapter V — The sources of 
Community law: acts 
of the Community institutions 
by Eberhard Grabitz 
Section I — The different types 
of legal act 
11 1. Classification and characteristics 
1. The different forms of act which the institutions of the European Communities are 
empowered to adopt in carrying out their tasks are set out in the Treaties establishing the 
Communities (first paragraph of Article 189 EEC, Article 161 EAEC and Article 14 
ECSC). 
The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty) and the 
Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC Treaty) draw a 
distinction, in the first paragraph of Articles 189 EEC and 161 EAEC, between regula-
tions, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions. The Treaty establishing the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC Treaty) does not employ the same terms. In 
the first paragraph of Article 14 it refers to general and individual decisions, recommen-
dations and opinions. 
These legal acts, prescribed by the Treaties, may be characterized in accordance with 
different legally valid criteria, based on the description of the different forms of legal act 
contained in the Treaties. These criteria relate partly to those to whom the measures are 
addressed and partly to their legal effect. However, the designation which is chosen by 
the Community institutions is not the decisive factor. ' 
The legal acts referred to in the Treaties may, therefore, be classified in relation to each 
other and their characteristics may be defined as follows. 
Joined Cases 16 and 17/62 Confédération nationale des producteurs de fruits et légumes v Council [1962] ECR 
471; Case 8/55 Fédération charbonnière de Belgique v High Authority [1956] ECR 245 and 292; Case 8/70 
Commission v Italian Republic [1970] ECR 961 et seq., especially at p. 980. 
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A. Regulations and ECSC general decisions 
2. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Articles 189 EEC and 161 EAEC. a regulation is 
a legal measure which has general application, is binding in its entirety and is directly 
applicable in all Member States. 
With regard to a general decision of the ECSC, the second paragraph of Article 14 ECSC 
merely provides that it shall be binding in its entirety. However, the Court of Justice of 
the European Communities has laid down a definition of what precisely this means, 
which is that a general decision establishes a legislative principle, imposes abstract con­
ditions for its implementation and sets out the legal consequences entailed thereby.2 
This definition makes it clear that a general decision of the ECSC has the same basic 
structural characteristics as a regulation; that, therefore, it is of general application: and 
that it is directly applicable in all Member States.3 
The general application of a legal act means that it contains general and abstract pro­
visions and that its legal effects extend to an indeterminate group of persons and to a 
multiplicity of circumstances described in general terms. It is clear from the case­law of 
the Court that, where a measure has the character of a regulation or of a general decision, 
that character is not called in issue by virtue of the fact that the number and even the 
identity of the persons to whom it applies may be determined more or less precisely, 
provided its application depends on an objective legal or factual situation defined by the 
measure with reference to its purpose.4 
To say that a legal act is binding means that it creates rights and obligations for those to 
whom it is actually addressed. When it is said that a regulation or a decision shall be 
binding in its entirety, this is to distinguish it from a directive or a recommendation of 
the ECSC, which are binding only as to the aims to be pursued. It also means that the 
Member States are not entitled to apply the provisions of a regulation in an incomplete 
or selective manner and thus exclude those parts of Community legislation which they 
consider to be against certain of their national interests.5 
Direct application means that legal acts take immediate effect. In order that they may do 
so it is not, therefore, necessary for the legislative institutions of the Member States to 
take any action to put them into operation. Within the scope of such acts the Member 
States can adopt legislative measures only so long as they limit themselves to reproducing 
the Community provisions, in which case they must ensure that their Community nature 
is manifest,ft or to adopting provisions implementing Community law or adapting the 
rules of their own legal order to the rules of Community law.7 
Case 8/55, cited at footnote 1 above; Case 13/57 Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen­ und Stahlindustrie ν High 
Authority [1957 and 1958] ECR 265, especially at p. 286. 
See also Ipsen. Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, 1972. p. 447. Rabe. Das Verordnungsrecht der EWG. 1963. 
p. 65. 
Case 6/68 Zuckerfabrik Watenstedt ν Council [1968] ECR 409: Case 64/69 Compagnie Française Commerciale 
et Financière ν Commission [1970] ECR 221 ; Case 101/76 Koninklijke Scholten Honig ν Council and Commis­
sion [1977] ECR 797, especially at p. 807. 
Case 128/78 Commission ν United Kingdom [1979] ECR 419, especially at pp. 428­429. 
Case 50/76 Amsterdam Bulb [1977] ECR 137. 
Case 34/73 Variola [1973] ECR 981; Case 31/78 Bussone [1978] ECR 2429. 
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As far as those subject to Community law are concerned, the consequence of direct 
applicability is that the provisions of a regulation or of a general decision confer rights 
and impose obligations on them and that the national institutions responsible for apply­
ing the law arc bound to use those provisions as the basis for any decisions which they 
may make in respect of individuals.8 
Finally, a regulation or general decision is directly applicable in all Member States. This 
means that, in principle, these acts must embody rules the legal effects of which apply 
throughout the whole of the territory of the European Communities. Regulations and 
general decisions may, however, be enacted exceptionally in cases where the situation 
referred to exists only in some of the Member States.9 In any event, it is essential that 
their structure should possess all the other characteristics and that the measures involve 
no discrimination. 
B. Directives and ECSC recommendations 
3. A directive is binding on each Member State as to the aim or, rather, the result to be 
achieved but leaves to the Member States the choice of form and methods for attaining 
within the national legal order the objectives laid down at Community level (third para­
graph of Articles 189 EEC and 161 EAEC). The same applies to a recommendation of the 
ECSC addressed to the Member States. Moreover, unlike a directive, a recommendation 
of the ECSC may also be addressed to individual citizens of the Community. 
In all cases, the structure of a directive and of an ECSC recommendation requires a 
legislative process comprising two stages. 
In the first stage, the result which the act aims to produce is imposed as an obligation on 
the addressee concerned, who is legally bound to produce this result. To this extent, such 
acts are, as far as their legal status and scope are concerned, indistinguishable from other 
provisions by which the Member States are bound. 10 Whether a legal instrument is 
called a directive or a recommendation within the meaning of the ECSC Treaty and 
notwithstanding the use of the term 'objective', the binding force of these instruments 
remains unchanged. ' ' 
The fact that a directive or ECSC recommendation is binding as to the result to be 
achieved obviously does not give any indication of the extent or magnitude of the results 
to be achieved. Nor does the wording of the third paragraph of Article 189 of the EEC 
Treaty contain any information on this point. 
In practice, the Community institutions have promulgated both general directives '2 and 
very detailed directives. '3 No objections have been raised against the practice either by 
Case 65/75 Tasca [1976] ECR 291. 
See Articles 5 and 6 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 834/74 of 5 April 1974 (OJ L99, 9.4.1974). 
Case 79/72 Commission ν Italy [1973] ECR 667. 
Case 52/75 Commission ν Italy [1976] ECR 277. 
For example. Council Directive 64/475/EEC (OJ, 30.7.1964); Council Directive 67/227/EEC (OJ, 11.4.1967, 
p. 1301). 
For example. Council Directives 70/524/EEC of 23 November 1970 (OJ L270, 14.12.1970); 75/318/EEC of 
20 May 1975 (OJ L 147, 9.6.1975); 76/432/EEC of 6 April 1976 (OJ L 122, 8.5.1976). 
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the Member States or by the Court of Justice, which has often had occasion to give a 
ruling on detailed directives. 14 
The second stage is concerned with the transposition into the law of the Member States 
of the substance of the objectives laid down by Community law. The measures adopted 
by the Member States alone enable directives and ECSC recommendations also to have a 
direct effect as far as individuals are concerned. For this purpose, it is not enough for a 
Member State to make provision, de facto or by appropriate administrative action, for 
the requirements of the directive; the directive must really be transposed into the 
national law and it is solely within the framework of this operation that the Member 
States are free to choose the form and methods used to implement it. 15 
Since 1970. in the course of the continuous process of developing its case-law. with 
respect to the immediate applicability of the provisions of the Treaties. I6 the Court of 
Justice has recognized the provisions of directives and decisions (EEC and EAEC) 
addressed to States as capable of having direct effect. I7 
One of the factors which, in the view of the Court, support this interpretation is the 
argument that the effectiveness of a directive would be weakened if the nationals of a 
Member State to which it was addressed could not rely on the directive before the 
national courts and if those courts could not treat it as an element of Community law. '8 
According to the case-law of the Court the pre-conditions for the direct applicability of 
directives are the same as those which the Court has already developed in its case-law 
relating to the direct applicability of the rules laid down in the Treaties. >'' 
Under the precedents established by the Court, it is necessary to examine, in each case, 
whether the legal nature, general scheme and wording of the provision in question is 
capable of having direct effects in the legal relationship between the Member States and 
individuals. This is the case when the provision is sufficiently clear and precise, its 
application is not subject to any material condition and its implementation and validity-
do not require the intervention of any other Community or national act on the part of the 
institutions of the Community or of the Member States.2,) 
C. EEC and EAEC decisions; individual ECSC decisions 
4. Under the fourth paragraph of Article 189 EEC and the fourth paragraph of Article 
161 EAEC a decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed. 
It can be addressed to the Member States or to a natural or legal person. 
Under arrangements which are otherwise the same, the second paragraph of Article 14 
ECSC, taken together with the second paragraph of Article 15 ECSC. refers to decisions 
14 Case 33/70 Sace [1970] ECR 1213: Case 48/75 Royer [1976] ECR 497. 
15 Case 102/79 Commission ν Belgium [1980] ECR 1473. 
16 Among others, Case 26/62 van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1 ; Case 6/64 Costa ν ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
17 Case 9/70 Grad [1970] ECR 825: Case 33/70. cited at footnote 14 above; Case 41/74 Van Duyn [1974] ECR 
1337; Case 51/76 Nederlandse Ondernemingen [1977] ECR 113: Case 21/78 Delkvist [1978] ECR 2327: Case 
148/78 Ratti [1979] ECR 1629. 
18 See Grabitz, Entscheidungen und Richtlinien als unmittelbar wirksames Gemeinschaftsrecht. EuR 1971. p. 8. 
19 Case 41/74, cited at footnote 17 above. 
20 Cases 26/62. 6/64. cited at footnote 14 above: Case 41/74, cited at footnote 17 above. 
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which are individual in character (in contrast to general decisions under the first para­
graph of Article 15 ECSC, which deals with a variety of situations) and not to individual 
addressees. However, this makes no difference to the legal effect. 
A decision addressed to a natural or legal person as a means of regulating particular 
situations provides the Community institutions with a suitable legislative instrument for 
the performance of their executive functions; in that respect, it can be compared with the 
administrative act known to German law. 
In the first place, it has individual application, which means that the addressee is indiv­
idually named and bound. If there are a number of addressees, there is no need for them 
to be individually named; if the group of addressees can be identified, that suffices. The 
Court of Justice has held that this happens when, on the day of publication, there is a 
distinguishable group of addressees which cannot be added to later.21 
Another basic feature of a decision is that it is binding in its entirety. This distinguishes it 
from a directive or a recommendation of the ECSC, which are binding only as to the 
aims to be pursued. This is subject to the reservation that difficulties always arise when, 
in a directive or an ECSC recommendation, the Community institutions are not content 
to indicate the aim to be pursued in general terms but prescribe it in detail. 
The Court has held that decisions addressed to the Member States are directly applicable 
under the same conditions as the provisions of the Treaties and directives.22 
D. EEC and EAEC recommendations and opinions 
5. A recommendation as provided for in the EEC and EAEC Treaties (fifth paragraph of 
Article 189 EEC and fifth paragraph of Article 161 EAEC) and an opinion, which is 
common to all the Treaties (fifth paragraph of Article 189 EEC, fifth paragraph of Article 
161 EAEC and fourth paragraph of Article 14 ECSC) differ from the other legal measures 
in that they are not binding and, in consequence, do no impose any legal obligation upon 
the addressees. The addressees of recommendations or opinions are almost always the 
Member States. Nevertheless, in certain cases specified in the Treaties, the addressee may 
be a person, a group of persons or an undertaking (Article 91(1) EEC, fifth paragraph of 
Article 54 ECSC). 
A recommendation is distinguished by the fact that, as a rule, it emanates from the 
Community institution which made it. Its object is to recommend a particular course of 
conduct to the addressees without legally binding them thereby. 
On the other hand, an opinion is given in consequence of an initiative from elsewhere. It 
contains either a general appraisal of certain processes or a contribution to the prep­
aration of further legal acts. 
As acts which are in no sense legally binding, recommendations and opinions are of 
largely political and psychological significance. They may, however, give rise to indirect 
legal effects if they create the conditions necessary for further measures or where the 
21 Joined Cases 106 and 107/63 Töpfer ν Commission [1965] ECR 405; Joined Cases 41 to 44/70 International 
Fruit Co. ν Commission [1971] ECR 411. 
Case 9/70, cited at footnote 17 above; Case 20/70 Lesage [1970] ECR 861 ; Case 23/70 Haselhorst [1970] ECR 
881. 
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Community institution which drew them up binds itself, the consequence of which may­
be to create a situation of legitimate expectation. 
E. Mixed-type acts 
6. Generally speaking, acts of the Community institutions have a uniform legal charac­
ter. Sometimes, however, not all the provisions of an act have the same legal character 
and the act in question contains provisions which differ in kind. There have been, in 
practice, legal acts which were given the title of regulations and were adopted as such but 
which contained provisions directed to certain specified persons and thereby acquired the 
nature of a decision.23 
Another point to be noted in connection with such acts is the principle that the title 
chosen by the Community institutions is in no way indicative of the real legal character 
of the act.24 It is, accordingly, quite possible to describe the various provisions by 
ascribing to them their real character by reference to their content. However, it is not 
difficult to imagine a series of rules making no sense unless viewed as a whole and thus 
requiring to be uniformly described. In such cases, even if the rules in question are 
accepted as having a uniform character in law, it is important to ensure that the need for 
individuals to have legal protection is satisfied. This aim can be achieved only if the 
individuals concerned have the right to contest the provisions of a regulation which arc 
in the nature of a decision, even if those persons have no right of action against the act 
because it is a general one.25 
11 2. Freedom of choice between several legal acts 
7. As a rule, the Treaties establishing the European Communities leave the Community 
institutions with no choice as regards the legal form which their acts must take; on the 
contrary, for each enabling rule, they prescribe the form in which the required provisions 
must appear (Articles 13(2) EEC, second sentence, 33(2) and 100 EEC; Articles 33 and 49 
EAEC; Articles 60(1) ECSC, second subparagraph and 63(1) ECSC). It is only occasion­
ally that the Treaties leave the Community institutions with discretion to choose the type 
of instrument. This sometimes occurs when a provision of the Treaty specifies the 
choices available, for example, regulations and directives (Articles 49 and 87(1) EEC), 
directives and decisions (Article 97 EEC) and regulations, directives and decisions (Ar­
ticle 43(2) EEC). On the other hand, in certain cases, the Treaties prescribe no particular 
instrument and employ general words such as 'provisions' or 'rules' (Article 7 EEC, 
second paragraph). 
In so far as the Community institutions have discretion to choose the form of instrument, 
their discretion is not unlimited but is subject to certain conditions. This is necessary 
because, in choosing a particular type of instrument for their purpose, the Community 
23 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1778/77 of 26 July 1977 (OJ L 196, 3.8.1977), at Article 3; on this subject. Case 
113/77 NTN Toyo Bearing Co. ν Council [1979] ECR 1185. especially at p. 1205. 
24 See footnote 2 above. 
25 Joined Cases 16 and 17/62, cited at footnote I above; Case 30/67 Industria Molitoria Imolesc ν Council [1968] 
ECR 143; Case 113/77, cited at footnote 23 above. 
institutions, in so doing, also determine the legal effect, the procedural requirements and 
the availability of protection by the law which appertain to the legal character of the 
chosen instrument. 
One restriction on freedom of choice arises from the enabling provision, which lays down 
that the choice must fall on the most appropriate instrument to achieve the objectives 
pursued by the measure in question. 
Moreover, in accordance with the principle of proportionality, which occupies an import-
ant place in Community law, there is, in making a choice from among the various 
methods available for the achievement of the objectives pursued, an obligation to choose 
the method which is the least burdensome for those concerned. 
In practice, the applications of this basic principle may mean that a Community institu-
tion is obliged to promulgate a directive and not a regulation or a decision. If an arbitrary 
choice is made it would, in such circumstances, constitute an infringement of the Treaty 
on the ground of lack of competence. 
Section II — Legislative technique 
11 1. Form of legal acts 
A. Formal structure 
8. The formal structure of a legal act of the Community institutions consists of a title, a 
preamble, the provisions properly so called of the act and a form of words concluding 
it. 
The title of a measure adopted in one of the forms provided for in the Treaties gives an 
indication of its nature. The title also states the name of the adopting authority and the 
number of the act, followed by a reference to its content. 
The preamble, which precedes the provisions properly so called, begins by repeating the 
name of the adopting authority. Then comes a reference to all the provisions of the 
Treaty which constitute the legal foundation of the power to adopt the act in question. In 
addition, the preamble refers to the proposal and to the opinions of the European Par-
liament or of the Economic and Social Committee and sets out the grounds on which the 
act was adopted. 
The final provision of the act differs according to its nature. In the case of a regulation or 
of an ECSC (general) decision, there is a reminder that the act is binding in its entirety 
and directly applicable in all Member States. In the case of a directive or of an ECSC 
(individual) recommendation, the final provision states to whom the act is addressed. 
The final provision concludes by stating the place where and the date on which the act, 
which is signed by the president-in-office of the institution concerned, was adopted. 
B. Rules on participation and cooperation 
9. In addition to the rules relating to the form of legal acts, there are rules on partici-
pation and cooperation. 
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The aim and purpose of the rules on participation are to ensure that the measure con­
templated is prepared with care and circumspection.26 The most important example of 
cooperation is that represented by the Commission's right of proposal, as provided for in 
numerous provisions of the EEC Treaty (e.g. Articles 7, second paragraph; 21. second 
paragraph; 43, second paragraph; 44, fifth paragraph; 49, 51, 75, 87 and 235 of the EEC 
Treaty). Under these provisions, the Council cannot adopt the measure which it is 
empowered to enact unless the Commission has submitted a proposal to it for the adop­
tion of a legislative act. Furthermore, the three Treaties contain a large number of pro­
visions for participation, generally in the form of an opinion, which, in the procedure for 
adoption of legislative measures, involves consultation with the European Parliament, 
the Economic and Social Committee or, in the ECSC, the Consultative Committee. In 
other circumstances, the Council (Article 60(1) ECSC) and the Member States (Articles 
88 ECSC and 169 EEC) are also consulted. In Cases 138/79 and 139/79,27 the Court of 
Justice was called upon for the first time to give a ruling on the consultation of the 
European Parliament as part of the legislative process after the Parliament, pursuant to 
Article 37 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice, intervened in support of 
two actions for annulment. In its judgments, the Court emphasizes that consultation 
enables the Parliament to play an effective part in the legislative process of the Commu­
nity and constitutes an essential element of the institutional balance which the EEC 
Treaty intended to provide. For these reasons, the Court considered that the proper 
consultation of the Parliament, in the cases prescribed in the Treaty, constituted an 
essential procedural requirement, non­observance of which renders the act in question 
null and void. The Court ruled that the fulfilment of this requirement means that the 
Parliament must express an opinion; it is not fulfilled merely by a request from the 
Council for one. 
C. Statement of reasons for legal acts 
1. Obligation to state reasons 
10. Among the procedural rules which the Community institutions must comply with in 
adopting legal acts are the provisions of the Treaties relating to the obligation to give the 
reasons for such acts. As far as the EEC and the EAEC are concerned, the Council and 
the Commission are, in Article 190 EEC and Article 162 EAEC, bound to give the 
reasons for the regulations, directives and recommendations which they make. Article 15 
ECSC, first paragraph, widens this obligation in so far as non­obligatory opinions, as well 
as decisions and recommendations made within the competence of the ECSC, must also 
be justified by a statement of reasons. 
The obligation to give reasons was embodied in the Treaties primarily to enable the 
Court of Justice to exercise full supervision of the validity of legal acts.28 Moreover, it is 
in the interests of the addressees of the acts in that a clear and comprehensive statement 
26 Case 6/54 Netherlands ν High Authority [1955] ECR 103; Case 20/59 Italy ν High Authority [1960] ECR 325; 
Case 25/59 Netherlands ν High Authority [1960] ECR 355. 
27 Case 138/79 Roquette Frères ν Council [1980] ECR 3333; Case 139/79 Maizena ν Council [1980] ECR 
3393. 
28 Well­established doctrine since Case 18/57 Nold [1959] ECR 41. 
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of reasons enables them to verify that the measures involved have been correctly applied 
and whether the facts described are correct.29 This makes it possible for those to whom 
the act is addressed to assess the scope of the act and to assert their rights in conse­
quence; this applies in particular to measures which have involved an appraisal of the 
situation by a Community institution. For the institution responsible for the act, the 
obligation to give reasons for it involves a kind of self­criticism since, in drawing up its 
reasons, it must pay close attention to the conditions precedent laid down for its action in 
the Treaties.30 This self­criticism is even more important in cases where the provisions 
of the Treaty imply legal concepts which are unclear or which give the institutions a 
margin of discretion since, in that event, the link which binds the institution to the 
Treaty loses much of its force. 
The obligation to give reasons is also a sound one in so far as the reasons stated can help 
in the interpretation of the act while at the same time providing the European Parliament 
and third parties not immediately concerned with information regarding economic policy 
and the legal standpoints of the Council or of the Commission.31 
2. Extent of the obligation to state reasons 
//. There is nothing in the Treaty provisions cited above to indicate the extent of the 
obligation to state reasons. 
As soon as the Court of Justice began its work, it therefore had occasion to deal with this 
question.32 On that occasion, it laid down certain general requirements which, in prin­
ciple, still hold good today, regarding the extent of the obligation to state reasons. These 
requirements can be defined by saying that the statement of reasons must contain the 
legal and factual considerations on which the measure is based. 
In the judgments of its earlier years, the Court placed a very narrow interpretation upon 
these requirements, with the result that, during that period and more frequently than in 
subsequent years, it annulled acts for want of a sufficient statement of reasons.33 Under­
standably, it has declared that there is no need to repeat reasons where the facts taken as 
a whole enable the reasons for the act to be identified;34 it has also ruled that it is in 
order for the Community institutions to confine themselves to essentials and explain the 
reasons succinctly.35 
It was not until judgment was delivered in Case 5/67 that the Court abandoned this strict 
attitude and laid down the general requirements in the light of the legal nature of the 
measure involved.36 This change of course was based on the distinction between a 
measure of individual application and one of general application. In any event, there is a 
29 Case 18/57. cited at footnote 28 above. 
30 Scheffler, Die Pflicht zur Begründung von Maßnahmen nach dem europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht, 1974, 
p.49. 
31 Bleckmann, EuR, 1978, p. 68. 
32 Case 6/54 Netherlands ν High Authority [1954 to 1956] ECR 103. 
33 Case 10/56 Meroni ν High Authority [1957 and 1958] ECR 157; Case 18/57, cited at footnote 28 above; Case 
1/63 Macciorlati Dalmas v High Authority [1963] ECR 303. 
34 Case 16/65 Schwarze [1965] ECR 877. 
35 Case 34/62 Germany v Commission [1963] ECR 131; Case 24/62 Germany v Commission [1963] ECR 63. 
36 Case 5/67 Beus [1968] ECR 83. 
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continued obligation to ensure that, in stating the reasons for an individual act. the 
minimum requirements must be fulfilled. 
In the case of a regulation or of an ECSC general decision, it must be borne in mind that 
these instruments govern a general situation without being too specific. Consequently, it 
is not possible to require the inclusion of the numerous and complex facts which led to 
the adoption of the measure. Instead, the statement may be confined to indicating the 
general situation which led to its adoption, on the one hand, and the general objectives 
which it is intended to achieve, on the other.37 
Moreover, the statement of reasons for a legislative act must be considered and assessed 
in the context of the complex of instruments of which it is an integral part; in other 
words, a statement of reasons which is insufficient in itself may be amplified and made 
clear by previously published measures.38 
3. Validation of an act otherwise invalid on account of a procedural irregularity 
12. Where, in a particular case, it is established that the statement of reasons is insuf­
ficient, the deficiency cannot be made good ex post facto unless the reasons had already 
been given in embryonic form and the information provided after the event merely 
supplies further details.39 
D. Indication of remedies 
13. Community law does not make it a procedural requirement that the legal acts of the 
Community institutions should contain an indication of the means of redress avail­
able. 
E. Principle of publication 
14. Under Article 191 EEC, first paragraph, first sentence, 163 EAEC, first paragraph, 
first sentence, and 15 ECSC, third paragraph, only regulations. ECSC general decisions 
and ECSC general recommendations require to be published in accordance with the legal 
principle of publication practised in all the Member States. Publication is effected in the 
Official Journal of the European Communities, which was established pursuant to deci­
sions of the Council of the EEC40 and of the EAEC dated 15 September 1958 41 and is 
also available to the ECSC as an organ of publication, replacing the Official Journal of the 
ECSC, which was published from 30 December 1952 until 13 May 1958. It is published 
37 Confirmed repeatedly in decisions since the judgment in Beus. cited at footnote 36 above; Case 80/72 Konink­
lijke Lassiefabrieken [1973] ECR 635; Case 87/78 Weldings [1978] ECR 2457: Case 134/78 Danhuber [1979] 
ECR 1007; Case 166/78 Italy ν Council [1979] ECR 2575. 
38 Case 78/74 Deuka [1975] ECR 421; Case 29/77 Roquette Frères [1977] ECR 1835. 
39 Case 28/68 Torrekens [1969] ECR 125; Case 18/57, cited at footnote 28 above. 
40 OJ 17, 6.10.1958. 
41 OJ 17, 6.10.1958. 
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